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Editors’ Introduction
This issue of Genocide Studies and Prevention continues a conversation that began in 2013 with 
the publication of 8.3, Humanitarian Technologies and Genocide Prevention. The current issue, titled 
Information and Communications Technologies in Mass Atrocities Research and Response, is guest edited 
by Colette Mazzucelli and Anna Visvizi. In their introductory state of the field article, they focus 
on the enduring ethical questions that surround information communications technologies for 
mass atrocity research and response. The articles in this issue contribute to the study and practice 
of mobile technology to document forensic evidence of sexual violence, the use of satellite and 
mobile phones, DNA technology and field dynamics in conflict related mass fatalities, human 
rights media, and a theory of harm for information communication technologies.
The editors wish to thank the following institutions for supporting the special issue: The 
Robert Bosch Foundation in Stuttgart, New York University, New York University-Washington 
DC, The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, The Global Diplomacy Lab, and Brandeis 
University’s Summer Institute for Israel Studies. We offer a special thanks to Susan Braden, for all 
of her tireless efforts as GSP’s Managing Editor. 
Randle DeFalco
Christian Gudehus
Douglas Irvin-Erickson
Yasemin Irvin-Erickson
Roland Moerland
Melanie O’Brien
Y-Dang Troeung
Colette Mazzucelli and Anna Visvizi, “Querying the Ethics of Data Collection as a Community of Research and Practice: The 
Movement Toward the “Liberalism of Fear” to Protect the Vulnerable” Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, 1 (2017): 2-8. ©2017 
Genocide Studies and Prevention.  
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Querying the Ethics of Data Collection as a Community of Research and Practice: 
The Movement Toward the “Liberalism of Fear” to Protect the Vulnerable
Colette Mazzucelli
New York University
New York City, New York, USA
Anna Visvizi
American College of Greece
Athens, Greece
Introduction
The literature that references the role of Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) 
in mass atrocities research and response is growing, as indicated by a previous Special Issue of 
Genocide Studies and Prevention.1 Other publications, in which ICTs feature prominently, influence 
the development of debates and engagement in human rights, humanitarian assistance, and human 
security. Increasingly, however, along with the burgeoning interest in ICTs and their promise in 
these fields, questions are being asked, and concerns expressed, as to fundamental problems of 
various kinds. The most pressing of these considerations speak to accountability, the ethics of use 
in local areas, and the impact on the vulnerable populations that ICTs promise to serve. These 
concerns are ever present as subjects of public debate during the writing of articles in the Special 
Issue. This is why dialogue connecting research and practice is necessary to identify ways to 
address these challenges at both the conceptual and political levels. The perspectives of researchers 
and the experience of practitioners must come together to bring the discussion forward. 
In response to this plea, a community of experts remains in dialogue after initial meetings to 
define the contents of the Special Issue.  The responsibility of this community is to grapple with 
specific issues that define the state of the field in data collection, including prominent uses of 
satellite imagery analysis, forensic investigation techniques, and mobile telephony applications, to 
document human rights abuses in remote areas, as evidenced in the work of Amnesty International 
and Physicians for Human Rights. Ethical considerations orient these discussions. The dilemma 
of how to use technology effectively, while not harming the vulnerable, constitutes one of the 
most salient issues.  Can technology, a two-edged sword in its applications, promote the objective 
of never again in mass atrocities response? This Introduction highlights the ways in which this 
question and others identified lead to reflections concerning an emerging pedagogy of mass 
atrocities research and response.  In the learning and teaching this pedagogy inspires, it may be 
possible to nurture a movement that is transformative, rather than incremental, in its challenge to 
the status quo characterized by what Raymond and Sandvik cite as “technological utopianism.”2
The necessity to increase the interactions among researchers and practitioners led the 
contributors to this Special Issue to meet first at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 
(USHMM) on November 7, 2015 followed by a subsequent gathering at NYU DC on June 11, 2016. 
The immediate goal was to raise questions that challenge the uses of ICTs in the collection and 
analysis of data from the field in highly sensitive areas where mass atrocities are likely or have 
already transpired. 
Five objectives focused the discussions in these meetings: (1) an awareness of the audiences the 
Special Issue aims to serve; (2) a consideration of the state of the literature to convey the breadth of 
what has already been investigated; (3) a curiosity to convey the ways in which evidence collection 
crosscuts with the latest applications of technologies; (4) a necessity to explore the tensions between 
the Western bias in the uses of technologies and the need to anchor the localization outreach; and, 
most fundamentally, (5) the largely missing aspect in the conversation, which is an impetus to 
1 Yasemin Irvin-Erickson and Douglas Irvin-Erickson, eds., Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 8, no. 3 
(2013), Special Issue: Humanitarian Technologies and Genocide Prevention.
2 See Nathaniel Raymond and Kristin Bergtora Sandvik, “Beyond the Protective Effect: Towards a Theory of Harm 
for Information Communication Technologies in Mass Atrocity Response,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An 
International Journal 11, no. 1 (2017), 9-24
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pedagogy. This last objective speaks to a primary concern of the contributors: to explain the state 
of the field and to indicate for the future generations of students the likely direction of evidence 
collection to document mass atrocities.3
There is a basic question the articles prompt readers to ask, which is essential to address in the 
literature: “If area experts and international researchers are only collecting data and no subsequent 
action is taken on the basis of the evidence discovered, is justice being served in the field of mass 
atrocities or genocide studies?4 In order to respond, the contributors highlight tensions between the 
Western bias, which Raymond and Sandvik analyze, namely, that of “ICTs having an inherently 
“ambient protective effect” (APE) - i.e. casually transforming the threat matrix of a particular 
atrocity producing environment in a way that improves the human security status of targeted 
populations,”5and the genuine harm that can be inflicted on already vulnerable populations as a 
result of technological interventions in remote and fragile locales. 
In this context, researchers and practitioners alike must always return to the impact of 
their engagement with technologies in the local area, which has a robust specificity in each case 
mentioned by the authors – Democratic Republic of Congo, Guatemala, Bosnia, Libya, North 
Korea, Syria, and Nigeria. This emphasis is in line with the area studies literature that rejects “the 
disappearing local” in the twenty-first century globalization context.6      
Localization outreach is a theme that figures prominently in the Special Issue led by the 
Raymond and Sandvik survey of the literature and a sequence of articles that includes the ground-
breaking MediCapt case discussed in the review essay by Naimer, Brown, and Mishori; and the 
insightful study by Koettl, which is situated between the juxtaposing analyses of Schmitt and 
Mazoori, on the one hand, and Aronson, on the other. These articles speak in different ways to the 
idea expressed by Eleanor Roosevelt in the opening quote cited in The Signal Code:7  
Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places, close to home - so close 
and so small that they cannot be seen on any maps of the world. Such are the places where 
every man, woman, and child seeks equal justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity without 
discrimination. Unless these rights have meaning there, they have little meaning anywhere. 
Without concerted citizen action to uphold them close to home, we shall look in vain for 
progress in the larger world.8
The preceding quote, attributed to a champion of human rights described as “First Lady of the 
World” in her quest to give voice to the powerless, guides the contributors in three ways to define 
the content of their articles – (1) to revolutionize, (2) to professionalize, and (3) to disrupt the field 
of data collection through the careful delineation of the manner in which an emerging community 
of research and practice works to intervene or not intervene with technologies at different stages of 
mass atrocities.  In this quest, the audience to which the Special Issue speaks is an interdisciplinary 
one, cutting across academic disciplines and non-governmental organization (NGO) activism, 
which can grasp the inherent dangers of a “technology optimism,” as identified by Raymond and 
Sandvik, that “impacts the distribution of resources, field practices and the rules and norms that 
regulate the use of these interventions.”9    
3 Colette Mazzucelli appreciates discussing these objectives with Ziad Al Achkar with particular reference to an exchange 
of views including Brynnan Parish during the meeting of contributors at NYU DC on June 11, 2016. 
4 Joyce Apsel and Ernesto Verdeja, eds., Genocide Matters (London and New York: Routledge, 2013); David A. Hamburg, 
Preventing Genocide (Boulder and London: Paradigm Publishers, 2010); Clea Koff, The Bone Woman (New York: 
Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2005).
5 Raymond and Sandvik, Beyond the Protective Effect, 9-24
6 Ali Mirsepassi, Amrita Basu, and Frederick Weaver, eds., Localizing Knowledge in a Globalizing World (New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 2003).
7 Faine Greenwood, Caitlin Howarth, Danielle Escudero Poole, Nathaniel Raymond, and Daniel Scarnecchia, The Signal 
Code (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2017).
8 Eleanor Roosevelt, speech to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, United Nations, New York, March 27, 
1958.
9 Raymond and Sandvik, Beyond the Protective Effect, 9-24.
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Implicit in these different articles is the understanding that the use of ICTs influences power 
relations. A classical view of international affairs underlines what Hoffmann terms “dissensus,”10 in 
other words, “the absence or paucity of common values, substantive or procedural” which liberals 
aim to interject to limit unrestrained abuses of the weak by the agents of coercive states, particularly 
the “military, paramilitary, and police agents.”11  The omnipresent “theory of change,” critiqued by 
Raymond and Sandvik in so far that “ICTs can serve as a platform on which hegemony can be promoted…
shifting the balance towards powerful institutions if the latter are able strategically to use ICTs as 
legitimating tools,”12 focuses attention squarely on the fact that, in the liberal tradition, “the individual, 
…the potential victim of cruelty, is to be protected against the incursions of public oppression.”13
Naimer, Brown, and Mishori weigh the obstacles and opportunities Physicians for Human 
Rights professionals encounter in the deployment of MediCapt, “a mobile phone app meant 
to assist health professionals conducting medical exams in sexual violence cases,”14 during an 
initial rollout phase in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In thinking about the ways to 
revolutionize, professionalize, and disrupt the field of data collection, this study is a seminal one 
in terms of the questions the MediCapt pilot launch engenders. In the epistemic community of 
research and practice that is emerging around the elaboration of The Signal Code, with a view to the 
“right to protection,” the “right to data privacy and security,” and the “right to data agency,”15 the 
analysis and assessment of MediCapt can heighten public awareness of the necessity “to lay out a 
theory of harm.”16 Raymond and Sandvik are cognizant of the “potentially transformative” impact 
in deploying MediCapt to “help hold perpetrators of human rights violations accountable for their 
crimes” starting in eastern Congo.17  The scope of the problem Raymond and Sandvik identify 
explains the urgency of their task, which is to elucidate “ICT as a site of ethical precariousness and 
as capable of causing actual harm to the response, to responders, and most importantly, to civilians 
who are the targets of mass atrocities.”18  
A theory of harm urges an emerging community of research and practice initially to 
acknowledge “the liberalism of fear” that Shklar defined as “a shifting line, but not an erasable 
one,” along which “The limits of coercion begin, though they do not end, with a prohibition upon 
invading the private realm…,”19 which, in turn, upholds the golden rule: do no harm.  Koettl 
underscores the perpetrators’ expectation of impunity, which reinforces the belief that “their crimes 
will go unnoticed or can be easily dismissed or minimized in an environment of high information 
uncertainty.”20 The likelihood of impunity demands that the costs for the perpetrator be raised as the 
opportunity to exploit the vulnerable is lessened. The demand, in turn, heightens the need, without 
shifting the line too far “in response to the technological and military character of governments 
and the productive relationships that prevail,”21 to address what Koettl identifies as the “lemon 
problem,” namely, “the risk of using misinformation that can discredit an entire research project, 
…exacerbated…where… [its] spread is made easier by digital social media networks.” [bold and 
italics added by the authors]
10 Stanley Hoffmann, Janus and Minerva Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics (Boulder and London: 
Westview Press, 1987).
11 Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, 29.
12 Raymond and Sandvik, Beyond the Protective Effect, 9-24.
13 Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, 23.
14 See Karen Naimer, Widney Brown and Ranit Mishori, “MediCapt in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: The Design, 
Development, and Deployment of Mobile Technology to Document Forensic Evidence of Sexual Violence,” Genocide 
Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 11, no. 1 (2017), 25-35.
15 The Signal Code, https://signalcode.org/.
16 Raymond and Sandvik, Beyond the Protective Effect, 9-24.
17 Naimer et al, MediCapt in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 25-35.
18 Raymond and Sandvik, Beyond the Protective Effect, 9-24.
19 Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, 24.
20 See Christoph Koettl, “Sensors Everywhere: Using Satellites and Mobile Phones to Reduce Information Uncertainty in 
Human Rights Crisis Research,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 11, no. 1 (2017), 36-54.
21 Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, 24.
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For this reason, the Naimer, Brown, and Mishori analysis illustrates the MediCapt design, 
which addresses the lemon problem by combining “a custom-designed medical intake form for 
forensic documentation with secure mobile camera functionality for forensic photography.”22  It 
is important to recognize that MediCapt, as Koettl explains, has “the potential to be impactful on 
specific issues and when working with dedicated networks.”23 In this context, MediCapt “helps to 
standardize and preserve critical forensic evidence of sexual violence.”24 The care with which the 
design of MediCapt evolves is a testimony to the extent to which clinical end-users are involved as 
well as the respect for local cultural norms in the co-design process, which is more important than 
the technological complications that ensued or the lack of material supplies (ink or copiers) that 
resulted when a specific printing feature was selected. Of particular relevance is the slow nature 
of these developments, particularly the years of study required “to determine the full impact of 
MediCapt on medical, legal, and human rights outcomes.”25 
The MediCapt study illustrates the challenges involved to develop an app that can be 
transformative over time.  Only a longer term assessment can reveal the extent to which survivors 
of sexual violence and other human rights violations can hold perpetrators accountable. If 
transformative means “finding a way between the insufficient and the impossible,”26 it is necessary 
to question if, as Koettl argues, MediCapt is “less likely to be adapted by large numbers of people 
or utilized by bystanders?”27 Is this the fate of documentation apps that capture relevant metadata 
and chain of custody records, which, as Schmitt and Mazoori argue, is essential if the vulnerable 
in local areas are to appeal through court systems in their own communities equipped with 
compelling as well as comprehensive forensic evidence to support their allegations?28 
The contributors to the Special Issue speak to a number of concerns around the applications 
of technologies increasingly used in human rights initiatives “to collect, analyze, and preserve 
evidence that could be admissible in court”29 with the full awareness of the risks associated 
with their use, particularly for vulnerable populations, as well as the need for those engaged in 
human rights work to identify best practices to address these risks together with colleagues in the 
technology community.
Although, as Naimer, Brown, and Mishori explain, “MediCapt meets best practices for chain-
of-custody considerations in evidence collection,”30 the app’s further development raises a host of 
concerns, particularly the “very real risk that hackers may seek weaknesses in the architecture of the 
app,” which, in turn, requires constant focus on “safeguarding the security of the app itself.” The 
risks to the user and to the many others involved in nothing less than a transformative approach 
to evidence collection requires a transparent dialogue around what constitutes a fair warning to 
potential users.
The articles in the Special Issue reference one another in considerations of 1) the mandate to 
deploy technology in any particular area as well as 2) the impact of the deployments over time. In 
this respect, Koettl’s analysis situates itself between that of Aronson, on the one hand, and Schmitt 
and Mazoori, on the other. Koettl’s discussion assesses the impact of satellite imagery and mobile 
phone technology as potential game changers to address the lack of information available to 
human rights activists documenting abuses in remote areas such as North Korea. Aronson speaks 
to the preservation of video materials, which may be curated as human rights public educational 
resources in a museum or university setting. Schmitt and Mazoori are squarely focused instead on 
the ways in which the collection of DNA samples may become legal evidence to be adjudicated, 
22 Naimer et al, MediCapt in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 25-35.
23 Koettl, Sensors Everywhere, 36-54.
24 Naimer et al, MediCapt in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 25-35.
25 Ibid.
26 Hoffmann, Janus and Minerva, 410.
27 Koettl, Sensors Everywhere, 36-54.
28 See Stefan Schmitt and Dallas Mazoori, “Jurisdiction, Privacy and Ownership: DNA Technology and Field Dynamics in 
Conflict Related Mass Fatalities,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 11, no. 1 (2017), 55-81.
29 Naimer et al, MediCapt in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 25-35.
30 Ibid.
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as a matter of necessity in each specific case, by the State, which is, in their view, “integral to a 
legitimate human identification process.” As they explain: “Attempting to minimize initial delays 
in human identifications at the expense of building local knowledge, skills and necessary legal 
frameworks risks undermining the legitimacy of the human identification effort.”   Their argument 
prompts further considerations of capacity. At one end of the spectrum, there is Palantir and what 
Morozov terms “solutionism” or the implicit belief that technology is able to solve humanity’s 
problems.31 At the other, there is the full development of local capacity such as iHub in Kenya, 
iLab in Liberia or the Guatemalan Forensic Anthropology Foundation (FAFG).32 The articles in the 
Special Issue make the case for developing capacity appropriate to a particular context, as Naimer, 
Brown, and Mishori make clear in the MediCapt study with reference to the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo.
The authors’ collective dedication to pedagogy33 lends a singular importance to the questions 
their articles raise around data collection. There is a corresponding responsibility to consider the 
core tension that exists in the analysis of what Aronson explains is the “duty to preserve”34 and its 
specific implications for the “right to agency”35 defined in The Signal Code.  The relevant questions in 
the analysis by Aronson include “whose needs are being met by the preservation of human-rights-
related video and who ought to control the storage and use of this content?”36  The commitment 
to preserve evidence of violations for justice and accountability, nationally and internationally, 
is voiced by the international human rights community. A view that speaks more to the right 
to agency upholds the “ethical duty to protect individuals and respect their wishes even when 
higher-level justice and accountability efforts may suffer.”37 This view is often articulated by those 
closer to the actual production of evidence. The different understandings expressed by human 
rights practitioners as to which view should be prioritized raise further questions for present and 
future generations to ponder. 
These questions, leading to a focus as well in the classroom on matters of consent, security, 
privacy, and ethics, bring to mind the ways voices may speak “to restrain…abusers of power” 
with a belief that “Liberalism must restrict itself,” as Shklar writes, “to lift the burden of fear … 
from the shoulders of adult women and men.”38 The ownership of information, of the evidence, 
that is collected is paramount in so far as the scope of some technology goes “far beyond personal 
information or evidence from a person’s body or memory.”39 The “privatization of evidence 
collection, with attendant threats to chain of custody as well as accusations of bias,” may result 
if these issues are not clarified.40 In light of these concerns, the genesis of a movement toward the 
liberalism of fear to protect the vulnerable is more likely to be anchored by the rights articulated in 
The Signal Code for a community of research and practice than principles debated in the chambers 
of the United Nations like Responsibility to Protect. 
The queries that challenge, the questions that inform, such a movement are born of learning in 
a classroom animated by the breadth of the imagination rather than the borders of a building. This 
may be perceived as the learning at the core of an “emancipatory education”41 for the generations 
31 Ian Tucker, “Evgeny Morozov: ‘We are abandoning all the checks and balances’,” The Guardian, March 9, 2013, accessed 
March 22, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/mar/09/evgeny-morozov-technology-solutionism-
interview.
32 Colette Mazzucelli and Dylan P. Heyden, “Unearthing Truth: Forensic Anthropology, Translocal Memory, and 
‘Provention’ in Guatemala,” Politics and Governance 3, no. 3 (2015), 44-45.
33 Colette Mazzucelli, “Humanitarian Technologies and Genocide Prevention: A Critical Inquiry,” Genocide Studies and 
Prevention: An International Journal 8, no. 3 (2014), 89-94. 
34 See Jay Aronson, “Preserving Human Rights Media,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 11, no. 1 
(2017), 82-99.
35 The Signal Code, https://signalcode.org/.
36 Aronson, Preserving Human Rights, 82-99.
37 Ibid.
38 Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, 31.
39 Naimer et al, MediCapt in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 25-35.
40 Ibid.
41 Maxine Greene, Landscapes of Learning (New York: Teachers College Press, 1978).
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to come:  those students born as digital natives for whom the applications of such technology 
are a matter of habit rather than deliberation. The social foundation of a movement toward the 
liberalism of fear is not only a matter of the content taught. The necessity to problematize ways of 
teaching is at the center of the endeavor, which Greene identifies: 
The teaching problem seems to me to be threefold. It involves equipping young people with the 
ability to identify alternatives, and to see possibilities in the situations they confront. It involves 
the teaching of…possible perspectives by means of which those situations can be assessed and 
appraised…norms that must be appropriated by persons desiring to join particular human 
communities. It also involves enabling students to make decisions…to reflect, to articulate, and to 
take decisive actions in good faith. Fundamental to the whole process may be the building up of 
a sense of moral directedness… an awareness, and a sense of possibility are required, along with 
the sense of autonomy and agency, of being present to the self.  There must be attentiveness to 
others and to the circumstances of everyday life. There must be efforts made to discover ways of 
living together justly and pursuing common ends. As wide-awake teachers work…eliciting moral 
judgements, they must orient themselves to the concrete, the relevant, and the questionable. 
They must commit themselves to each person’s potentiality for overcoming helplessness and 
submergence, for looking through his or her own eyes at the shared reality…this can only be 
done if teachers can identify themselves as moral beings, concerned with defining their own life 
purposes in a way that arouses others to do the same….the young are most likely to be stirred to 
learn when they are challenged by teachers who themselves are learning, who are breaking with 
what they have too easily taken for granted, who are creating their own moral lives.42  
The aim in the Special Issue, to revolutionize, professionalize, and disrupt the field of data 
collection, emphasizes localization rather than prevention. As articulated in The Signal Code, the 
need to elaborate “a human rights approach to information during crisis”43 asks an emerging 
community of research and practice to challenge an illiberal principle of exclusion, which divides 
humankind into peoples served by technology and those made increasingly vulnerable by its 
deployment around the world. In the face of the harm that inappropriate uses of technology 
may engender, the contributors query the ethics of data collection. In so doing, it is essential to 
acknowledge, as Shklar explains in refuting objections to the liberalism of fear, that “We would 
do far less harm if we learned to accept each other as sentient beings, whatever else we may be, 
and to understand that physical well-being and toleration are not simply inferior to the other aims 
that each one of us may choose to pursue.”44  The contributions to the Special Issue urge readers, 
present and future, to join the authors raising questions to inform pedagogy. These are questions 
anchored in field experiences, which respect the rights defined in The Signal Code to protect the 
vulnerable and to empower the local community.
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44 Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, 32.
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improved the article content. Dr. Anne Marie Goetz made time to comment on the MediCapt 
analysis. Brynnan Parish assisted most ably taking meeting notes and editing articles. Shirley Cloyes 
DioGuardi shared her knowledge and time generously and graciously in numerous conversations 
about the content of the Special Issue. Charles Patrick Martin-Shields provided helpful insights 
as the Special Issue was nearing publication. The Editors look forward to cooperate with the 
community of research and practice to disseminate the Special Issue among members of the Global 
Diplomacy Lab (GDL) and Brandeis University’s Summer Institute for Israel Studies (SIIS).
Bibliography 
Apsel, Joyce and Ernesto Verdeja, eds. Genocide Matters. London and New York: Routledge, 2013.
Aronson, Jay D. “Preserving Human Rights Media.” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International 
Journal 11, no. 1 (2017): 82-99. http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.1.1441
Greene, Maxine. Landscapes of Learning. New York: Teachers College Press, 1978.
Greenwood, Faine, Caitlin Howarth, Danielle Escudero Poole, Nathaniel Raymond, and Daniel 
Scarnecchia. The Signal Code. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2017.
Hamburg, David A. Preventing Genocide. Boulder and London: Paradigm Publishers, 2010.
Hoffmann, Stanley. Janus and Minerva Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics. 
Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987.
Irvin-Erickson, Yasemin and Douglas Irvin-Erickson, eds. Genocide Studies and Prevention: An 
International Journal 8, no. 3, Special Issue: Humanitarian Technologies and Genocide Prevention, 
2013. http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.8.3
Koettl, Christoph. “Sensors Everywhere: Using Satellites and Mobile Phones to Reduce Information 
Uncertainty in Human Rights Crisis Research.” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An 
International Journal 11, no. 1 (2017): 36-54. http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.1.1440
Koff, Clea. The Bone Woman. New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2005.
Mazzucelli, Colette and Anna Visvizi. “Querying the Ethics of Data Collection as a Community 
of Research and Practice The Movement Toward the ‘Liberalism of Fear’ to Protect the 
Vulnerable.” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 11, no. 1 (2017): 2-8. 
http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.1.1493
Mazzucelli, Colette and Dylan P. Heyden. “Unearthing Truth: Forensic Anthropology, Translocal 
Memory, and ‘Provention’ in Guatemala.” Politics and Governance 3, no. 3 (2015): 42-53. 
https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v3i3.451
Mazzucelli, Colette. “Humanitarian Technologies and Genocide Prevention: A Critical 
Inquiry.” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 8, no. 3 (2014): 87-99. 
https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.8.3.8
Mirsepassi, Ali, Amrita Basu, and Frederick Weaver, eds. Localizing Knowledge in a Globalizing 
World. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2003.
Naimer, Karen, Widney Brown, and Ranit Mishori. “MediCapt in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo: The Design, Development, and Deployment of Mobile Technology to Document 
Forensic Evidence of Sexual Violence.” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International 
Journal 11, no. 1 (2017): 25-35. http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.1.1455
Raymond, Nathaniel and Kristin Bergtora Sandvik. “Beyond the Protective Effect: Towards a 
Theory of Harm for Information Communication Technologies in Mass Atrocity Response.” 
Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 11, no. 1 (2017): 9-24. http://doi.
org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.1.1454
Schmitt, Stefan and Dallas Mazoori. “Jurisdiction, Privacy and Ownership: DNA Technology and 
Field Dynamics in Conflict Related Mass Fatalities.” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An 
International Journal 11, no. 1 (2017): 55-81. http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.1.1452
Shklar, Judith N. “The Liberalism of Fear.” In Liberalism and the Moral Life, edited by 
Nancy L. Rosenblum, 21-38. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989. 
https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674864443.c2 
Tucker, Ian. “Evgeny Morozov: ‘We are abandoning all the checks and balances’.” The Guardian, 
March 9, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/
mar/09/evgeny-morozov-technology-solutionism-interview.
Mazzucelli & Visvizi
Kristin Bergtora Sandvik and Nathaniel A. Raymond, “Beyond the Protective Effect: Towards a Theory of Harm for Information 
Communication Technologies in Mass Atrocity Response” Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, 1 (2017): 9-24. ©2017 Genocide 
Studies and Prevention.  
http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.1.1454
Beyond the Protective Effect: Towards a Theory of Harm for Information Communication 
Technologies in Mass Atrocity Response
Kristin Bergtora Sandvik
University of Oslo
Oslo, Norway
Nathaniel A. Raymond
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
Introduction
Historically, the international community’s response, or lack thereof, to mass atrocities, has been 
shaped by the absence of timely and accurate information.1 The past two decades have witnessed 
non-governmental organizations, international agencies, governments, and private sector actors 
designing, adopting, and employing information communication technologies (ICTs) including 
smartphone apps, remote sensing platforms such as satellite imagery analysis, surveillance drones 
and other forms of digital data collection and analytics, as standard components of sectoral and 
cross-sectoral responses to both the threat and alleged committal of mass atrocities in a variety of 
operational and geographic contexts. Throughout this period, the use of ICTs has metamorphosed 
from consisting of a series of prototype use cases of these tools and techniques to become a 
commonplace component of the human rights and humanitarian sector’s response to mass atrocity 
and human security crisis scenarios. Accompanying this mainstreaming is a set of generalized 
and, to date, largely unsubstantiated claims that ICT changes the nature and effectiveness of mass 
atrocity response.
So far, limited conceptual scholarly attention has been given to the progress-claims made on 
behalf of ICT technologies and how these claims correspond to their actual impact on the broader 
field of mass atrocity response. This is problematic, because this form of technology optimism, or 
even utopianism, impacts the distribution of resources, field practices and the rules and norms that 
regulate the use of these interventions. In this article, we contest the theory of change presented by 
various actors in the mass atrocity field. According to this theory, ICTs are not only force multipliers 
with respect to civil society’s ability to address atrocities, but the use of ICT in itself represents a 
form of response that enhances the protection of civilians. In doing so, we make three arguments.
First, we argue that there is no evidence of the existence of what can be referred to as a 
causal Protective or Preventative Effect (PPE) from the use of ICTs in mass atrocity producing 
environments. In our coinage, the PPE is conceptualized as the following: The use of technology 
in mass atrocity contexts are largely preceded by the encoding of assumptions and aspirations 
into ICTs having an inherently Ambient Protective Effect (APE); i.e. casually transforming the 
threat matrix of a particular atrocity producing environment in a way that improves the human 
security status of targeted populations. Second, we suggest that more attention needs to be paid 
to the reverse effect, namely that the collection and distribution of demographically identifiable 
information (DII) in disasters can instead be a causal vector for harm. Building on Raymond, we 
define DII as either individual and/or aggregated data points that allow inferences to be drawn that 
enable the classification, identification, and/or tracking of both named and/or unnamed individuals, 
groups of individuals, and/or multiple groups of individuals according to ethnicity, economic 
class, religion, gender, age, health condition, location, occupation, and/or other demographically 
1 Scott Strauss, “Identifying Genocide and Related Forms of Mass Atrocity,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 7 
(2011), accessed May 21, 2017, https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20111219-identifying-genocide-and-mass-atrocity-
strauss.pdf. As observed by Strauss, conceptual clarity matters: For mass atrocity prevention and response alike, 
it is necessary to have a working definition of the class of events that can trigger civic activity or political and 
military responses. At the same time, the term “mass atrocity” covers a range of events (beyond common standards 
such as genocide, crimes against humanity or mass violence) that are themselves the objects of contestation and 
analytical confusion. For the purposes of this article, we take up the commonly understood notion of mass atrocity as 
widespread and systematic violence against civilians. 
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defining factors.2 We suggest that the absence of a shared theory of harm and a corresponding 
framework for applying it to these new and evolving ethical challenges represents a key challenge. 
Third, to that end, we begin to articulate the core components of such theory of harm with 
respect to the use of ICT in mass atrocities. In our articulation, harm can arise from a wide array 
of technology-based practices, interactions and policy considerations in mass atrocity response. 
As a first step, we need to do the work of linking data security (privacy and data protection) and 
cybersecurity more comprehensively to human security. As a second step in our attempt to articulate 
a theory of harm, we put forward the view that DII requires its own category and science of 
identifiable data specific to itself. As a third step, we propose a closer focus on preparedness: We 
argue that mass atrocity and human security fields more broadly are characterized by missing 
conversations about tradeoffs before tech deployment. As a fourth step, we point to the need for 
greater reflexivity: we argue that it is necessary for response actors to take the differences between 
the ideologies, means, methods and objectives of humanitarian service provision and human rights 
truth provision-oriented communities seriously, and to more consciously reflect on the significance 
of this difference for one’s own work. The fifth element of our theory of harm relates to ourselves 
as mass atrocity responders, and the ethical limits to how far we can go to digitally protect our 
operations.
The article proceeds as follows. We begin by briefly describing the rise of ICT technologies 
in mass atrocity response. We then argue that seen through the theoretical prism of technological 
utopianism, the arguments made on behalf of ICT technologies go beyond the notion of 
ICT as a force multiplier to claim that monitoring and information gathering may itself be 
equated to enhanced protection of civilians.3 Next, we offer a four-pronged critique of the ICT 
progress narrative. We flesh out the components of the ambient protective or preventative 
effect; and describe the emergence of ICT as a site of ethical precariousness and as capable of 
causing actual harm to the response, to responders, and most importantly, to civilians who 
are the targets of mass atrocities. In the final part, we begin to lay out a theory of harm that 
can help us understand and address this issue. We conclude by arguing that our attempt at 
offering a theory of harm can assist in developing a means for logging and evaluating critical 
incidents, including standard definitions and procedures used by funders, governments, and 
local communities to evaluate past projects and prevent the infliction of harm from similar, future 
deployments. 
The Rise of ICT in Mass Atrocity Response
These mass atrocity response specific uses of ICTs can include, but are not limited to, the following: 
Satellite imagery collection and analysis4; surveillance drones5; the use of crowd mapping and social 
media platforms6; and Big Data and algorithmic, machine-learning techniques to process large 
volumes of digital data from multiple sources. Increasingly, these individual tools and techniques 
2 Nathaniel A. Raymond, “Beyond ‘Do No Harm’ and Individual Consent: Reckoning with the Emerging Ethical 
Challenges of Civil Society’s Use of Data,” in Group Privacy: New Challenges of Data Technologies, ed. Linnet Taylor et al. 
(Cham: Switzerland, Springer International Publishing, 2017), 67-82.
3 Christopher Tuckwood, “The State of the Field: Technology for Atrocity Response,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: 
An International Journal 8, 3 (2014), 9. Our argument is concerned with different objectives than those articulated 
by Tuckwood, who argues that “recent years have seen a marked decline in the brand of ‘cyber utopianism’ that 
predicted the inevitable arrival of human rights and liberal democracy following rapidly on the heels of internet 
access in many of the world’s dangerous places. Very few observers still believe that simply introducing an 
unspecified category of tools labeled ‘technology’ will be the panacea to defend human rights and save lives.” 
4 Tanya Notley and Camellia Webb-Gannon, “FCJ-201 Visual Evidence from Above: Assessing the Value of Earth 
Observation Satellites for Supporting Human Rights,” The Fibreculture Journal 27 (2016), accessed May 21, 2017, http://
twentyseven.fibreculturejournal.org/2016/03/21/fcj-201-visual-evidence-from-above-assessing-the-value-of-earth-
observation-satellites-for-supporting-human-rights/.
5 Kristin Bergtora Sandvik and Kjersti Lohne, “The Rise of the Humanitarian Drone: Giving Content to an Emerging 
Concept,” Millennium-Journal of International Studies 43, no.1 (2014), 145-164; Kristin Bergtora Sandvik and Maria 
Gabrielsen Jumbert, The Good Drone (New York: Routledge, 2016).
6 Ryan Burns, “Rethinking Big Data in Digital Humanitarianism: Practices, Epistemologies, and Social Relations,” 
GeoJournal 80, no. 4 (2015), 477-490.
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are now being integrated together into combined applications that seek to fuse together several 
streams of data from different sources and formats into an amalgamated data product. While the 
deployment of each of these technologies takes place in discrete fields (humanitarianism, human 
rights, etc.) that are described and discussed by separate academic literatures, there is increasing 
recognition of responsible data management as the key crosscutting issue.7 
The specific applications of these technologies and platforms are diverse and constantly 
evolving, but can be generally divided into two broad categories of prevention/response and 
justice/accountability: the uses that seek to create unique situational awareness for population 
protective purposes and informing response activities; and use cases aimed at detecting and/or 
documenting evidence of alleged crimes for judicial and/or advocacy purposes. In recent years, 
the intensifying adoption of the ICT technologies for mass atrocity response has commonly been 
presented as an expedient and substantive response to the gross human rights abuses arising 
from ongoing armed conflicts in non-permissive environments such as Syria, Iraq, South Sudan, 
Yemen, Libya and others. Additionally, the adoption of these technologies appears to be spurred, 
in large part, by a set of key factors, namely their comparatively low cost in comparison to other, 
analog interventions and their ability to be remotely deployed in highly lethal, non-permissive 
environments that preclude traditional, ground-based approaches.
“Hacking” Mass Atrocities: Technology Adoption as a Theory of Change
Thus, ICTs are now effectively treated as indispensable “force multipliers” that may either 
supplement or, in some cases, supplant mass atrocity responses that rely on humans physically 
making contact with other humans in the places where mass atrocity events are occurring. The 
adoption of an ever more technology-reliant and increasingly “remote” posture has encoded within 
it an implicit aspiration to literally predict, prevent and deter these crimes as a direct causal result 
of deploying these modalities. We propose that this increasingly publicly expressed vision that 
technology itself can fundamentally alter the calculus of whether and how mass atrocities occur 
demonstrates that civil society actors have done more than simply adopt tools and techniques: 
They have adopted a theory of change based on technological utopianism as well, a theory that 
posits technological change is inevitable, problem-free and progressive. 
Technological utopianism is a belief in technological progress as inevitable, and in technology 
as the vehicle for “achieving a ‘perfect’ society in the near future.”8 This theory of change can 
be illuminated through Morozov’s concept of “solutionism”, described as “the idea that given 
the right code, algorithms and robots, technology can solve all of mankind’s problems, effectively 
making life “frictionless” and trouble-free.”9 In the cybersecurity field, cyber-utopianism refers 
to “a naïve belief in the emancipatory nature of online communication,” along with a refusal to 
acknowledge any negative impact of the Internet on society.10 We argue that the emergence of ICTs 
as a perceived remote, force multiplication capability for civil society actors responding to alleged 
mass atrocities has, critically, dovetailed with the narrative that more information about a mass 
atrocity producing situation can intrinsically increase the chances of preventing or mitigating these 
scenarios. As Pryce writes in How to Prevent a Mass Atrocity, 
7 Nathaniel A. Raymond, Ziad Al Achkar, et al, “Building Data Responsibility into Humanitarian Action,” United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, (2016). Also, Nathaniel A. Raymond, Caitlin Howarth, and Jonathan 
Hutson, “Crisis Mapping Needs an Ethical Compass,” Global Brief 6 (2012), accessed May 21, 2017, http://globalbrief.
ca/blog/2012/02/06/crisis-mapping-needs-an-ethical-compass/. 
8 Howard P. Segal, “The Technological Utopians,” in Imagining Tomorrow: History, Technology and The American Future, ed. 
Joseph J. Corn, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986). 
9 Ian Tucker, “We are Abandoning All the Checks and Balances,” The Guardian, March 9, 2013, accessed May 21, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/mar/09/evgeny-morozov-technology-solutionism-interview. 
10 Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (New York: Public Affairs, 2011). Milton Mueller, 
What is Evgeny Morozov Trying to Prove? A Review of the Net Delusion (Internet Governance Project, 2011), accessed May 
21, 2017, www.internetgovernance.org/2011/01/13/what-is-evgeny-morozov-trying-to-prove-a-review-of-the-net-
delusion. 
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Early warning networks in countries at risk are essential, whether they involve tapping into 
worldwide Diasporas for the wealth of knowledge and contacts they provide, or making use 
of cell phone technology for immediate access to unfolding events.11
It should be noted that this perception is supported and reinforced by similar developments in 
adjacent fields of human security-related rescue and response. Generally, with the rise of Big 
Data, data visualization has become central to the understanding of societal problems and their 
potential solutions.12 In the field of humanitarian action, a key driver behind the rise of technology 
is the increasing conflation between information and protection: embedded within the embrace of 
extensive monitoring is the implicit promise of better performance.13 More broadly this is connected 
to the widespread notion that “knowing about atrocities” through imagery and other data streams 
somehow mobilizes empathy and engenders political action.14 
Herscher describes how the public viewing of images was understood to motivate public action, 
and how, with the Eyes on Darfur Campaign, the public viewing of satellite images was viewed as 
public action in itself.15 In a different example, an October 2010 report from ICT4D Foundation 
expresses the decidedly solutionist aspiration that the deployment of these technologies themselves 
can realize a “dream of rescue” for imperiled populations succinctly, stating:
Civil society is becoming increasingly involved in the search and design of digital 
innovations for addressing the challenges of genocide. A recent example is Project 10^100, a 
competition hosted by Google, where the idea of creating a genocide monitoring and alert 
system was one of the sixteen finalists. The ideas included reducing crimes against humanity 
by aggregating data, including pertinent statistics, the history and geography of specific 
conflicts, local cultures, geostrategic interests, by using e.g. updated dynamic web maps and 
hand-held GPS devices…Done well and over the long-term, initiatives like these can prevent 
recurrence of genocide and mass atrocity crimes.16
As a result, the goal of using technology in mass atrocity response has become more ambitious than 
simply how these tools and techniques can better help responders simply collect, make sense of, 
and act upon information derived from ICTs. Somehow the use of technology may fundamentally 
short-circuit how, whether, and to what degree these abuses actually occur.
Contesting the ICT Progress Narrative
Power and Political Economy
In this part, we offer four lines of critique of the ICT progress narrative. The first concerns power 
and political economy. We argue that an initial problematic aspect of this idea of “hacking” mass 
atrocities is the invisibilization of existing and emergent power relationships: hence, for us, it is 
not the (contestable) newness of ICT for mass atrocity response that must be investigated, but the 
11 Michael C. Pryce, “How to Prevent a Mass Atrocity,” (n.d), accessed May 21, 2017, http://genocidewatch.net/genocide-2/
articles-on-genocide/. 
12 Katharina Rall et al, “Data Visualization for Human Rights Advocacy,” Journal of Human Rights Practice 8, no. 2 (2016), 
171-197.
13 Tina Comes, Kristin Bergtora Sandvik and Bartel De Walle, “Cold at Heart: A Critical Review of Technology for Keeping 
the Cool in Humanitarian Cold Chains.” (Manuscript on file with authors). Also, Kristin Bergtora Sandvik and Katja 
Lindskov Jacobsen, UNHCR and the Struggle for Accountability Technology, law and results-based management, (Abingdon, 
Oxon: Routledge Humanitarian Studies, 2016).
14 Richard Ashby Wilson and Richard D. Brown, Humanitarianism and Suffering: The Mobilization of Empathy (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
15 Andrew Herscher, “Surveillant Witnessing: Satellite Imagery and the Visual Politics of Human Rights,” Public Culture 
26, no. 3, 74 (2014), 469-500.
16 Caroline Hargreaves and Sanjana Hattotuwa, “ICTs for the Prevention of Mass Atrocity Crimes,” Report on the World 
Summit on the Information Society Stocktaking, ICT for Peace Foundation (October 2010), 4, accessed May 21, 2017,  
http://ict4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/ICTs-for-the-Prevention-of-Mass-Atrocity-Crimes1.pdf.
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power it represents.17 Technology is not neutral. Instead of society passively adopting technology, 
technology and society engage in a mutually constitutive relationship.18 Nevertheless, we do 
believe that the diffusion of non-human objects generates new political settlements,” which, in 
themselves, constitute a form of institutional power, rather than an elimination of it.19 
Understanding the political economy of ICT mass atrocity practice is important for 
understanding power relations.20 Essentially, ICTs can serve as a platform on which hegemony 
can be promoted and existing power imbalances be reinforced, shifting the balance towards 
powerful institutions if the latter are able to strategically use ICTs as legitimating tools.21 This 
also links to a more instrumental rationale of technological utopianism, namely that confident, 
solutionist claims made on behalf of technology’s ability to address mass atrocity are part of a 
moral economy whereby established industry actors and startups developing and promoting ICT 
solutions are trying to gain legitimacy, visibility and a leg up in the burgeoning business of global 
emergencies under the heading of “humanitarian innovation,” “peace innovation”, and so forth.22 
Commentators have noted that generally, in the Tech for Good sector, technology often appears as 
a solution in need of a problem. This is also the case in mass atrocity response where “the choice 
of technology used for prevention activities sometimes appears to be supply-driven as opposed 
to demand-driven.”23 Similarly, many utopian progress claims have been made in the name of the 
arrival of “digital humanitarians” in the crisis response field (such as the Standby Task Force, the 
Humanitarian Open Street Map and the Digital Humanitarian Network).24 
In short, we suggest that the uses of ICTs by a diverse conglomerate of non-governmental, 
governmental, and private sector actors centrally contains within it an assumption that the present 
and future committal of mass atrocities can itself be somehow hacked; and that this assumption 
serves as a vehicle for accumulating legitimacy, resources and projects. Meanwhile, the potential 
negative consequences of hacking what is often the application of military means by state and 
non-state actors is subsumed by the potential, though unproven, benefits of these inherently 
experimental applications of technology.
The Myth of the Ambient Protective or Preventative Effect
Our second line of critique concerns what we call the myth of the protective or preventative effect. 
Despite the broad adoption of ICT, and the broad claims made on behalf of its abilities to provide 
change, we argue that there is no extant base of scientific evidence that in any way suggests, let 
alone proves, the existence of what in our conceptualization can be referred to as a causal Protective 
or Preventative Effect (PPE) from the use of ICTs in mass atrocity producing environments. We 
put forward the idea that the Ambient Protective Effect (APE) is based on the assumption that 
increased volumes of unique otherwise unobtainable data over large-scale geographic areas and/
or non-permissive environments may cause one, some, or all of the following four outcomes 
to occur:
1. Deterrent APE: Perpetrators are less likely to act because of threat of having action 
documented.
17 See Tuckwood, The State of the Field.
18 Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, The Social Shaping of Technology (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1999).
19 Daniel R. McCarthy, “Technology and ‘the International’ or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Determinism,” 
Millennium-Journal of International Studies 41, no.3 (2013), 471, 489.
20 Ella McPherson, ICTs and Human Rights Practice, A report prepared for the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, 
or Arbitrary Executions, (2015), accessed May 21, 2017, https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/251346. 
21 Ioannis Tellidis and Stefanie Kappler, “Information and Communication Technologies in Peacebuilding: Implications, 
Opportunities and Challenges,” Cooperation and Conflict 51, no.1 (2016), 75-93.
22 Kristin Bergtora Sandvik, “Humanitarian Innovation, Humanitarian Renewal?” Forced Migration Review (2014), 25-27.
23 Francesco Mancini and Marie O’reilly, “New Technology and the Prevention of Violence and Conflict,” Stability: 
International Journal of Security and Development 2, no. 3 (2013).
24 Burns, Rethinking Big Data.
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2. Public Outcry APE: Citizens in nations that have capability to interdict become more 
activated to push for interventions/protective actions because of immediacy/undeniability/
uniqueness of ICT derived/transmitted evidence.
3. Actionable intelligence APE: Governments are given new intelligence that they otherwise 
would not have, due to focus of NGOs on poorly monitored/lower politically valued 
locations, which causes them to act.
4. Early warning APE: Targeted communities have early warning that enables them to make 
better, quicker, more informed decisions that are potentially lifesaving.
Underlying these strands is a common conflation of how we intend technology to work and how we 
predict and measure its effect. Hence, we argue that these aspirations for the effects of technology 
use, effects that have frequently been seen as objectively resulting from its mere application, have 
no objective foundation. 
The Potential for Harm
Our third line of critique concerns the awareness and acknowledgment of the possible direct and 
indirect negative effects of ICT. There are longstanding and well-articulated concerns about the 
use of data for example in the human rights field: data is non-existent or of poor quality due to 
collection problems or digital shadows; data suffers from bias; effective data analysis is hampered 
by low levels of data literacy in the practitioner community and so forth. The concern is that 
these weaknesses affect levels of credibility and accuracy, which is “the currency of human rights 
advocacy.”25 However, over the last five years, the domain of mass atrocity ICT has in itself emerged 
as a site of ethical precariousness. 
As noted by Latonero and Gold, the “problem is that we simply do not know all the positive 
and negative impacts these new technologies will bring, which makes it difficult to make informed 
decisions in the present.”26 The problem is not only that well-intentioned data driven interventions 
may fail to assist (through bad strategic planning, insufficient resources or inattentiveness to 
context) but that they may even harm beneficiaries.27 An important aspect of this development is 
what appears to be a very weak community-wide interest so far in the ethical dimensions of ICT 
use for mass atrocity-producing contexts.28 Concerns have been emerging both with respect to 
the practices of the volunteer and tech community, and the information practices of the “walled 
garden” of human security professionals in the UN and INGO system.29 
While many heavily promoted initiatives around cell phones proclaim that SMS codes can 
save lives, these detection and documentation focused initiatives seem to be generally unconnected 
to the response side of operations. Commenting on the celebrated crowd-seeded program Voix des 
Kivus, Pham and Vinck note that “there were no known efforts to respond to or address incidents 
or issues raised by cell phone holders.”30 Other times, information collection practices have lacked 
transparency and accountability, leading to suspicion by individuals and communities providing 
information.31 
25 Rall, et al, Data Visualization.
26 Mark Latonero and Zachary Gold, “Data, Human Rights & Human Security,” Human Rights & Human Security (2015), 
1-16.
27 Ibid. 
28 Kate Crawford and Megan Finn, “The Limits of Crisis Data: Analytical and Ethical Challenges of Using Social and 
Mobile Data to Understand Disasters,” GeoJournal 80, no. 4 (2015), 491-502.
29 Megan Finn and Elisa Oreglia, “A Fundamentally Confused Document: Situation Reports and the Work of Producing 
Humanitarian Information,” Proceedings of the 19th ACM (Association for Computing Machinery) Conference on Computer-
Supported Cooperative Work & Social Computing. ACM, 2016.
30 Phuong N Pham and Patrick Vinck, “Technology, Conflict Early Warning Systems, Public Health, and Human Rights,” 
Health and Human Rights 14, no. 2 (2012), 106-117, accessed May 21, 2017, https://www.hhrjournal.org/2013/08/
technology-conflict-early-warning-systems-public-health-and-human-rights/. See also Alexander Austin, “Early 
Warning and the Field: A Cargo Cult Science?” Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, 2004), 129-150.
31 Finn, et al, A Fundamentally Confused Document.
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Additionally, and crucially, emerging, though limited, evidence is beginning to suggest 
that the opposite of the intended PPE may, in fact, be occurring. A growing body of scholarship 
indicates that the attempt to project a PPE through technology may be, in some cases, both exposing 
affected civilian populations to new, rapidly evolving risks to their human security and negatively 
mutating the behavior of alleged mass atrocity perpetrators. Technology can have unpredictable or 
unpredicted knock-on effects: For example, crowd-sourced data is neutral in the sense that it can 
also be used to foment violence, for example by creating a riot, instead of preventing it.32 In one 
available example, there is qualitative evidence that the presence of ICTs may cause governments to 
restrict a population’s ability to communicate, as well as facilitate actions that further violence and 
make conflict dynamics more complex. Mancini and O’Reilly, discussing the use of ICTs during 
violent crisis in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, write:
In a context where the government restricted the use of new technology, ICTs appeared to 
do little to facilitate a response from local authorities or international actors. On the contrary, 
the government elected to shut down some mobile networks. At the community level, actors 
using mobile phones and Internet websites did foster group action, but these technologies 
were predominantly used to help mobilize violent mobs, issue threats to the opposing 
community, and propagate conflict narratives.33
Another, primarily quantitative example indicates that ICTs may have, in at least one case, directly 
increased violence against the very vulnerable populations that the deployment of these tools and 
techniques was originally intended to protect. Gordon’s study of Amnesty International’s 2007-
2008 Eyes on Darfur project, that monitored villages in the Darfur region of Sudan at risk for attack, 
provides some of the first evidence of a potential causal relationship between ICT use and direct 
harm on populations. Gordon argues that:
…Amnesty’s intervention increased violence in monitored villages and neighboring villages 
during the program as well as in subsequent years. Coupled with qualitative data, results 
suggest that the Government of Sudan increased violence to retaliate against Amnesty’s 
advocacy efforts. This study highlights the potential for well-intentioned advocacy efforts 
to generate perverse effects.34
It should be reasonably assumed, sadly, that the incidents described above are likely not the only 
critical incidents that have occurred so far. 
Lack of preparedness
Our fourth line of critique concerns the lack of collective consciousness and preparedness regarding 
these emergent risks. Despite these concerns being raised by multiple voices over the course of 
years, there has been no concerted, successful effort to date by the various sectors using ICTs in 
human security crises to develop common ethical, technical, and rights-based standards for their 
safe and responsible use.35 Several reasons likely exist for the failure of the human rights and 
humanitarian sector to either proactively or responsively address the clear and present dangers 
that these new modalities and methods present for the vulnerable populations these groups seek to 
protect. We suggest that these factors may include concerns amongst practitioners that documenting 
and releasing evidence of critical incidents having occurred during their ICT-based projects could 
cause reputational damage and jeopardize current or future funding. Also of vital importance is a 
32 Joseph G. Bock, “Firmer Footing for a Policy of Early Intervention: Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Comes of 
Age,” Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 12, no. 1 (2015), 103-111.
33 Mancini, New Technology.
34 Grant Gordon, “Monitoring Conflict to Reduce Violence: Evidence from a Satellite Intervention in Darfur,” (2016), 
accessed May 21, 2017, http://www.grantmgordon.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/GG-EoD.pdf.
35 See also Joseph G. Bock, “Technology and Vulnerability in Early Warning: Ethical Use of IT in Dangerous Places,” 
Information Technology for Development, 22, no.4 (2016), 696-702.
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lack of technical and ethical fluency amongst funding and supporting organizations about how to 
evaluate the potential harm these projects may inadvertently cause. Most critical, however, is the 
absence of a shared theory of harm and corresponding framework for applying it to these new and 
evolving ethical challenges.
Towards a Shared Theory of Harm
Regardless of the actual reasons for the lack of intentional and comprehensive action on these 
issues, it is the last point – the absence of a shared theory of harm and a corresponding framework 
for applying it – that represents the logical starting point for course correction by the sectors 
and actors engaged in this work. As noted by Latonero and Gold, “Harms from data revelations 
range from physical violence, to retribution, to shaming. Yet a more precise taxonomy of data 
related harms is needed.”36 An accepted, evidence-based theory of harm specific to the potential 
deleterious impacts resulting from current technical realities of the applications of ICTs in the mass 
atrocity response context is the first step for the development of any ethical framework for guiding 
this area of work.
In this article, we seek to articulate this initial theory of harm for ICT and digital data use in 
the mass atrocity response context. Our goal of doing so is to hopefully initiate a discussion within 
the fields of both research and practice that is grounded in reality, rather than in aspirations and 
assumptions, about how to move beyond the “dream of rescue” and the unproven solutionist myth 
of the PPE towards a rights-based ethical framework for these activities. With rights-based we 
do not refer to the kind of impossible-to-articulate-and-to-meaningfully-implement rights-based 
buzzword of the previous decade: our understanding is of rights-based as applying the rule of law 
and existing data protection and privacy guarantees fully and responsibly to the human insecurity/
crisis response field, as well as the concerted effort to identify and develop legal protection 
mechanisms for new threats posted by ICT use in the human security field. 
Failure to develop an accepted theory of harm may mean that civil society will continue to 
accept the current status quo indefinitely under the auspices of innovating mass atrocity response. 
At the heart of the current context resulting from the absence of a shared theory of harm is a 
perceived imperative by civil society to continue to test and deploy largely untested and non-
consented interventions in a host of worst-case scenarios because trying anything is seen as better 
than doing nothing. 
Evidence of the dangers of this perceived worst-case scenario innovation imperative can 
be found in a recent case of the 2014-2015 West Africa Ebola Outbreak. During that crisis, Call 
Detail Records (CDRs) were collected from mobile phone networks for the ostensible purpose of 
tracing the spread of the disease. McDonald, in his paper Ebola: A Big Data Disaster describes this 
phenomenon in the context of Ebola as “disaster experimentation”, writing:
The chaos of humanitarian disaster often creates an implied social license for experimentation 
with new approaches, under the assumption of better outcomes. Vested interests dominate 
the public discussion of humanitarian data modeling, downplaying the dangers of what 
is essentially a public experiment to combine mobile network data and social engineering 
algorithms. In the case of using mobile network data to track or respond to Ebola, the 
approaches are so new–and generally so illegal– that most advocacy focuses on securing 
basic access to data. Advocates for the release of CDRs often paint an optimistic picture of its 
potential benefits, without applying the same rigor to the risks or likelihood of harm. This 
trades on the social license created by disaster to experiment with the lives of those affected, 
under the implicit assumption that it can’t make the situation worse.37 
The presiding paradigm can be seen as fundamentally treating highly vulnerable populations 
affected by extreme crisis events as experimental subjects of largely untested, non-consented, 
36 Latonero, et al, Data, Human Rights & Human Security.
37 Sean. M. McDonald, “Ebola: A Big Data Disaster. Privacy, Property, and the Law of Disaster Experimentation,” CIS 
Papers (2016).
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and remotely applied technological interventions.38 We are however concerned that as the scale 
and depth of global connectivity increases, the scale and nature of cyber-insecurity is being 
transformed from representing a nuisance or economic loss to encompass fundamental threats to 
human security that may themselves contribute to mass atrocity targeting and committal.39 ICT 
interventions in mass atrocity responses are often designed and deployed by actors often existing 
outside the affected communities themselves. What’s more, the severity of the crisis event appears 
to serve as justification by human rights, humanitarian, and private sector actors for routinely 
abrogating certain categories of rights – i.e. privacy and human subject research protections - in the 
stated service of an unproven theoretical protective effect. This approach to the use of ICTs in mass 
atrocity producing contexts has inherently injected, however unintentionally, a utilitarian ethic of 
greater goods and trade-offs into this work at the expense of the do no harm ethics traditionally 
espoused by actors in this space. The phenomena of ad hoc prioritization of one set of rights over 
another by outside actors utilizing technology creates implicit hierarchies of rights and operational 
objectives that the subjects of these interventions have little to no consent as to whether, when, and 
how they are imposed.
In this article, we argue that as a community, we are causing harm through the current paradigm 
of deployment that will cause irreparable damage to populations in crisis and those who work 
with them. As a critical community, we need to do a better job of articulating the components of 
this claim. Without an accepted theory of harm grounded in the operational and technical realities 
of this work, this utilitarian ethic of disaster experimentation will likely persist and continue to 
evolve in unpredictable and dangerous ways. In our attempt to begin to articulate a theory of harm, 
we include five lines of argument. 
Cyber Insecurity as Human Insecurity
As a first step, while the case that legal rights are being violated is increasingly made40, we 
need to do the work of linking data security (privacy and data protection) and cybersecurity more 
comprehensively to human security.41 The protection of social identity has been considered a key 
component of human security. We suggest that as social identity is increasingly constituted through 
information technology, threats to data protection and privacy can usefully be understood to now 
exist as core threats to human security. In 1994, the UN Human Development Report challenged 
the state-centered conception of security as pertaining to geopolitical issues, exploring the “new 
frontiers of human security in the daily lives of the people” by arguing that “[h]uman security is 
not a concern with weapons - it is a concern with human life and dignity.”42 Human vulnerabilities 
were therefore to be found across a range of issues, broadly categorized into security matters in 
the community, the economy, and the environment, as well as people’s food security, and their 
health, political and personal security. Since then, contestations over human security’s substance, 
its definitions of threats and vulnerabilities have been thoroughly examined.43 We suggest that the 
concept of human security deepens the understanding of threats to both privacy and data protection 
by repositioning the physical individual at the center of the privacy and data protection discourse.
38 Katja Lindskov Jacobsen, “Making Design Safe for Citizens: A Hidden History of Humanitarian Experimentation,” 
Citizenship Studies, 14, no.1 (2010), 89-103. As noted by Katja Lindskov Jacobsen, experimentation on subjects in 
the human security field is nothing new; this was part and parcel of the colonial enterprise. She explains that 
humanitarianism’s history cannot be understood apart from a history of experimentation, including experimental 
colonial and postcolonial endeavors in foreign territories and on foreign bodies to test new technologies and to make 
them safe for use by more valued citizens often located in metropolitan states. 
39 Kristin Bergtora Sandvik, “The Humanitarian Cyberspace: Shrinking Space or an Expanding Frontier?” Third World 
Quarterly 37, no.1 (2016), 17-32.
40 McDonald, Ebola.
41 This section draws on Kristin Bergtora Sandvik, Mareile Kaufmann and Kjersti Lohne, “Terror Threats, Data Protection 
and Human Security: A Shifting Interface in Norwegian Law,” 2011, on file with authors.
42 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1994 (New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 1994), 3. 
43 Taylor Owen, “Human Security- Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a 
Threshold-based Definition,” Security Dialogue 35, 3 (2004), 373-387.
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Emphasizing the universality of the concept, and in contrast to the use of human security as a 
foreign policy tool to look at “other” societies, we adopt Burgess and Tadjbakhsh’s inward-looking 
perspective appraising personal integrity through data protection as an asset of value which 
belongs to the vital core of mass atrocity response. Our ambition here is to set the stage for a harm 
matrix by emphasizing the utility of human security as an analytic tool in order to comprehend 
the globalization of the erosion of “personal liberties as trade-offs to national security” where the 
individual moves to center stage; and to emphasize the way in which global civil society has become 
engaged in the capture, storage and distribution of personal data in a way that alters its compact 
with the populations it purports to act on behalf of.44 The concept of human security is useful 
not only for the definition and identification of human in/securities, but also for evaluation and 
critique of those practices which make people insecure.45 Considering the detachment of personal 
data from the individual as a process of dehumanization, we argue that the human security 
perspective, informed by stringent empirical analysis, can provide a theoretical starting point from 
which scholarship may help to bring back the human and reconnect the individual with its body of 
data now being generated in technologically driven mass atrocity responses. 
What is the Risk: Ignoring Demographically Identifiable Information (DII) 
A failure to understand the linkage between cyber security and human security; poor cyber 
security approaches or even blatant mistakes of such as losing, dumping or inadvertently releasing 
data can result in harm. Harm may also arise from a failure to calibrate the sensitive nature of 
the information one is releasing or sharing with third-parties with substandard cyber security 
practices or partners with commercial or political priorities that puts shared data at risk. Generally, 
there has been an increasing, if insufficient, acceptance across the sector of the problems related 
to collecting personal identifiable information (PII) from individuals in crisis; the challenges of 
obtaining informed individual consent; and the issues raised by resorting to implied or “good 
enough” consent. 
However, we argue that DII is increasingly becoming a critical issue. It is critical in part 
because DII is being explicitly subordinated to PII in standards used by crisis responders.46 While 
there is some mention of demographic information, it is often presented as a subset of personal 
identifiable information, such as name, age, ethnicity, etc. DII can include, though is not limited 
to PII, online data, geographic and geospatial data, environmental data, survey data, census data, 
and/or any other data set that can - either in isolation or in combination - enable the classification, 
identification, and/or tracking of a specific demographic categorization constructed by those 
collecting, aggregating, and/or cross-corroborating the data. 47
Hence, as a second step in our attempt to articulate a theory of harm, we put forward the 
view that DII requires its own category and science of identifiable data specific to itself. This 
absence of a clearly articulated concept of DII is striking given its critical role in now common 
digital, networked data collection approaches, such as smartphone apps, social media, and any 
crowd-sourced platform offered by the private sector. The lack of a standard definition of this 
term is itself evidence of the enormity of the technical and doctrinal challenge that this type of 
data presents for all fields of data science, not only humanitarian and human rights applications 
of ICTs and the data derived from them. The importance of DII in civil society applications of 
ICTs and the data derived from them cannot be overstated. It may be argued that most, if not 
all civil society applications of ICTs and the data derived from them fundamentally aim to 
collect, analyze, and create actionable products either initially based upon and/or seeking to 
result in DII.48
44 Peter J. Burgess and Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, “The Human Security Tale of Two Europes,” Global Society 24, no.4 (2010), 
447-465.
45 Alex J. Bellamy and Matt McDonald, “The Utility of Human Security: Which Humans? What Security? A reply to 
Thomas & Tow,” Security Dialogue 33, no. 3 (2002), 373-377, 376. 
46 Raymond, Beyond ‘Do No Harm’.
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid.
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DII can be seen as, at first glance, ethically neutral by itself in many cases, without a seemingly 
obvious ethical imperative for a practitioner to immediately act upon. For example, the 2013 Red 
Cross Professional Standards for Protection Work, comparing the risks of aggregated data to 
sensitive individually identifiable data, seems to underplay the risks of these aggregated data sets, 
stating:
Protection actors working with aggregated information, such as trend analysis, do not face 
the same challenges as the information they handle is less sensitive. They may feel less 
concerned by the standards and guidelines of this chapter. They should nevertheless be 
aware of the constraints of managing data on individuals and events, in order to understand 
how the information they are handling has been obtained.
The more, seemingly subtle ethical implications of DII are in stark contrast to many common types 
of PII encountered in the civil society context, such as raw, de-identified individual health records 
or refugee registration documents. DII’s ethical implications largely results situationally from 
when, how, why, and from what combinations of initial sources it is derived and applied, rather 
than the more easily ethically categorized data that comprises PII. In other words, DII can result 
from the transformation of seemingly disparate, unrelated data sets into an amalgamated data 
product that can be easily weaponized into a means for doing harm. The potential harm of DII is 
often most apparent, if not entirely, to the perpetrator of potential harm, rather than to the holder 
of one or all of the pieces of a potentially actionable mosaic of DII. 
Whereas PII’s potential harm comes from when it is leaked or breached, DII’s harm, and thus 
its ethical implications, often emanates from simply whether the possibility exists that it can be 
even created. This reality makes the overall ethical imperative to understand, manage, and protect 
potential sources of DII as important, if not more so in some cases, than those commensurate with 
holding only one source of PII.
Missing Conversations About Tradeoffs Before Tech Deployment Shape Outcomes
With new ways of seeing come new, correspondent ways of being blind. For example, with new 
means of mitigating one potential harm or risk (i.e. remote sensing mitigating threat to staff 
from deployment in dangerous environments) comes an increase in the potential willingness by 
organizations to act in ways that might harm vulnerable populations in exchange for enhanced staff 
protection through increased situational awareness. Another example concerns the application of 
ICT in early warning approaches, and the tradeoff between speed and accuracy, which affects the 
quality and reliability of the information collected.49 The most important category of examples, 
however, concerns the uses of aggregate population data and personally identified data. These 
tradeoffs are dynamic by nature: As noted by Latonero and Gold, in an acute crisis, concerns over 
data privacy and data protection mechanisms may be low, but as the threat to life diminishes, the 
equation changes. They note that “such tradeoffs require measured assessments which are often 
unclear and ambiguous when data is readily available, easy to collect or simple to share.” 50 
As a third step, we propose a closer focus on preparedness: We argue that mass atrocity and 
human security fields more broadly are characterized by missing conversations about tradeoffs 
before tech deployment: at its most general, this concerns the question of whether to deploy a 
particular technology or not; the choice between technological modalities and eventually costs 
and benefits in particular deployments. What’s missing is both a structured process for having 
such conversations and a generalized perception that these conversations are intrinsic both to 
preparedness and accountability efforts. This also involves a consideration of the kind of tradeoffs 
taking place, but also the scope and nature of permissible tradeoffs: when does a particular class 
of tradeoffs become unethical? At present, this evolving economy of largely undocumented trade-
offs related to technology are creating new power disparities and dichotomies that fundamentally 
49 Pham, et al, Technology, Conflict Early Warning Systems.
50 Latonero, et al, Data, Human Rights & Human Security.
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favor the interests and operational needs of northern NGO, government, and corporate actors 
over the rights and needs of the subjects of these deployments, in many cases. These trade-offs 
are happening in often unacknowledged, sublimated ways that are left unsurfaced due to the 
sometimes pervasive presumption that somehow tech application for situational awareness is 
somehow separate and hermetically sealed off from risks incurred from ground interventions. 
Ironically, it may be argued that in fact the scale and scope of ICT related harm may, in some cases, 
potentially outstrip the harms incurred through ground action precisely because its remote nature 
somehow removes the perception that it can be harmful. 
Taking Difference Seriously: Understanding the Incongruity between Data for Humanitarian Service 
Provision and Human Rights Truth Provision
This article focuses on mass atrocity response as part of the broader field of human security response. 
While this broad and very common categorization is helpful to articulate general problems, it 
also obscures fundamental differences in the objectives, practices, cultures and toolboxes of the 
various communities of practice that aim to protect or rescue civilians. In our view, in particular, 
this categorization obfuscates the growing split between human rights and humanitarians as 
crisis responding communities. This includes how this split shapes and is shaped by each group’s 
use of data and the impact the use has on crisis affected individuals and communities. It also 
includes increasingly divergent perceptions of what responsible approaches to data collection, 
maintenance, storage and sharing of data look like. Here, as a fourth step, we point to the need 
for greater reflexivity: we argue that it is necessary for response actors to take the differences 
between the ideologies, means, methods and objectives of these communities seriously, and to 
more consciously reflect on the significance of this difference for one’s own work.
At the outset, the moral underpinnings of these two communities are different: Humanitarianism 
is ideologically framed around the two imperatives of doing no harm and providing assistance 
according to need; as well as around adherence to core humanitarian principles of humanity, 
neutrality, impartiality and universality. The humanitarian field has a curious relationship to law 
and legal regulation: there is an erstwhile and enduring implicit relationship with the IHL modality 
of trade-offs; proportionality and acceptance of collateral damage if necessary for military gain. At 
the same time, the law of humanitarian action is fragmented and consists in large part of soft law 
initiatives surrounding service provision and the conduct of the service providers themselves in 
contexts of mass atrocities, crisis and other operational scenarios.
The human rights crisis response community is heavily regulated by international human 
rights law and core principles of non-discrimination. Human rights are also shaped by the regularity 
of states of exception and suspension of rights in times of crisis. Where humanitarianism has a 
problem with “politicization” of human security at the expense of responding to human need, 
the human rights framework conjures up panoply of possible tradeoffs in the interest of securing 
formal rights protection. As noted above, the product of the human rights community is accurate 
and credible information about human suffering and rights violations. In short, this community 
produces and provides “truth” in response to mass atrocities as the product of its operations.
These differences are highly relevant because they problematize the protection perspective: 
whether you approach data as a means to service provision or as a means to the provision of 
truth. These differences need to be taken into account as the mass atrocity community engages 
more comprehensively in exploring how problem definitions shape and are shaped by technology 
use. As noted above, a power perspective is required for making sense of how the interests of 
the larger industrial, corporate humanitarian and human rights complexes shape idiosyncratic 
notions of the harm matrix and where one’s own work is situated. We suggest that through the 
insistence that one’s own work has no possibility for physical impact (only providing truth) or 
is apolitical (only aiding the needy) members of each community not only wrongly attempt to 
exclude themselves from the harm matrix in the individual instance, but contribute to systemic 
abdication of responsibility for the potential harms caused by their data-driven interventions. 
The Transformational Capacity of Cyber-Insecurity: Human Security Protection as Counter Intelligence?
The final element of our theory of harm relates to ourselves as mass atrocity responders.  Some 
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concern has been directed at the potential damage arising from “bad apples” intent on causing 
harm by destroying or disrupting data flows. However, a more important and realistic danger is 
posed by the widespread and near-permanent state of cyber-insecurity in which human security 
responders find themselves, which may render them as vehicles for attacks by hostile actors. To 
put it bluntly, when we worry about human rights actors as spies, that is quaint – the critical 
concern is how what we are doing now provides capacities and capabilities for other people’s 
spies. When civil society is cyber-attacked or cyber-exploited, it is not necessarily because attackers 
want to stop our activities but because we are a surfboard to accessing additional sources and 
methods in the control of civil society actors. Attackers are often mostly parasitic. This reality calls 
for a greater understanding of the very utilitarian nature of cyber-attacks, not as targeted acts of 
aggression violating rights to free speech or to organize, but as a business strategy – civil society is 
fast becoming an access point to a smörgåsbord of data, devices and institutions. In short –we are 
now an intelligence asset. 
In practice, some human rights actors are taking the consequences of cyber vulnerability 
seriously, actively developing offensive counter-strategies. These activities can involve wiping 
context or providing malware to trace attackers. The result is, however, that we are becoming a 
surveillance actor. For practitioners, intelligence capability produces a unique situational awareness 
that is highly beneficial for advocacy. However, this capability also gives actors intending to commit 
atrocities the ability to make otherwise unavailable real time decisions. This paradox raises an 
important but little discussed issue: is it ethical for us to think about the fact that in the digital age, to 
protect mass atrocity operations, we have to engage in counter intelligence, to prepare and counter 
armed actors’ attempts to exploit us; to study their perceptions and capabilities? Are we allowed 
to engage in deception and kinetic cyber counter-attacks against direct denial of service (DDS) 
attacks, for example? What would engaging in counter measures mean for the core obligations of 
human rights and humanitarian actors to protect civilians and respect human rights? Moreover, 
in the short to medium term, another issue will arise that adds increasing complexity to the do no 
harm imperative, namely the paradox of ICT counter intelligence activities becoming inextricably 
linked to the notion of responsible and ethical use of ICT technologies in mass atrocity contexts, 
resulting in the possibility that ethical ICT use can only happen with built-in counter intelligence 
components. This potential paradigm fundamentally challenges the do no harm approach and 
the sources of tradition and doctrine that have defined both humanitarian and human rights civil 
society sectors.
Conclusion
In this article, we have attempted to begin to articulate the components of a shared theory of 
harm. Our concluding observations concern ethics and evidence. Developing ethical frameworks 
to guide emergent technologies is a complex endeavor, and such frameworks have a temporary 
nature. We are not advocating the adoption of a permanent convention or similar instruments. 
What we are asking, is that the human security community broadly speaking—particularly 
mass atrocity responders, such as humanitarians, human rights advocates and peace builders—
come to terms with the fact that there is a difference between knowing about alleged atrocities 
and doing something about them; monitoring a mass atrocity crime is different and distinct 
from preventing it or protecting against its effects. We are also asking that the members of this 
broad and diverse community to begin to take seriously the fact that ICT use can cause real harm 
to civilians.
We argue that there is a need to talk about critical incidents stemming from these interventions 
openly and transparently— not as urban rumors, not as scandal but in the structured form of after 
action processes. If we can’t collect evidence about failure, we are not a scientific evidence based 
profession— we are not learning and we cannot become ethical in our approach to ICT. Instead, we 
will become, however unintentionally, a post-ethical and extra-legal field. Civil society requires a 
means for logging and evaluating critical incidents, including standard definitions and procedures 
used by funders, governments, and local communities, etc., to evaluate the impact of these projects. 
In this regard, the imperative to consider ethics must be emphasized as a prerequisite for fulfilling 
the obligation to do no harm. 
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It should be emphasized that in itself, the absence of empirical evidence of impact and risk 
fundamentally makes this project of ICT use problematic. The ethics and evidence of technical 
opportunities, limitations, and liabilities are intrinsically entwined into the development of each 
other. If we don’t have ethics in our science, we can’t responsibly collect results from evidence. 
Conversely, if we don’t have scientifically obtained results from evidence, we can’t shape our 
ethics to be inclusive of the likely modalities of our potential activities and manage their intended 
and unintended outcomes. Ethics without evidence is impossible. Valid evidence without ethics is 
also impossible.
This enterprise also entails renegotiating the ethical compact of the human rights and 
humanitarian fields for the digital age: Current ethical doctrine is based on operational and 
contextual assumptions from a bygone era (i.e. the 20th century). These “unitary” ethical and 
protection doctrines were based on direct information collection of PII from individuals, thus 
the ethical compact between providers and advocates with the populations they encountered is 
based on a technical reality and value proposition rooted in conceptions of data technologies and 
expectations of data control that no longer fully apply. The continued use of outmoded ethics in 
the age of ICTs is, in itself, an unethical act. For even the patina of “ethicality” to be restored to 
these fields that now more and more rely on ICTs for basic workflows, this “compact” must be 
reexamined and ultimately renegotiated. 
Finally, in a post-Snowden era when global military surveillance is occurring, it is now a 
key part of the humanitarian imperative to be able to demonstrate why using digital data and 
platforms in operations does not affect the ethical commitment to do no harm to beneficiaries. Our 
task as academics and researchers is to establish empirical evidence and pedagogic narrative of 
impact—both positive and negative alike—with clarity and honesty about the current context, 
which, increasingly, is defined by cyber-insecurity and cyber-warfare.
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Introduction 
This year marked the 70th anniversary of the verdicts of the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg,1 a milestone that precipitated the emergence of modern international criminal law.2 
Despite significant evolution in that body of law since 1946, it was not until 1998 that international 
courts and tribunals began prosecuting charges of rape during conflict as a grave offence in its 
own right.3 Even so, these cases remain notoriously difficult to prosecute. Many survivors of sexual 
violence choose not to report the violations for fear of reprisals, re-traumatization, community and 
family rejection, and economic hardship. And in cases where survivors do dare to come forward, 
their cases often fail due to lack of adequate evidence to support their allegations. This is true in 
international courts and tribunals as well as in judicial processes at the national level.4 The problem 
is especially acute in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), a country that has suffered war 
and profound violence for more than 20 years and has notoriously been described as the “rape 
capital of the world.”5
In response to this crisis, Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), a U.S.-based international 
NGO, launched in 2011 the Program on Sexual Violence in Conflict Zones,6 a multi-year training 
and advocacy initiative designed to reinforce national prosecutions for sexual violence cases. 
We train doctors, nurses, social workers, police officers, lawyers, and judges to enhance their 
technical capacity in two key areas: the provision of medical care and treatment to survivors of 
sexual violence; and the collection, documentation, analysis, management, and preservation of 
forensic evidence to support effective investigations and prosecutions of these crimes. Through 
multi-sectoral training, these stakeholders come to appreciate their respective roles in the judicial 
1 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal: Nuremberg 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946, 
(Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal, 1947), accessed November 22, 2016, https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/
Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-I.pdf. 
2 “70th Anniversary of the Verdicts of the International Military Tribunal, 01 October 2016,” International Nuremberg 
Principles Academy, October 10, 2016, accessed November 22, 2016, http://www.nurembergacademy.org/events/70th-
anniversary-of-the-verdicts-of-the-international-military-tribunal-01-october-2016/.
3 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (1998) marked the first time an international tribunal (the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) considered rape as a grave offence constituting a crime against humanity 
and an element of genocide. See “AKAYESU, Jean Paul (ICTR-96-4),” United Nations Mechanism for International 
Criminal Tribunals, accessed November 22, 2016, http://unictr.unmict.org/en/cases/ictr-96-4. The Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo ICC-01/05-01/08 (March 2016) was where the International Criminal Court for the first time 
fully recognized in a verdict the crime of rape as a weapon of war. See “Case Information Sheet: The Prosecutor v. 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo,” International Criminal Court, July 26, 2016, accessed November 22, 2016, https://www.
icc-cpi.int/car/bemba/Documents/BembaEng.pdf. See also Kelly D. Askin, “Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other 
Gender-Related Crimes under International Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles,” Berkeley Journal of 
International Law 21, no. 2 (2003), 288.
4 Nduku Kilonzo, et al, “Sexual Violence Legislation in sub-Saharan Africa: The Need for Strengthened Medico-legal 
Linkages,” Reproductive Health Matters 17, no. 34 (2009), 10-19.
5 “Tackling Sexual Violence Must Include Prevention, Ending Impunity – UN official,” UN News Centre, April 27, 2010, 
accessed November 22, 2016, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=34502#.WDC1A7IrKUk.
6 “Program on Sexual Violence in Conflict Zones,” Physicians for Human Rights, accessed November 22, 2016,  
http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/issues/rape-in-war/program-on-sexual-violence-in-conflict-zones.html.
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process, and we help cultivate sustainable networks of collaboration among medical and legal 
professionals who can work together across sectors on a case-by-case basis to better support the 
survivor at the center of the process.7 The program has been actively engaged in DRC and Kenya, 
as both countries have endured widespread, conflict-related sexual violence; both countries 
ratified the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court and were each being investigated for 
mass crimes by the ICC8; both have implemented national constitutional and legislative reforms 
to strengthen the laws supporting stronger responses to sexual violence; and both have a growing 
cadre of trained medical and legal professionals who are skilled and interested in learning new 
forensic techniques for gathering evidence to support judicial processes. 
In support of these programmatic goals, since 2012, PHR has been developing MediCapt,9 a 
mobile phone app meant to assist health professionals conducting medical exams in sexual violence 
cases. A smartphone application, MediCapt combines a custom-designed medical intake form 
for forensic documentation with secure mobile camera functionality for forensic photography. 
By combining these components, MediCapt helps to standardize and preserve critical forensic 
evidence of sexual violence. Clinicians can use the app to compile medical evidence, photograph 
survivors’ injuries, and securely transmit the data to their law-enforcement counterparts who may 
be located at a police station several kilometers away. This tool includes sophisticated encryption, 
cloud data storage, and tamper-proof metadata, and it meets best practices for chain-of-custody 
considerations in evidence collection. 
In many ways, eastern Congo is an unlikely place to launch a smartphone-based app to assist 
medical and legal professionals. When PHR first began exploring solutions with our Congolese 
partners, very few people had smartphones and there were major problems with the reliability 
of Internet access compounded by low bandwidth. But, as others have noted elsewhere,10 
mobile phone use in Sub-Saharan Africa is becoming increasingly widespread and the range 
of possibilities opened up by deploying technology to help hold perpetrators of human rights 
violations accountable for their crimes is vast and potentially transformative. 
This review essay will provide an overview of the MediCapt app and the steps PHR has taken 
to design, develop, and field-test the app in DRC. It will also explore advocacy opportunities that 
the app’s emerging technology may facilitate down the road. This review essay will also identify 
the many challenges and questions that we have grappled with and lessons learned as we seek to 
deploy MediCapt in a low-resourced and politically unstable context and to take it to scale beyond 
DRC. Finally, in sharing the details of this case study, we hope to emphasize both the promise of 
new mobile technology for human rights organizations as well as the significant legal and ethical 
responsibilities that accompany it.  
Conceptualizing MediCapt
From the outset, PHR identified medical professionals in particular as potentially powerful change 
agents, and intervened at a practical level to devise a way for clinicians to work directly with their 
law enforcement and legal colleagues to change how survivors receive medical care and access 
justice. During our earliest assessments in DRC in 2010 and 2011, we established that the evidence 
coming before national (military and civilian) courts was weak because, among other determining 
factors, clinicians were not conducting forensic medical evaluations of sexual violence survivors; 
medical charts were not being kept, or were incomplete and illegible; and clinicians were not using 
7 Over the last five years, we have trained more than 1,500 health care providers, police officers, lawyers (prosecutors and 
defense counsel), magistrates, and judges around Kenya, DRC, and elsewhere.
8 The ICC was or is investigating numerous cases regarding the situations in the DRC and Kenya, respectively. See 
“Situations under Investigation,” International Criminal Court, accessed November 22, 2016, https://www.icc-cpi.int/
pages/situations.aspx.
9 In 2013, MediCapt won first place in the Safe Documentation category in the USAID-Humanity United Tech Challenge 
for Atrocity Prevention. See “PHR wins 2013 Tech Challenge for Atrocity Prevention with Mobile App,” Physicians 
for Human Rights, February 13, 2013, accessed November 22, 2016, http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/press/press-
releases/phr-wins-2013-tech-challenge-for-atrocity-prevention-with-mobile-app.html.
10 Christopher Tuckwood, “The State of the Field: Technology for Atrocity Response,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An 
International Journal 8, no. 3 (2014), 81-88. 
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forensic photography to document physical injuries sustained. We also noted that the medical, law 
enforcement, and legal communities tended to work in silos and stakeholders did not coordinate 
across sectors; nor did they share the same language or professional terminology, understand each 
other, or appreciate their respective roles in the justice process. 
Through PHR’s training workshops and advocacy initiatives, we worked with these medical 
and legal professionals to identify low-tech solutions to overcome some of these hurdles, taking 
into account limited resources and varying technical skills. One of the most successful initiatives 
we implemented, in close collaboration with our medical-legal network partners in eastern DRC, 
was the development of a standard medical intake form to document forensic medical evidence 
of sexual violence. Building on post-rape care forms used in other countries, including Kenya11, 
South Africa12, and the United States13, we developed the form with our Congolese colleagues 
and made sure it both met commonly accepted global practices and was also responsive to the 
cultural, legal, and resource-constrained contexts of the DRC. The standard form helps to reinforce 
the documentation of comprehensive data and consistent interpretation of medical findings; it 
prompts clinicians to ask more questions and collect more data; it reduces the opportunity for 
clinicians to include non-probative conclusions; and it streamlines the laborious documentation 
process by asking clinicians to check boxes and draw on pictograms rather than write out lengthy 
narratives (which can be especially challenging and time-consuming in low-literacy environments). 
And, because of the printed format, the standard form is easily legible, making it accessible to non-
clinicians (police officers, lawyers, and judges) for use in their investigations, prosecutions, and 
adjudication of these cases.14 This standard form, known locally as the Medical Certificate, was 
featured as a model template in the International Protocol on the Documentation and Investigation 
of Sexual Violence in Conflict, launched by the United Kingdom in June 2014.15
While the emergence of the standard form helped to enhance forensic medical documentation 
in individual cases, we also noted that sexual violence cases were still stymied by basic infrastructure 
hurdles (e.g., poor roads, which impedes the delivery of documentation) and resource constraints 
(e.g., paper and pens to document evidence are often in short supply, and police officials often 
lack funds for petrol or access to vehicles to travel to a health clinic or crime scene). Through our 
sustained presence working with these communities, we were also acutely aware of the daily risks 
that medical, law enforcement, and legal professionals face by retaining hard copies of sensitive 
documentation, especially in hostile political environments. Community police stations sometimes 
lack storage resources, so sensitive case files can be left open on the dirt floor, where evidence 
could easily be lost or compromised. And frontline first responders and other stakeholders 
may themselves be threatened for preserving evidence as this material can incriminate alleged 
perpetrators. We also work with senior military judges who feared evacuating from their own 
homes in the middle of conflict – despite the fact that they were being personally targeted by rebel 
11 See National Guidelines on Management of Sexual Violence in Kenya,” 3rd ed., 2014, accessed November 22, 2016,  
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Kenya_Natl-Guidelines-on-Mgmt-of-Sexual-
Violence_3rd-Edition_2014.pdf.
12 See National Management Guidelines for Sexual Assault, 2003, accessed November 22, 2016, http://www.cecinfo.org/
custom-content/uploads/2012/12/SouthAfrica-Sexual-Assault-Guidelines-2003.pdf.
13 National Protocol for Sexual Assault Medical Forensic Examinations, US Department of Justice, Office on Violence 
Against Women, 2013, accessed November 22, 2016, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ovw/241903.pdf. California 
Medical Protocol for Examination of Sexual Assault and Child Sexual Abuse Victims, 2001, accessed November 22, 
2016, http://www.caloes.ca.gov/GrantsManagementSite/Documents/2-923%20to%202-950%20Protocol.pdf.
14 The South Kivu medical-legal network began using a hard copy version of this form in sexual violence cases in 2012, 
and in June 2016 national authorities in Kinshasa (the Ministries of Justice, Defense, Health, Interior, and Women, 
Family, and Children (formerly Gender), along with The President’s Special Representative on Sexual Violence in 
Conflict and the Recruitment of Child Soldiers) obtained consensus to adopt the medical certificate nationally. 
15 See “Annex 10: Sample sexual assault medical certificate,” International Protocol on the Documentation and Investigation of 
Sexual Violence in Conflict, (London: Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2014), 138, accessed November 22, 2016,  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/319054/PSVI_protocol_web.pdf; 
Second edition of the International Protocol on the Documentation and Investigation of Sexual Violence in Conflict, 
accessed March 30, 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/598335/
International_Protocol_2017_2nd_Edition.pdf. 
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factions – because they did not want to leave behind several years’ worth of sensitive documentation 
from the many mass crimes cases over which they presided in mobile courts. These judges worried 
about the destruction of these court records as well as the safeguarding of witnesses, survivors, 
and others involved in prosecuting these difficult cases. 
Taking all of these infrastructural and political challenges into account, and building from 
the simple but powerful innovation of the standard form, PHR conceptualized a mobile app that 
sought to overcome these obstacles while at the same time facilitating comprehensive forensic 
documentation of evidence, safeguarding it from loss or willful tampering or destruction, and 
creating secure channels to transmit evidence from the health clinic to the police stations and courts. 
Figure 1. A typical medical record or “carnet” at a health center in DRC.
Figure 2. A portion of the standard medical intake form for sexual violence developed in DRC.
Naimer et al.
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Early Design, Field Testing, and End User Feedback
In a setting in which forensic medical exams are rarely conducted, or conducted poorly, MediCapt 
was designed, first and foremost, to allow clinicians to collect and document medical evidence of 
sexual violence in a standardized, systematic manner. The app’s early versions were essentially 
digitized configurations of the standard form into a digital format. Intended to reproduce the 
standard form, the app, however, also provides clinicians with prompts (demographics, history, 
physical, mental health) that may serve to enhance the quality of the medical encounter by 
reminding clinicians about the degree of comprehensiveness required (conducting a full body 
exam, taking forensic photos of injuries, requesting lab tests where possible) and providing them 
with decision support. This feature, subsequently, may enhance the care given to the survivor and 
the overall clinical skills of the physician. Once the evidence is collected, we envisioned an app 
that would securely transmit the data to law enforcement and the justice system, circumventing 
infrastructural barriers, overcoming communication barriers, and preventing the loss, destruction, 
or inadequate storage of data and evidence. 
Figure 3. Proposed flow of information through the use of MediCapt.
The initial prototype - a simple conversion of the sexual violence standard form to a digital 
format - used an off-the-shelf, third-party platform called Magpi and contained more than 250 
entries using simple logic features. In January 2014, PHR piloted this early iteration of MediCapt 
with eight Congolese physicians from Bukavu, Minova, and Uvira in eastern DRC who had 
previously participated in PHR’s forensic training. These clinicians provided frank feedback and 
quickly became our collaborators in the app’s design. While the clinicians liked the concept of the 
app and saw the benefits of digitizing the standard medical certificate, they also helped identify 
two key areas for improvement: a cumbersome user interface and the absence of any photo capture 
capacity. Moreover, despite building logic into the app, the clinicians requested a more intuitive 
interface, the ability to use a secured camera to take photographs, and additional functionalities 
such as a writable pictogram. 
Following this first round of field-testing in DRC, PHR engaged a technology development 
company, Main Street Computing, to conduct a thorough needs assessment, user analysis, and 
technology landscape review. After determining that no other existing technology met the specific 
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needs articulated by the end users, we started from scratch to develop a completely new version of 
MediCapt. Given this opportunity, we chose to future-proof the technology – to ensure MediCapt 
maintains the ability to be a dynamic, nimble technology that can respond to different needs and 
contexts as appropriate. In other words, MediCapt is designed to be able to accommodate the 
relevant form required in different legal jurisdictions. The overall MediCapt architecture is now 
built as a modular system to allow for the creation of different forms and corresponding app skins. 
Significantly, the app is also designed to also accommodate the various languages and literacy 
levels of its users. With a robust forms-creation and forms-management backbone, MediCapt can 
now be used not only for the standard form in DRC, or any post-rape care or sexual violence 
standard form, but also for other human rights documentation and data collection efforts.16
MediCapt’s Key Features
Working with technologists at Main Street Computing, we decided to disaggregate the goals of 
MediCapt, separating them into two separate objectives: the capture of details of a forensic medical 
evaluation, and the use of those details in the pursuit of justice. To execute this newly refined 
vision, we created both an Android app that would be used by the medical sector (data generators) 
and a web app that would be accessed by law enforcement in their investigations, by the judicial 
system as evidence of a sexual violence crime, and by PHR researchers (data retrievers) in a de-
identified, aggregated manner for early detection of mass crimes and to trigger rapid response. 
This diagram outlines the approach used in developing MediCapt 2.0: 
Given the intermittent and unreliable Wi-Fi connectivity in some remote areas of the DRC, we 
determined that offline functionality would be essential, and that the mobile app should be able 
to receive the forensic medical information, capture photographs, and then store this data until 
connectivity is established. Accordingly, we have chosen to use store and forward architecture that 
16 The app was designed to accommodate lack of familiarity with digital interfaces by simplifying as much as possible the 
number of choices in the menu. To that end, we have attempted to minimize the number of possible interactions for 
the user toward the goal of keeping it accessible for those with low digital literacy. With regard to language, the app, 
as well as the back-end content management system (where forms are configured), is multilingual by design. The 
first two languages currently configured are French and English, but other languages are readily accommodated by 
adding language specific forms to the back end and language specific user interface elements to the app.
Figure 4. MediCapt information flow between mobile app and web app.
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allows us to capture data and store it in an encrypted form on the hardware (smartphone or tablet), 
and then send that data to the server at a different time. An additional benefit of this architecture 
is that, if a connection is lost during transmission, the data that has already been transmitted need 
not be sent again, and, upon re-connection, the remainder of the data will be sent. These features 
are essential, given the limited bandwidth in the DRC.
MediCapt has also been designed to include the following additional features: (1) Camera: 
The basis of the camera feature on MediCapt is InformaCore – an open-source library for Android. 
InformaCore enhances the camera on the mobile phone by capturing and validating authenticity. 
In addition to using some of the core components of InformaCore and the camera on the mobile 
phones themselves, for security and confidentiality purposes, the photos are stored within the local 
database on the app and not within the photo gallery of the phone. (2) Writable Pictogram: The 
pictogram is one of the clinicians’ preferred features of the standard form. We sought to replicate 
that in MediCapt, allowing clinicians to use digital pictograms. In this feature, health care workers 
have the ability to add markers to the pictogram (to identify where injuries or forensic information 
are found on the body). MediCapt then prompts clinicians to take a forensic photograph of the 
noted area, and they can add notes as well. (3) Authenticity: Establishing authenticity of the patient 
file is a key benefit of using technology for sexual violence documentation. The MediCapt mobile 
app currently captures crucial metadata including latitude, longitude, environmental sensors, 
time and date stamps, and other identifying information that will help establish the veracity of 
the record. (4) Encryption: Maintaining the security of the information inputted into MediCapt is 
crucial for the success of this application. All data stored in the local database is encrypted upon 
creation, and all photos taken are stored in encrypted format inside the database, not as separate 
files. No data is stored in an unencrypted state on the device.
Finally, we also hoped from the outset that MediCapt could be used for improved future 
monitoring surveillance and early detection of mass violence. Our design therefore allows for 
individual files to be de-identified to protect the privacy of the survivor, and for critical fields to be 
aggregated and analyzed. With this function, for example, it may be possible to look at geographic 
parameters, timelines, and clusters of crimes, and cross-reference this information with open-source 
intelligence concerning military and militia activity within a specific timeframe or location. This 
analysis would allow investigators and prosecutors to map trends or patterns of locations attacked, 
types of victims targeted, injuries sustained, weapons used, languages spoken, and military or 
militia uniforms worn by perpetrators. Not only will this data assist in documenting the prevalence 
of sexual violence and the widespread or systematic nature of attacks, it will also provide the 
factual and legal criteria necessary for reframing a series of seemingly-isolated, individual attacks 
as mass crimes or crimes against humanity. These indicators may also serve as compelling evidence 
to hold military or civilian leaders to account for the crimes committed by their subordinates under 
command responsibility – a key doctrine for war crimes prosecutions.
Partnering with Clinical End Users for “Co-Design” 
As a general rule, any technology should be designed with the end users in mind, and, if possible, 
in close collaboration with them. We adopted a collaborative or co-design approach in which 
we made efforts to involve our clinical end users in all phases of the design: the initial needs 
assessment, the prototyping and refinement of the app, and the exploration of its usability in their 
clinical workflow and patient care routine. This was pursued over the course of three years, during 
which we engaged our clinician partners in multiple rounds of refining the app through training 
workshops, focus groups, and surveys. In each round, we solicited input on design, clinical matters, 
and usability, all related to the clinicians’ unique practice settings and existing infrastructures, and 
upgraded and updated each subsequent version based on their feedback.
This ongoing dialogue helped uncover various systemic, institutional, infrastructural, and even 
cultural barriers to a successful implementation of MediCapt. Going paperless emerged as a key 
issue. In eastern DRC, most health care settings do not employ an electronic health record system 
(EHR), and the idea of capturing and recording health care data electronically is a foreign one not 
only to the clinician, but also to the patient. There is a cultural expectation that any documentation 
generated during clinical visits be produced as a hard copy – in the form of a hand-written “carnet”, 
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visit summary, or, in these cases, a sexual violence document. Patients expect to receive a hard copy 
to take to the police, hospitals need them for storage in paper charts, and administrators are often 
accustomed to providing a literal stamp of approval. Rather than disregard these cultural norms, 
we decided to create a printing feature as a work-around. However, this adaptation required 
additional modifications from the technology team, and it pushed back our expected field launch. 
Moreover, it presented additional hurdles in the form of material restrictions (e.g. lack of available 
printers and ink, copiers, and supplies).17 
Additional barriers to a successful implementation of the app fell into three groups: (1) 
infrastructural; (2) systemic and organizational; and (3) personal behavior. Infrastructural problems 
included frequent periods with no electricity, and a lack of consistent Wi-Fi availability.18 End 
users overall lacked clarity regarding digital data storage and they did not uniformly understand 
the concept of cloud storage. From the organizational perspective, questions were raised about 
institutional buy-in and support at the hospital level as well as at the district, regional, and national 
levels. Finally, human factors played a substantial role in the perceived likelihood of adoption of 
this new technology. These behavioral issues included a wide range in technological literacy, a 
range in the clinicians’ degree of openness to changes in their work flow, a range in their willingness 
to invest time in learning to use this app, and a range in their abilities to negotiate peer resentment 
and perceived jealousy after receiving advanced devices and monetary incentives to participate in 
our program. 
Additionally, as mentioned above, our potential users for this technology extend beyond 
medical clinicians to include professionals from the law enforcement and judicial sectors. Among 
this larger group of end users, there is also a range of skill and comfort levels regarding technology 
adoption, digital literacy, and electronic data collection. Future phases of the app’s development 
will therefore more closely involve these data receivers and processors (law enforcement and legal 
practitioners). 
The field-testing is still in its early stages. To date, we have tested the usability of the app in 
simulated conditions with about 12 clinicians from five health facilities in North and South Kivu. 
We expect these clinicians to begin piloting the app with patients later this year.
Monitoring and Evaluation 
Our team is designing a robust longitudinal monitoring and evaluation process.19 Ideally, MediCapt 
will enable us to look at each individual case – putting the survivor at the center – and ensure 
that all necessary medical data (history, physical findings, photographs of injuries, lab results) 
are collected and stored in one place, organized in a standardized and consistent fashion, and 
as comprehensively as possible in order to facilitate a successful legal process. Digitization and 
time stamping should further improve the capacity to track cases from initiation to conclusion 
and to identify delays in the submission and processing of an individual case. These features will 
ultimately bring greater accountability and transparency to a process that has been sorely lacking 
in efficiency, completeness, and timeliness. 
17 Once clinicians input the information into the MediCapt mobile app, they will then have the ability to print directly 
from their mobile device (via Bluetooth technology) to allow for multiple copies of the standard form. These paper 
copies of the form will then be distributed to the survivors themselves, law enforcement, and prosecutors. The 
original record will still be saved digitally (in the cloud), ensuring the original forensic medical information will be 
preserved in the event that the paper copies are lost, stolen, or misfiled. The original forensic medical record would 
then be produced in court with chain of custody intact, if needed. 
18 The app is designed to function when off the electric grid by accommodating offline access, and battery powered 
printers.  If the device and printer are charged, the app can function off-grid for hours, and when back at the office 
or clinic, the app syncs with the back-end server once network connectivity has been established.  Any commodity 
battery that has USB charging can be used to extend the life of the tablet and printer, including solar charged batteries, 
however at the time of this writing, we have not specifically tested this configuration.
19 We are still in the early stages of field-testing the usability and feasibility of the app in the clinical setting.  We have not 
yet begun to compare data collection with the app against the process of using the paper form alone to determine if 
there are differences in accuracy, completeness, and ease of use, among other possible outcomes. We plan to evaluate 
these issues in the near future, via a “standard practice” control group. Similarly, we are developing an assessment 
instrument to gauge the acceptability of the app from the survivor perspective.
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MediCapt will also facilitate the ability to look at de-identified aggregate data and gain 
important insights about process (how many cases are seen per week, per month, per location, 
per clinician, etc.), and also about outcomes (the number of cases tried, those ending in a 
conviction, etc.). Important epidemiological information could be extracted from the dashboard, 
for example, regarding age and gender distribution of cases, types of assault, injury patterns 
and weapons used, geographic locations. This population-level information and data mapping 
will be critical in revealing prevalence and patterns of violence and uncovering systematic 
atrocities and crimes against humanity. All of this said, we anticipate it may require years of 
study before we can determine the full impact of MediCapt on medical, legal, and human rights 
outcomes.
The Risks and Responsibilities of Human Rights NGOs Leveraging Technology in Pursuit of 
Their Missions 
At present, there are roughly three categories of technology tools being used in human rights 
communities: those created to assist activists in gathering information and documentation to expose 
or highlight violations; those that collect, analyze, and preserve evidence that could be admissible 
in a court; and, finally, those that aim to secure or enhance communication among activists or 
even provide protection (e.g. Amnesty International’s panic button app). All three categories of 
tools have serious risks associated with them, and require that the human rights and technology 
communities come together to identify best practices to address these risks.
MediCapt, which falls into the second category, has been particularly challenging as it requires 
that the user or manager of MediCapt be able to produce credible metadata that can be used by a 
magistrate, judge, or other person to assess the integrity of the evidence. There is a very real risk 
that hackers may seek weaknesses in the architecture of the app, and we have therefore focused on 
safeguarding the security of the app itself. Any attack might conceivably place the user and many 
others at risk. We have thus needed to address the question of what constitutes a fair warning to 
potential users. 
Many related issues also need to be further explored. No information or evidence will be 
collected from a person without their informed consent, including their consent for how the 
information or evidence will be used. But once consent has been given, who then owns the 
information and evidence that is being collected? The scope of some of this technology also goes far 
Figure 5. Images of MediCapt screens.
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beyond personal information or evidence from a person’s body or memory. With so many activists 
pursuing justice, the question of who owns the evidence is paramount. Unless these issues are 
clarified, we may witness the privatization of evidence collection, with attendant threats to chain 
of custody as well as accusations of bias. 
Another crucial issue is how to assess the lifecycle of technology and when such technology 
needs to be retired because it can no longer be safeguarded. As organizations and funders direct 
significant resources toward the development of both new hardware and software, users must be 
made aware of any changes to older legacy products and security safeguards. 
Situating MediCapt in Context 
In addressing these questions regarding the development of MediCapt, PHR has tried to develop 
the most functional app possible with all relevant safeguards, knowing that information and 
evidence collected in DRC is too often lost, destroyed, tampered with, or languishes in a hospital 
because the police were unable to collect the information. PHR aimed to be absolutely mindful of 
the security issues involved in the development of MediCapt but not let the perfect be the enemy 
of the good – especially given the current state of impunity for crimes of sexual violence. What we 
have learned along the way is to see the development and use of the app as a process.  We will need 
to ensure that changing contexts – political, technological, and judiciary – may at times impact 
how the app functions. It is our responsibility to ensure that PHR and our partners in DRC can be 
responsive to these developments in a timely manner.
Conclusion 
MediCapt is being designed and developed with the hope that it will eventually be used by 
clinicians around the world. Currently, PHR and our partners in DRC are continuing to refine 
this technology while also attempting to increase the comfort levels of our end users with 
MediCapt’s interface. After completing competency trainings – which will seek to model actual 
clinical settings with standardized (simulated) patients – we will partner with pilot hospitals 
to integrate this app into their standard operating procedures for patient care in cases of sexual 
violence. And, as national authorities adopt and roll out the standard medical form across the 
country, PHR will work with health, law enforcement, and legal officials to train and integrate 
MediCapt into that process as well. Along the way, we will be documenting both setbacks and 
successes and we will continue to learn from and collaborate with our many partners – the 
end users, technologists, citizen activists, clinicians and ethicists, human rights advocates, 
and funders. 
We have been especially grateful to our DRC-based colleagues, who have placed their trust 
in us and provided vital input at every step in this process. With their help, we have remained 
focused on directing this new technology toward the larger mission of transforming justice 
systems. Ultimately, if survivors of sexual violence and other human rights violations can succeed 
in holding perpetrators accountable through the court systems in their communities because they 
are equipped with more compelling, comprehensive forensic evidence to support their allegations, 
we will have taken a major step forward.  
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Sensors Everywhere: Using Satellites and Mobile Phones to Reduce 
Information Uncertainty in Human Rights Crisis Research
Christoph Koettl
Amnesty International
Washington, D.C., USA
Introduction
Human rights researchers pin much hope on the use of information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) to strengthen the quality of their research. Increased trainings,1 funding,2 and 
hiring of specialized staff are all signs of the high expectations that technology will positively 
impact, if not provide an easy fix, to current human rights problems. However, in order to realize 
the actual potential of ICTs, it is important to conceptualize clearer their added value, and to go 
beyond wishful assumptions: A single app or interactive map will hardly catch a war criminal,3 
and ICTs are no panacea for atrocity detection or response.
ICTs by themselves do not deliver complete truth—let alone provide a shortcut to justice—as 
they largely capture a limited scope of information. Instead, they add very specific details and 
insights to research. Their significant added value in mass atrocities research thus arises from their 
ability to reduce information uncertainty. A 2015 UN report on ICTs and human rights, specifically 
in regards to the right to life, pointedly captures the challenge ICTs can help to address:
(…) the work relating to protecting this right [to life] often concerns disputed facts or even the 
availability of facts. Individuals commit violations of the right to life not because they believe 
it is justifiable, but because they believe they will not be called on to justify themselves. That 
places a premium on fact-finding and evidence.4
Uncertainty can best be described as the inability to assign probabilities. Information 
uncertainty in a human rights documentation context, as stated in the quote above, encompasses two 
related challenges: information scarcity and the unknown quality of available information. While 
these are not new challenges in human rights research, the latter is exacerbated in the digital age.
This article describes how ICTs reduce information uncertainty during human rights crises, 
which, by definition, are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty and the commission of 
atrocity crimes. The author will showcase how ICTs are integrated into human rights crisis research 
to detect and document mass atrocities, i.e. crimes under international law such as war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, or genocide. It is written from a practitioner’s perspective, drawing from 
the work of a global human rights watchdog, thus avoiding the trap of inferring conclusions from 
a single region or a specific tool. Having said that, since ICTs describe a wide range of technologies 
that enable the electronic collection, transmission, presentation or storage of data, this article 
focuses on two specific types of ICTs that are used to address information uncertainty: geospatial 
and mobile phone technologies. 
Crisis, Uncertainty and the “Lemon Problem”
Information uncertainty is especially high during times of crisis. Common traits of human rights 
crises are condensed in the following table: 
1 See, for example, “Remote Sensing for Humanitarian Programs Workshops,” Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, accessed 
July 20, 2016, http://hhi.harvard.edu/education/workshops/remote-sensing. 
2 See, for example, “The Tech Challenge for Atrocity Prevention,” Humanity United, accessed July 20, 2016, http://
thetechchallenge.org/blog/. 
3 Owen Bowcott, “eyeWitness to Atrocities: The App Aimed at Bringing War Criminals to Justice,” The Guardian, June 7, 
2015, accessed July 25, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/08/eyewitness-to-atrocities-the-app-
aimed-at-bringing-war-criminals-to-justice; Christoph Koettl, “#DemandJustice: The Website War Criminals Don’t 
Want You To Share,” July 19, 2012, accessed July 25, 2016, http://blog.amnestyusa.org/africa/demandjustice-the-
website-war-criminals-dont-want-you-to-share/. 
4 United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns: Use of 
information and communications technologies to secure the right to life, April 24, 2015 (A/HRC/29/37), 5-6. Highlighting by 
author. 
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A cross-cutting attribute across these issues is the presence of serious, often widespread, 
human rights violations. Crisis situations are prone to the commission of atrocity crimes, resulting 
from perpetrator expectations that their crimes will go unnoticed or can be easily dismissed or 
minimized5 in an environment of high information uncertainty.
5 Scott Edwards, “Fieldwork from the Sky: Remote Data Collection from War Zones,” International Sudan Studies 
Association 2009 annual conference in Pretoria (2009), South Africa, 1-3. 
Table 1. Common traits of human rights crises.
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The Lemon Problem
The combination of the characteristics listed in Table 1 create what can be referred to as the “lemon 
problem”—the risk of using misinformation that can discredit an entire research project. While this 
is an old challenge, it has been exacerbated in the digital age, where the spread of misinformation 
is made easier by digital social media networks.6
The lemon analogy is borrowed from economics. The term lemon is used in the United States 
to describe a defective car, and was used by Nobel Prize winning economist George Akerlof 
to analyze quality uncertainty, using the example of a car buyer who faces the risk of buying a 
bad car7 (whereas a used-car dealer represents an institution that reduces quality uncertainty). 
International theorist Robert Keohane used this analysis to explain the creation of institutions in 
international affairs.8
Both of these concepts prove useful in assessing the value of ICTs for human rights crisis 
research. In this context, a lemon describes a piece of misinformation—or bad information—that 
creates the danger of discrediting the accuracy of research. Accuracy has always been at the core of 
human rights fact-finding, as standard works on this topic emphasize: 
For NGOs, the stakes in surviving (…) scrutiny could not be higher. The credibility of their 
fact-finding is their stock-in-trade. Broadly stated, the chief objective of human rights NGOs 
is to promote compliance with international human rights standards. (…) Fact-finding lies at 
the heart of these efforts, and the fact-finding ‘works’ when it convinces the target audience 
that the published allegations are well founded.9
The opportunities for human rights documentation stemming from the omnipresence of 
digital sensors are undeniable. Investigations by both intergovernmental10 and non-governmental11 
human rights monitoring groups increasingly rely on video or photographic evidence. However, 
the rise of ICTs and citizen media leads to an exponentially growing lemon problem. With lower 
6 For a recent study on the online misinformation ecosystem see Craig Silverman, “Lies, Damn Lies, and Viral Content. 
How news websites spread (and debunk) online rumors, unverified claims, and misinformation,” Tow Center for 
Digital Journalism, February 10, 2015. As the author states on page 35: “There is a growing online misinformation 
ecosystem that churns out false information at an increasing pace. Its success often depends on two factors: the ability 
to cause sharing cascades on social networks and the ability to get online media to assist in the propagation, thereby 
adding a layer of credibility that further increases traffic and sharing.”
7 George Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 84, 3 (Aug 1970), 488-500.
8 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984). See also a 2004 interview with Keohane: “Akerlof showed how in an economic market, the 
used-car market, there could be market failure. That is, the lack of institutions could create a situation where prices 
didn’t clear. A buyer was not able to buy a car from a seller for a mutually agreed price which would have been good 
for them both, because there were no institutions, there was nobody to make credible promises unless you have this 
institution of the used-car dealer. I saw immediately that the used-car dealer was very much like the international 
institution, which would increase the credibility, the promises, reduce uncertainty, and reduce the cost of 
transactions, and, therefore, this was the key to thinking about the role of international institutions.” “Robert Keohane 
Interview: Conversations with History”, Institute of International Studies, University of California Berkeley, March 9, 
2004, accessed July 27, 2016, http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people4/Keohane/keohane-con2.html.
9 Diane Orentlicher, “Bearing Witness: The Art and Science of Human Rights Fact-finding,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 
3 (1990), 92-93.
10 On the use of information and communications technologies by human rights mechanisms, see United Nations, “Report 
of the Special Rapporteur”, 17-19. For a specific example, see also: Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, United Nations, Technical Note prepared by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 
Mr. Philip Alston, in relation to the authenticity of the “Channel 4 videotape,” January 7, 2010, accessed July 27, 2016, http://
groundviews.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/un_technical_note.pdf?x98647. 
11 See, for example, Human Rights Watch, “Sri Lanka: Execution Video Shows Need for International Inquiry,” August 
26, 2009, accessed July 25, 2016, http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/08/26/sri-lanka-execution-video-shows-need-
international-inquiry; Amnesty International, “‘Shocking’ Video Shows Armed Group Carrying Out Summary 
Killings of Men in Syria’s Idlib Province, Says Amnesty International,” November 1, 2012, accessed July 25, 2016, 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/press-releases/shocking-video-shows-armed-group-carrying-out-summary-
killings-of-men-in-syria-s-idlib-province-says. 
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barriers to self-publishing and re-sharing digital content instantly and globally, the spread of 
misinformation increases. The lack of institutions that provide quality control—such as traditional 
media outlets before the advent of digital social networks—contribute to this challenge, which only 
recently came under scrutiny through the fake news debate following the 2016 U.S. presidential 
elections. The human rights profession is not immune to this problem, and examples of human 
rights related lemons are plentiful: 
• In a since removed tweet, Human Rights Watch Executive Director Ken Roth used a drone 
video from the destruction in Gaza in the aftermath of the 2014 conflict to describe the 
impact of barrel bombs on Aleppo.
• In the first half of 2016, images from the conflict in north-east Nigeria were repeatedly 
used to support claims of mass atrocities in other countries. The same images were then 
used in the context of extrajudicial executions in Burundi, and the crisis in South Sudan 
starting in June 2016.12
• A video showing extreme violence, likely stemming from Kenya, is repeatedly circulated 
online. The highly graphic video was used to describe post-election violence in Cote 
D’Ivoire,13 in addition to describing violations in the context of South Sudan and Burma. 
• The BBC used an image from Iraq in 2003 for a story on the Houla massacre in Syria in 
May 2012.14
• In the last week of May 2016, a video of a killing was posted, reportedly related to the 
Fallujah Offensive that started in late May.15 However, a second video16 of the same 
incident was already shared in mid-April 2016. The incident was thus old and not related 
to this specific military operation.
This list is a non-comprehensive sample. Global human rights groups are faced with such 
digital misinformation on a weekly basis. There is another cost of the lemon problem, in addition to 
the high risk of inaccuracy. It forces human rights researchers to treat every piece of digital content 
with extreme caution, and creates high opportunity costs to review and assess a video or image. 
There is no silver bullet to detect lemons, and the verification process of a single piece of digital 
content can easily take up an entire day.17 Consequently, a lot of content is either ignored (the triage 
problem) or added on only as an afterthought, once enough traditional research is gathered.
Corporate institutions emerged over the last years to fill the void in quality control, the 
most prominent being Storyful, the self-described world’s first “news agency (...) for the social 
media age.”18 However, with its focus on viral and newsworthy content and its cost-prohibitive 
subscription, this is not a suitable option for human rights groups, thus leaving it to individual 
researchers themselves to verify information. Both large news organizations and human rights 
organizations started to set up internal institutions to provide quality control, such as the BBC’s 
12 Andrea Spada, Twitter Post, March 1, 2016, 6:43a.m, https://twitter.com/Baldoriano/status/704633182063370240. 
[Warning: Graphic Content]
13 Julien Pain, “Beware of Internet Misinformation: Hoax Footage of Atrocities in Ivory Coast,” France 24, July 4, 2011, 
accessed July 27, 2016, http://observers.france24.com/en/20110407-beware-internet-misinformation-hoax-footage-
atrocities-ivory-coast. 
14 Chris Hamilton, “Houla Massacre Picture Mistake,” BBC, May 29 2012, accessed July 25, 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
blogs/theeditors/2012/05/houla_massacre_picture_mistake.html. 
15 Video originally posted on Twitter https://twitter.com/irakiRevolution/status/736240104155586561. Account has been 
deleted.
16 Twitter Post, April 22, 2016, 10:27p.m. https://twitter.com/D_yassir_1/status/723699727146057728. [Warning: Graphic 
Content]
17 Christoph Koettl, “Citizen Media Research and Verification: An Analytical Framework for Human Rights Practitioners,” 
(Human Rights in the Digital Age: CGHR Practitioner Paper 1, Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge Centre of 
Governance and Human Rights), January 2016, accessed July 27, 2016, http://www.cghr.polis.cam.ac.uk/publications/
cghr-practitioner-papers-series/paper-1. 
18 Mark Little, “The Human Algorithm,” May 20, 2011, accessed July 27, 2016, http://blog.storyful.com/2011/05/20/the-
human-algorithm-2. 
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user-generated content hub,19 or Amnesty International’s Tactical Research and Analysis Team.20 
An interesting trend to follow will be the creation of collaborative and volunteer networks to 
address the lemon problem, such as Amnesty International’s Digital Verification Corps,21 which is 
tasked “to find content in social media streams and to verify videos and photographs to help (…) 
researchers monitor and report on human rights violations.”22 Journalism schools started to offer 
graduate program in so-called Social Journalism that include coursework on verification,23 and the 
human rights field might follow suit.
A technical solution to address the lemon problem is documentation apps that capture relevant 
metadata and chain of custody records. These have the potential to be impactful on specific issues 
and when working with dedicated networks—as Karen Naimer, Widney Brown, and Ranit Mishori 
write in their article published in this special issue of Genocide Studies and Prevention—but are less 
likely to be adapted by large numbers of people or utilized by bystanders.24
Applications in Human Rights Crisis Research 
ICTs can help address the challenges faced during crises as listed in Table 1. Geospatial technologies 
and camera enabled cell phones have proven the most useful in human rights crisis research, as 
they can be used to circumvent access restrictions to collect and transfer potential evidence.
Geospatial technologies, most notably satellite imagery, are some of the most impactful tools 
to circumvent access restrictions and address the information scarcity problem. As one of the 
case studies below will detail, satellite imagery enables human rights fact-finding in inaccessible 
areas such as North Korea. While satellite images are limited regarding the human rights issues 
they can document, this technology has proven successful to document a range of violations, 
including violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ESCR). It is important to note that space-based remote sensing allows for the 
detection of both spatial and temporal trends. Vast archives of satellite imagery give researchers 
access to historical records, which can be highly relevant in the documentation of atrocity crimes. 
Relevant features to assess include: civilian, military or humanitarian infrastructure, and if and 
how they have changed over time.25 Further, satellite sensors collect data across the infrared, 
visible, and ultraviolet wavelength of the electromagnetic spectrum. This has ramifications for 
human rights researchers, as it allows going beyond simple visual analysis (e.g. housing demolitions 
or other infrastructure demolitions) to more advanced analysis, such as detecting petrochemical 
releases26 or thermal anomalies.27 Remote sensing technologies will gain in importance 
over the coming years, as more commercial actors enter the sub-meter resolution market, including 
micro-satellite companies, and entry barriers to using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) get 
lower. 
19 Sally Taft, “How Did You Help Us Change the Way We Report the News?” December 27, 2014, accessed July 28, 2016, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-30421631. 
20 See the informal blog of the team, “Lemming Cliff - View from the Event Horizon,” accessed March 1, 2017, https://
medium.com/lemming-cliff. 
21 PBS Newshour, “A New Generation of Human Rights Investigators Turns to High-tech Methods,” February 13, 2017, 
accessed February 27, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dDLtL8aWRAQ.  
22 Sam Dubberley, “New Data and the Importance of Collaboration,” July 18, 2016, accessed July 28, 2016, https://
citizenevidence.org/2016/07/18/new-data-and-the-importance-of-collaboration/. 
23 The City University of New York, Graduate School of Journalism, accessed July 25, 2016, https://www.journalism.cuny.
edu/academics/social-journalism/curriculum-and-courses/. 
24 Karen Naimer, Widney Brown and Ranit Mishori, “MediCapt in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: The Design, 
Development, and Deployment of Mobile Technology to Document Forensic Evidence of Sexual Violence,” Genocide 
Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 11, no. 1 (2017): 25-35.
25 See, in detail, Nathaniel A. Raymond, Brittany L. Card, and Isaac L. Baker, “A New Forensics: Developing Standard 
Remote Sensing Methodologies to Detect and Document Mass Atrocities,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An 
International Journal, Volume 8, Issue 3, (2013) Article 6.
26 American Association for the Advancement of Science, “Documentation of Petrochemical Release: Bodo, Nigeria,” 
accessed July 26, 2016, http://www.aaas.org/page/documentation-petrochemical-release-bodo-nigeria. 
27 Lars Bromley, “Relating Violence to MODIS Fire Detections in Darfur, Sudan,” International Journal of Remote Sensing, 31, 
9 (2010), 2277-2202.
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Mobile phone technology has implications for gaining access to information and has led to 
an explosion in open source information that human rights researchers can exploit. Open source 
information includes publically accessible information such as news articles, academic articles, 
statistics, and, increasingly, audiovisual content or reporting shared through online social 
networks. This rapid growth of information is fed by smart phone technology and enabled by digital 
networks. It is important to note that the audiovisual content by itself is nothing new. Prominent 
human rights-relevant examples from the pre-digital age are the Rodney King video or the Zoran 
Petrovic video of Srebrenica.28 Camera enabled cell phones, the digitization of content, and the 
ongoing increase in internet penetration are the game changers. The result is that information is 
distributed less through official media outlets, such as TV broadcasts and newspapers, and more 
through online social networks in real-time. Thus, more than ever, reporting on human rights 
abuses moves beyond the control of governments. The implications for researchers are profound, 
similar to the advent of commercial remote sensing. 
The following case studies and examples provide insights on how these technologies positively 
impact human rights fact-finding.
Satellite Imagery
The unspeakable atrocities that are being committed against inmates of the kwanliso political 
prison camps resemble the horrors of camps that totalitarian States established during the 
twentieth century. The institutions and officials involved are not held accountable. Impunity 
reigns.29
The value of ICTs to address lack of information is most powerfully demonstrated in the use of 
satellite imagery to document political prison camps in North Korea. Despite severe constraints, the 
UN Commission of Inquiry on North Korea was able to document serious violations of international 
human rights law on a systematic level that suggest that North Korean authorities are committing 
crimes against humanity.30 ICTs played a crucial role in contributing to the establishment of the 
Commission and the collection of rare evidence used by the Commission. 
North Korea is one of the world’s most reclusive and inaccessible countries. Human rights 
researchers face the following problems when attempting to document the system of political 
prison camps and associated human rights violations:
• Human rights researchers do not have direct access to the country.
• No other independent observers, such as international journalists or the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),31 have access to the political prison camps
• Due to heavy restrictions on freedom of expression, there is no online or social media 
content available of the camps. In fact, there appears to be only a single piece of audiovisual 
content available of the political camps, which is a video by Japanese Fuji TV, reportedly 
of Yodok camp.32
Human rights researchers thus have only two options to research camp conditions –by 
interviewing the few people who were in one of the camps and fled the country, or by using remote 
28 “Rodney King beating video, full length footage,” YouTube video, 8:08, March 3, 1991, accessed July 25, 2016,  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sb1WywIpUtY; “Zoran Petrovic video,” YouTube video, 1:16, July 14, 1995, 
accessed July 25, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=344e_D-Vc7g. 
29 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “North Korea: UN Commission documents wide-ranging and 
ongoing crimes against humanity, urges referral to ICC,” February 7, 2014, accessed July 27, 2016, http://www.ohchr.
org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14255&LangID=E#sthash.ukBW9bLP.dpuf. 
30 Ibid.
31 While the ICRC has a small presence in Pyongyang, it does not appear to have access to any political prison camps. See 
ICRC, ”The ICRC in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” accessed July 27, 2016, https://www.icrc.org/en/
document/dprk-icrc-activities-leaflet. 
32 Reuters, Video Shows Harsh Life in N. Korean Camp - Japan TV, February 27, 2004.
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sensing. Detention facilities lend themselves very well for remote observation, due to the fact that 
the detention infrastructure is easy to detect and assess from afar. The rationale of using remote 
sensing came from addressing some of the following uncertainties:
• The very existence of the camps: North Korean officials deny the existence of political prison 
camps. While denial is a standard strategy of perpetrators,33 in this case it is especially 
difficult to counter authorities’ narrative due to an almost complete lack of information 
about the camps. The dependence on an extremely limited number of eyewitness becomes 
even more challenging when testimony appears to contain inaccuracies.34
• The number of camps: There was some dispute about the exact number of political prisons 
camps, due to reports of closures. Current reports estimate four active camps. 
• The number of prisoners: It remains unclear how large the size of the prison population is, 
and current estimates list 80,000-120,000 people.35
In 2003, the US Committee on Human Rights North Korea (HRNK) published a seminal report 
on the camp system.36 It was one of the first times a non-governmental organization deployed remote 
sensing for human rights documentation, providing visual evidence of a vast system of political 
prison camps. Amnesty International later used satellite to document the existence of the camps, 
as well as apparent changes to the camps’ infrastructure. In 2013, during the run up to the vote at 
the UN Human Rights Council that established the Commission of Inquiry, Amnesty International 
released findings that suggest that authorities are expanding its detention infrastructure, by setting 
up a new security zone adjacent to Camp 14.37 This determination was made by analyzing satellite 
imagery that showed the construction of fences and controlled access points, which limited the 
freedom of movement of people living within the newly created control zone.
33 Edwards, Fieldwork from the Sky, 1-3. 
34 Catherine E. Shoichet and Madison Park, “North Korean Prison Camp Survivor Admits Inaccuracies, author says,” 
CNN, January 20, 2015, accessed July 25, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/18/asia/north-korea-defector-changes-
story/.
35 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “North Korea: UN Commission Documents Wide-ranging and 
Ongoing Crimes Against Humanity.” 
36 David Hawk, “The Hidden Gulag. Exposing North Korea’s Prison Camps. Prisoners’ Testimonies and Satellite 
Photographs,” US Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, (2003), accessed July 27, 2016, https://www.hrnk.org/
uploads/pdfs/NKHiddenGulag_DavidHawk.pdf.
37 Amnesty International, “North Korea: New images show blurring of prison camps and villages,” March 7, 2013, 
accessed July 27, 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/03/north-korea-new-images-show-blurring-
prison-camps-and-villages/. 
Figure 1. © DigitalGlobe. February 7, 2013.
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A few months later, new satellite imagery analysis documented ongoing investment in the 
camps’ infrastructure, such as new housing blocks and an expansion of production facilities38—
facts that were in direct contrast with ongoing North Korean authorities’ claims that the political 
prison camps do not exist. 
Satellite image analysis subsequently played a crucial role in the report of the Commission of 
Inquiry, the most comprehensive record of the human rights situation in North Korea. The value 
of the imagery analysis was highlighted by Chairman Michael Kirby during the presentation of the 
report, and a separate appendix with only satellite images is a further sign of the importance of this 
content to the investigation.39 
In addition to documenting the very existence of the camps, thus establishing basic facts 
in, details were derived from the imagery that addressed some of the other uncertainties. For 
example, additional analysis from December 2013 determined the exact size of Camp 16, which 
with 560 km2 is three times the size of Washington, D.C.40 Analysis by the HRNK and AllSource 
Analysis pointedly captures how satellite imagery reduces information uncertainties in regards to 
speculations on the creation of a new camp: 
The Ch’oma-bong Restricted Area is unique among North Korea’s network of [political prison 
camps] in that its identification as a political detention facility is based upon the analysis of 
satellite imagery, comparison of its infrastructure characteristics with other [political prison 
camps] (e.g., security perimeter with entrance and guard positions, internal arrangement, 
etc.), and its physical association with Camp 14—they share a common security perimeter 
for approximately 3.1 kilometers.41
Looking forward, more could likely be done to gather additional human rights relevant facts: 
For example, occasionally satellites capture construction in progress, as was the case in a 2013 
satellite image of Camp 16. Such insights into the size of houses and rooms could be used to make 
more precise estimations on the size of the prisoner populations. With the advent of satellite video,42 
the potential capture of active vehicles and checkpoints could be indications of ongoing activities 
in the camps, which might counteract claims to the contrary.
The use of satellite images in human rights documentation has become standard since HRNK’s 
2003 report and too many examples exist to list in this article. However, two additional examples 
are especially useful to demonstrate how satellite images are reducing information uncertainty.
In January 2015, both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch released satellite images 
of one of the deadliest Boko Haram attacks to date. The high-resolution images of the burned down 
villages of Baga and Dora Baga in north-east Nigeria created massive media coverage, including 
front page coverage in the New York Times.43 It is noteworthy that this coverage came approximately 
two weeks after the actual attack happened. Only minimal information was available of the attack 
and no journalists or human rights researchers could reach the affected area. This information 
challenge was exacerbated by a lack of local communications infrastructure.
In Sri Lanka in 2009, satellite imagery allowed researchers to gain remote access to the 
conflict affected area and provide human rights relevant documentation, such as the presence of 
impact craters or the emergence of gravesites in the so-called Civilian Safety Zone. Additionally, 
38 Amnesty International, “New satellite images show scale of North Korea’s repressive prison camps,” December 5, 2013, 
accessed July 27, 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/12/new-satellite-images-show-scale-north-
korea-s-repressive-prison-camps/.
39 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights “Satellite images of currently existing political prison camps 
(kwanliso) in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” January 28 2014, accessed July 27, 2014, http://www.ohchr.
org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIDPRK/Pages/ReportoftheCommissionofInquiryDPRK.aspx.
40 Amnesty International, New satellite images show scale of North Korea’s repressive prison camps.
41 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Andy Dinville, and Mike Eley, “North Korea: Ch’oma-bong Restricted Area,” March 17, 2016, 
accessed July 27, 2016, https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/ASA_HRNK_Chmbg_201603_FINAL.pdf.
42 “Terra Bella,” Google, accessed March 17, 2017, https://terrabella.google.com/.
43 “Frontpage January 16, 2015,” New York Times, accessed July 20, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/images/2015/01/16/
nytfrontpage/scan.pdf.
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Figure 2. © Digital Globe. May 26, 2013.
Figure 3. Graphic and analysis by AAAS, used with permission.
analysts at the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) were able to draw 
conclusions about the likely actor responsible for shelling, a fact that was repeatedly disputed 
by the parties to the conflict.44 Analysis of craters, their ejecta patterns, and likely trajectories of 
44 See, for example, an incident in January 2009: “The spokesman for the Sri Lankan military, Brig. V. U. B. Nanayakkara, 
denied that government artillery had hit a United Nations compound, or a hospital compound. He said that either the 
relief and hospital officials had been pressed by the rebels to disseminate false information, or that the Tamil Tigers 
had been responsible for the shelling.” Quoted in Somini Senguptajan, “U.N. Staff and Hospital Come Under Shelling 
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shells revealed that multiple impact craters stemmed from artillery positions of the Sri Lankan 
army.45
Mobile Technology
In addition to Syria, the armed conflict in north-east Nigeria is a prime example that demonstrates 
the impact camera enabled cell phones have on human rights fact-finding.
For two 2015 reports on violations by both Boko Haram and Nigerian security forces, Amnesty 
International analyzed close to 100 videos in addition to multiple photographs. The footage—
stemming from eyewitnesses and likely perpetrators, captured mainly on cell phones and 
shared via messaging apps or on social media, —played a crucial role in the research. The videos 
predominantly showed human rights violations by Nigerian military forces and an associated 
civilian militia, the so-called Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). A noteworthy lemon that slipped 
into this collection was a video of a likely homicide from outside the conflicted affected area.46
The videos captured multiple incidents related to the ongoing conflict. A single date—March 
14, 2014—stood out both in terms of the severity and scale of violations and the amount of available 
digital content. On that day, Boko Haram attacked Giwa military barracks in Maiduguri, freeing 
hundreds of detainees. In response to the attack and prison break, Nigerian security forces and 
CJTF killed more than 600 men and boys, most of them recaptured detainees.47 Videographic 
evidence played a leading role in the following investigation. Footage included a Nigerian soldier 
executing an unarmed person in broad daylight who was lying on the ground. Two other videos 
showed how security forces and CJTF forced captured young male adults to dig graves before 
executing them by cutting their throats. (The same video showed up with claims that it originates 
in the Central African Republic).48 While the location of this incident could not be independently 
verified from the footage alone, Amnesty International researchers were able to receive the original 
video files. This allowed analysts to confirm the incident date by reviewing the intact metadata 
of the files (which is often not possible since the metadata is normally altered or removed when 
files are shared through social media or mobile phone apps such as WhatsApp or Signal). Most 
importantly, the footage presented strong evidence in terms of agency, which is crucial to identify 
specific units or command responsibility. An inventory number visible on a rifle of a Nigerian 
soldier suggests that it belonged to the Support Company of the 81 Battalion (and Amnesty 
International researchers confirmed with sources within the military that this specific rifle has not 
been reported stolen).49 Such findings might have political or legal implications. The International 
Criminal Court is currently conducting a preliminary examination into the armed conflict in 
north-east Nigeria. Additionally, national legislation, such as the Leahy Law in the United States, 
prohibits military aid to foreign security forces that are implicated in serious violations of human 
rights. It is precisely this sort of detail on unit involvement and command responsibility that has 
serious implications on the vetting process of the Leahy Law.50
Another example comes from Bama, 70 km east of Maiduguri, where several individuals 
recorded various incidents. Multiple videos showed how Boko Haram fighters in September 2014 
took prisoners from Bama prison, tied them behind a truck, dragged them to a bridge, lined them up, 
as Sri Lanka Fights Cornered Rebels,” New York Times, January 27, 2009, accessed July 28, 2016, http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/01/28/world/asia/28lanka.html?_r=0. 
45 See especially Figure 11, American Association for the Advancement of Science “High-Resolution Satellite Imagery and 
the Conflict in Sri Lanka,” (2009), accessed July 28, 2016, http://www.aaas.org/geotech/sri_lanka_2009. 
46 “Man arrested with dead baby in suitcase in Abuja,” September 16, 2012, accessed July 28, 2016, http://naijagists.com/
man-arrested-with-dead-baby-stuffed-suitcase-in-abuja/. 
47 Amnesty International, “Nigeria: More than 1,500 killed in armed conflict in north-east Nigeria in early 2014,” March 31, 
2014, accessed July 28, 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AFR44/004/2014/en/. 
48 “Génocide en Centrafrique: L’élimination des musulmans se poursuit paisiblement,” Alwihda Info, June 3, 2014,  
http://www.alwihdainfo.com/Genocide-en-Centrafrique-L-elimination-des-musulmans-se-poursuit-paisiblement_
a11542.html. [Warning: Graphic Content]
49 Amnesty International, “Nigeria: Gruesome footage implicates military in war crimes,” August 5, 2014, accessed July 28, 
2016, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/08/nigeria-gruesome-footage-implicates-military-war-crimes/. 
50 “Leahy Vetting,” U.S. Department of State, accessed July 25, 2016, https://www.humanrights.gov/leahy-vetting.html. 
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killed them, and threw their corpses in a river. Due to the clear geographic landmarks visible in the 
video (prison and bridge), it was possible to confirm the exact locations and reconstruct the event. 
More than a year earlier, the Nigerian military conducted a screening operation of hundreds 
of men in the same town, after which 35 were arrested and later executed. Several, lengthy videos 
allowed analysts to reconstruct the operation, identifying the exact location as 380 meters east of 
Bama market. At one point, eyewitnesses were filming each other. Such multi-angle videos will 
play an increasingly important role in human rights investigations, as they allow for detailed 
crime scene reconstructions, especially when combined with satellite imagery, as is already 
common in law enforcement investigations. Examples for such an approach are Situ Research’s, 
Forensic Architecture’s and Human Rights Watch’s reconstruction of White Phosphorous attacks 
on residential areas in Gaza in 2009,51 or Forensic Architecture’s and Amnesty International’s 
investigation into the attack on Rafah on August 1, 2014.52 
Describing the amount of human rights relevant photo and videographic evidence from 
Syria goes beyond the scope of this article, but also raises important questions about archiving 
and evidence handling. Jay Aronson in his contribution to this special issue provides an analysis 
on preservation of human rights related video, in which he identifies two core tensions: first, the 
purpose of preservation; and second, the control over the saved content. Many important questions 
around consent, security, privacy, and ethics can be traced back to these two issues, as Jay Aronson 
argues in his article published in this special issue.53 The Syria Justice and Accountability Center54, 
51 “White Phosphorus Report,” Situ Research, accessed July 25, 2016, http://www.situresearch.com/works/white-
phosphorus-report.
52 “‘Black Friday’: Carnage in Rafah,” Amnesty International, accessed July 25, 2016, https://blackfriday.amnesty.org/.
53 Jay Aronson, “Preserving Human Rights Media,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 11, no. 1 (2017): 
82-99.
54 U.S. Department of State, “The Syria Justice & Accountability Center. Fact Sheet,” February 20, 2013, accessed July 29, 
2016, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/02/205031.htm. 
Figure 4. Some colors inverted using VLC Player, for enhancement purposes only. Graphic produced by 
author.
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as a newly created organization, has been tasked with this effort, among other responsibilities. 
Automated analysis will play an increasingly important role in processing large datasets for human 
rights research and event reconstruction. For example, Carnegie Mellon University’s Center for 
Human Rights Science assisted with investigating the killing of protestors in Ukraine by processing 
520 videos with a total length of 65 hours with an audio analysis and synchronization tool.55
To give a final example of the increasing evidentiary value of video, digital content is 
playing an increasingly important role in assessing the legality or proportionality of airstrikes by 
international forces. Videos of suspected Russian airstrikes have been used to identify specific 
strike locations in residential areas, as analysts can use videos and photographs to geolocate specific 
buildings that were destroyed by airstrikes. For example, 17 civilians, including three children, 
were killed and at least 34 civilians were injured in September 2015 in Talbisseh, when suspected 
Russian air strikes hit Karama Street in the center of the city.56 Similarly, multiple buildings in a 
residential neighborhood in the immediate vicinity of a mosque were flattened in one of the first 
US led coalition airstrikes, on Kafr Deryan, in September 2014. While this information alone does 
not answer the question if this was a legitimate military target, the fact that videos show what 
appear to be multiple civilian victims, including children,57 would suggest otherwise, and raises 
questions for military commanders about violations of IHL. Additionally, Human Rights Watch 
identified the missile remnants visible in a photograph circulated online as the turbofan engine of 
a U.S. Tomahawk missile,58 tying the airstrikes in the area to US forces. This assessment is further 
supported by YouTube videos released by the U.S. Navy showing the launch of cruise missiles on 
the day of the attack.59 
As the above examples have demonstrated, cell phones have become important tools to collect 
and subsequently transmit digital audiovisual content that can provide important facts about the 
date and location of an incident. However, they go beyond providing such basic facts and often 
present crime base or linkage evidence, which reveal violations that would have gone otherwise 
unnoticed, and in the best case scenario identify the responsible actor. Tapping into this potential 
for reducing information uncertainty can provide the necessary facts and evidence to counter 
perpetrator strategies of denial and minimization. 
As the final case study will demonstrate in detail, combining satellite imagery with citizen 
media can increasingly strengthen mass atrocity research.
The Convergence of ICTs to Lead Atrocity Research
There has been a notable shift since human rights groups started using remote sensing in the early 
2000s as citizen media can gradually guide satellite imagery analysis. Such a tip and cue process 
was not possible before the widespread proliferation of camera-enabled cell phones. Research into 
suspected mass graves in Burundi provides a good case study of new ICT-led workflows in human 
rights crisis research.
In December 2015, reports about mass graves emerged shortly after Burundian security forces 
killed dozens of people on December 11, 2015. The killings included well-documented incidents 
of extrajudicial killings with evidence of close range shots to the head of some victims and at least 
55 Junwei Liang, et al, “Video Synchronization and Sound Search for Human Rights Documentation and Conflict 
Monitoring,” Center for Human Rights Science Report, (June 2016), accessed July 25, 2016, http://www.cmu.edu/chrs/
documents/Video-Synchronization-Technical-Report.pdf. 
56 Amnesty International: Syria, “‘Civilian objects were not damaged’: Russia’s statements on its attacks in Syria 
unmasked,” December 23, 2015, accessed July 29, 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde24/3113/2015/en/. 
57 Christoph Koettl, “Dissecting a US Airstrike in Syria,” October 26, 2016, accessed March 17, 2017,     https://medium.
com/lemming-cliff/dissecting-a-us-airstrike-in-syria-9c6e31b12fff#.4wy2yz5f2.  
58 Human Rights Watch, “US/Syria: Investigate Possible Unlawful US Strikes. At Least 7 Civilians Dead; Residents Say No 
Evident Military Target,“ September 27, 2014, accessed July 29, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/27/us/syria-
investigate-possible-unlawful-us-strikes. 
59 U.S. Navy, “USS Arleigh Burke launches Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles to combat ISIL,” September 23, 2014, accessed 
July 29, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H9034BawdX4; “USS Philippine Sea launches Tomahawk Land 
Attack Missiles to combat ISIL,” September 23, 2014, accessed July 29, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6a-
d67lJfdk. 
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one body tied up. However, the question of what happened to the bodies remained unanswered 
for several weeks after the incident. By January 2016, images started to appear on social media that 
claimed to show mass graves.
A shaky cell phone video of a desolated area was shared with Amnesty International. 
The short video did not reveal many reference points and ended with showing a small area of 
disturbed earth. A slow motion review of the video allowed analysts to extract crucial details: 
First, the video appeared to show five separate, small mounds. Second, the video included at 
least some geographic reference points, most notably an abandoned building, grave stones, and 
palm trees. Field and news reports suggested that one possible mass burial site was near Mpanda 
cemetery, to the north of the capital Bujumbura. A review of pre-event satellite imagery on Google 
Earth and other geographic databases eventually allowed pinpointing the exact location of the 
likely gravesite. Equipped with this new information extracted from the video and Google Earth, 
Amnesty International was able to commission analysis of new satellite imagery (Google Earth 
imagery normally does not provide the most current imagery. In this case, the available imagery 
was from prior to the event of interest). 
Figure 5. © DigitalGlobe/Google Earth. November 3, 2015. Graphic produced by author.
The analysis of new satellite imagery provided further important details. A time series of 
images showed that the area of disturbed earth emerged between 3 November and 22 December 
2015. Another satellite image from early January 2016 showed light vegetation re-growth, 
suggesting that the earth disturbance visible in the December image was likely very fresh, thus 
being consistent with the eyewitness claims that it is a mass burial site containing bodies of some 
of those killed on 11 December.
This case study describes the successful deployment of a combination of ICTs to detect a 
likely mass atrocity crime and led to the publication of a briefing that would have been impossible 
without the use of ICTs.60 Specifically, combining multiple technologies allowed the following:
60 Amnesty International, “Burundi: Suspected mass graves of victims of 11 December violence,” January 29, 2016, 
accessed July 30, 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr16/3337/2016/en/; Please note that a briefing on the 
killings, published in the immediate aftermath of the events, was based on field research: “‘My children are scared’: 
Burundi’s deepening human rights crisis,” December 22, 2015, accessed July 30, 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/en/
documents/afr16/3116/2015/en/. 
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1. Gaining access to a restricted area: Both video and satellite imagery allowed to gain remote 
access to a suspected mass grave site, which at that point was restricted to international, 
independent fact-finders. 
2. Determining the exact location: The video, despite being of low quality and lacking 
any major landmarks or reference points, allowed establishing the exact location of the 
suspected mass burial site.
3. Determining the time frame: Commercially available satellite imagery confirmed the exact 
location of the site. Most importantly, however, the time series of satellite imagery allowed 
establishing a time window within which the suspected grave site was created. 
Finally, it is important to stress that ICTs, by themselves, did not reveal all details about this 
incident. Both the video and satellite images showed disturbed earth at a specific location, created 
in a specific time-window, but this did not necessarily prove the existence of a mass grave, nor 
what was below the disturbed earth.61 Building on traditional research (eyewitnesses testimony), 
however, this technology-enabled research helped build a strong case, which allowed calls for 
accountability and further investigations, including physical access to the site to conduct forensic 
analysis. Thus, the analysis strongly reduced the uncertainties surrounding multiple reports of 
mass graves that were circulating for weeks in the aftermath of the extrajudicial executions. 
Teaching the Next Generation
When teaching the next generation of human rights researchers, it is imperative to not solely 
transfer technical skills. No matter which technology is used, at the core should be the responsible 
use of data, which is defined as 
[t]he duty to ensure people’s rights to consent, privacy, security and ownership around the 
information processes of collection, analysis, storage, presentation and reuse of data, while 
respecting the values of transparency and openness.62
Beyond this core guiding principle, different technologies create different risk scenarios, 
which should be considered at the onset of any new research project. Especially the increase of 
audiovisual materials through cell-phone cameras leads to datasets whose content often include 
information that can be used to identify specific individuals, a challenge that will only be exacerbated 
by the increased use of UAVs. In addition to the content, metadata that is invisible embedded in 
photographs or videos can reveal sensitive information about a person.
Satellite imagery that reveals little to no information about specific individuals, however, 
creates other risk factors. These include providing intelligence to a party to a conflict, or the public 
dissemination of other sensitive information such as trapped civilians who are fleeing violence. 
Only the responsible use of data (based on well-established professional standards) generated from 
inherent surveillance technologies such as satellites and drones can solve the tension of its use by 
human rights groups, who at the same time criticize the increase in government mass surveillance.
More and more resources exist that can be used in teaching on these topics. They include a 
growing body of academic articles on remote sensing,63 in addition to more technical resources 
61 However, for research on grave detection from air- or space-borne sensors, see G. Leblanc, M. Kalacska, and R. Soffer, 
“Detection of single graves by airborne hyperspectral imaging,” Forensic Science International, Volume 245 (2014), 
17- 23; Hannah Hoag, “Using Technology to Find Hidden Graves,” Discover, (October 2015,) accessed July 30, 2016, 
http://discovermagazine.com/2015/oct/14-body-of-evidence; M. Kalacska, et al, “The Application of Remote Sensing 
for Detecting Mass Graves: An Experimental Animal Case Study from Costa Rica,” Journal of Forensic Sciences, 54 
(2009), 159–166.
62 “DatNav: How to navigate and integrate digital data in human rights research,” (August 2016), accessed September 
2015, https://www.theengineroom.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/datnav.pdf, 63. 
63 See, for example, Susan Wolfinbarger, “Remote Sensing as a Tool for Human Rights Fact-Finding,” in The Transformation 
of Human Rights Fact-Finding, ed. Philip Alston and Sarah Knuckey, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 463-
478; Steven Livingston, “Commercial Remote Sensing Satellites and the Regulation of Violence in Areas of Limited 
Statehood,” CGCS Occasional Paper Series on ICTs, Statebuilding, and Peacebuilding in Africa, Nr. 5, (January 2015), 
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produced by universities.64 Initial in-depth writings have been published in the area of open source 
research and verification65 and the use of mobile technology66, in addition to the sharing of best 
practices, hands-on guides,67 case studies68 and ethics.69 
What is still missing is the development of actual curricula on new methodologies in human 
rights research, although first academic programs in this field are emerging.70 Additionally, large 
human rights groups have developed multi-day trainings for both internal and external audiences 
focusing exclusively on the ethical and impactful use of new technologies in human rights research.
Finally, there are increasing opportunities for students to gain practical experience in this 
work, through, for example, the Syracuse University’s Syrian Accountability Project71 or the Digital 
Verification Corps, a partnership between Amnesty International and the Universities of Berkeley, 
Essex, Toronto and Pretoria.
Conclusion and Outlook
Due to the high level of information uncertainty during human rights crises, there is a very high 
premium on fact-finding and the collection of reliable evidence. As this paper has shown, certain 
ICTs can help achieve this goal and can contribute meaningfully to mass atrocities research by 
reducing uncertainties. Often, this comes through the collection and transmission of highly 
relevant details on specific violations, including crime base and linkage evidence. To be clear, the 
technologies described here are most impactful if they are part of a holistic approach to crisis 
research: integrated into traditional research and deployed to address specific information gaps, 
instead of relying on a single technology or source.
There are a number of steps the human rights community can take to increase the efficiency 
of its current use of ICTs. First, human rights organizations can provide more trainings to their 
research staff. For example, Amnesty International has started to integrate geospatial and open 
source research and verification into its core research methodology training. While this is an 
important step, more can be done. Resources on methodology in these areas are still insufficient and 
there are needs and opportunities that can be addressed outside the practitioners’ field. Academics 
could contribute to the development of guidelines on the use of ICTs based on well-established and 
proven human rights research methodologies. Funders can support projects that go beyond tool 
development, such as grants for curricula development, in order to provide the next generation of 
researchers with the appropriate coursework.
Finally, human rights groups largely work in silos when it comes to filtering out misinformation 
from relevant content. While human rights crisis reporting increasingly builds on digital content 
and technology enabled research, the misinformation that was encountered during the research 
process largely remains on the computers or in the individual memory of a researcher. As a lot of 
digital misinformation is recycled content that re-emerges during crises, knowledge sharing and 
accessed September 15, 2016, http://www.global.asc.upenn.edu/app/uploads/2015/01/Livingston_Final.pdf.
64 See, for example, “The Nature of Geographic Information. An Open Geospatial Textbook,” accessed September 15, 2015, 
https://www.e-education.psu.edu/natureofgeoinfo/.
65 Koettl, Citizen Media Research and Verification.
66 Jay Aronson, “Mobile phones, social media and big data in human rights fact-finding. Possibilities, challenges, and 
limitations,” in The Transformation of Human Rights Fact-Finding, eds. Philip Alston and Sarah Knuckey, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 441-461.
67 “Citizen Evidence Lab,” Amnesty International, accessed September 15, 2016, https://citizenevidence.org/.
68 Christoph Koettl: “Using UGC in human rights and war crimes investigations,” in Verification Handbook for investigative 
reporting, ed. Craig Silverman, (Maastricht: EJC, 2015), Chapter 7, accessed September 15, 2015,  
http://verificationhandbook.com/book2/chapter7.php. 
69 On the topic of crowdsourcing, which has not been addressed in this article, see Martin Shields, “The Technologist’s 
Dilemma. Ethical Challenges of Using Crowdsourcing Technology in Conflict and Disaster-Affected Regions,” in 
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs Vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer/Fall 2013), 157-163.
70 See, for example, the University of Essex’s focus on technology and human rights in its 2015 Summer School, accessed 
September 15, 2016, https://www.essex.ac.uk/hrc/summerschool/default.aspx. 
71 “Syria Accountability Project”, Syracuse University College of Law, accessed September 15, 2016,  
http://syrianaccountabilityproject.org/.
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the creation of community knowledge, in the form of a shared database, could further help address 
the lemon problem.
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Jurisdiction, Privacy, and Ownership: DNA Technology and Field Dynamics 
in Conflict-Related Mass Fatalities
Stefan Schmitt, MS
Dallas Mazoori, JD 
Introduction
Criminal investigations and trials center around identifying evidence relevant to a defined crime 
and linked to an identified perpetrator and identifiable victim. In the case of death investigations, 
the cause of death is determined by a government authority—a medical examiner or coroner—
to be homicide, suicide, accidental, natural or undetermined. This determination has defined 
legal consequences, such as the opening of a criminal investigation in the case of a homicide. Part 
of the state’s responsibility in the course of a death investigation is to ensure that the victim is 
correctly identified as the individual they were at birth.  It is therefore in the state’s interest to 
ensure that human identifications are conducted under controlled circumstances and are subject 
to judicial review. The state acknowledges the death, generally via a death certificate, and ensures 
the implementation of legal consequences and processes, and in the course of so doing, effectively 
acknowledges the truth of what happened.
In the thirty years since DNA profiling was first used in a criminal case,1 investigators have 
come to rely on DNA as an important tool in identifying individuals, whether living or deceased. 
The role of DNA-supported identifications of human remains in mass fatalities has become 
particularly important as a means of dealing with large numbers of unidentified victims. In countries 
experiencing armed conflict or emerging therefrom, rule of law and with it forensic services are at 
best overwhelmed or have ceased functioning altogether. The short term solution of outsourcing 
human identifications with the intent of expediting the identification and repatriation of remains 
to the families of victims is one that appeals to national decision makers, victim families, and often 
also the international donor community. This can, however, lead to neglect of existing national 
forensic and infrastructure and the state’s obligation of due process in the case of wrongful deaths, 
divorcing the local jurisdiction from the overall human identification effort.2 
The current article explores the dynamics and challenges of undertaking human identifications 
in states experiencing armed conflict or emerging therefrom. Of primary concern to the authors 
is the fact that where a state lacking the necessary forensic infrastructure outsources DNA work 
for human identifications, it tends to lead to the abdication of the necessary jurisdiction and 
scientific transparency over DNA samples and their analysis. This can complicate the resolution of 
discrepancies that may arise between DNA laboratory results and field investigations.  It also raises 
important questions about consent, privacy and human rights. The authors argue that the role of 
the State remains integral to a legitimate human identification process. It is the State that makes 
the ultimate decision to identify an individual and confirm their death, and it is the State that is 
responsible for human rights, the right to the truth, civil identity and, through its administrative 
and judicial organs, review of decisions—something that can be overlooked in an outsourced 
context. Attempting to minimize initial delays in human identifications at the expense of building 
local knowledge, skills and necessary legal frameworks risks undermining the legitimacy of the 
human identification effort.
Human Identifications
Positive Human Identifications
Positive identification is a term used in the context of forensic human identifications to refer to 
the definitive determination that a person or deceased remains is that of a specified individual.3 
1 See R v Pitchfork, England and Wales Court of Appeal, May 14, 2009.
2 Stefan Schmitt, Amanda Sozer, Gillian Fowler and Dallas Mazoori, “Physicians for Human Rights: The Role of Forensic 
Archaeology in Transitional Justice Contexts,” in Forensic Archaeology: A Global Perspective, ed. W.J. Mike Groen et al. 
(Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015), 476. 
3 Segen’s Medical Dictionary, “Positive Identification,” accessed August 5, 2016, http://medical-dictionary.
thefreedictionary.com/positive+identification.
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A positive identification involves correlating known information about the deceased (or a missing 
person) with information from the body to a level of certainty so that a legal authority, typically 
medical examiner or coroner, is satisfied that the deceased individual is who they are recorded to 
be within an identification system, such as a civil registry. 
Positive Human Identifications in Mass Fatalities
A mass fatality is an event resulting in more deaths than the local available resources can process.4 
A mass fatality event can be manmade (armed conflict), natural disaster (tsunami), or accident that 
may be due to manmade or natural causes (plane crash). Mass fatalities occur under chaotic and 
uncontrolled conditions, and the number of victims is outside of what established forensic, law 
enforcement and judicial entities are prepared to handle. Such a context also requires stringent 
controls over the identification of human remains, which can often be fragmented, commingled, 
and it is unknown who exactly the victims could be. 
Interpol has addressed this for controls in their Disaster Victim Identification Guide.5 Interpol 
divides identification criteria into primary and secondary means of identification. The primary and 
most reliable means of identification are fingerprint comparisons between those of the decedent 
with existing fingerprint records, comparative dental analysis between existing dental records and 
the dental traits of the deceased and DNA kinship relationship and/or match analysis. Secondary 
means of identification include personal description, medical findings as well as evidence and 
clothing found on the body. Secondary means of identification serve to support identification by 
primary means and are not sufficient as a sole means of identification in mass fatalities. However, 
even where a strong primary identification standard has been achieved it is good practice to record 
other evidence that supports the identification. 
Unlike identifications that are made within the routine operations of a medical examiner, where 
often times the deceased is identified without primary means of identification (fingerprint, dental 
records, DNA) as the visual identification of the body by next of kin supported by the circumstances 
in which the death occurred are considered sufficient,6 identification in mass fatalities where the 
context is not controlled should never be made solely by means of visual recognition. 
The identification of human remains is therefore necessarily forensic in that the identification 
is a legal determination (sealed by the jurisdictional authority’s signature on a death certificate) 
based on the scientific matching of information on reported missing persons with unidentified 
human remains.7 The ways and methods through which this information is obtained and matched 
are important. The use of incorrect methods for collecting and documenting findings may 
render data, and the conclusions drawn from it, legally unacceptable, thus negatively impacting 
identification efforts.8 For this reason, transparency in the processes and decision-making involved 
in them, coupled with the availability of review, is essential. 
Dynamics of Human Identification Efforts in Mass Fatality Situations
The complexity of a human identification effort in the mass fatality context reflects the complexity of 
the event itself, and requires different agencies and jurisdictions to work together.9 The knowledge, 
approaches, procedures and functions of the range of actors involved in mass fatality response can 
vary significantly. A proper chain of command and organisational structure is essential to ensuring 
effective coordination between the different actors and elements.10 In addition, every mass fatality 
4 Amanda Sozer, DNA Analysis for Missing Person Identification in Mass Fatalities (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2014), 23.
5 Interpol, Disaster Victim Identification Guide (Interpol, 2014), 39-40 and Annexure 12 “Methods of identification,” 94-97, 
accessed May 10, 2017, https://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Forensics/DVI-Pages/DVI-guide. 
6 David Dolinak and Evan Matshes, “Identification,” in Forensic Pathology: Principles and Practice, ed. David Dolinak et al. 
(Burlington: Elsevier, 2005), 555-562. 
7 International Committee of the Red Cross, Missing People, DNA Analysis and Identification of Human Remains: A guide to 
best practice in armed conflicts and other situations of armed violence, 2nd ed. (Geneva: ICRC, 2009).
8 Amanda Sozer, DNA Analysis, 31.
9 Ibid., 23.
10 See Disaster Victim Identification Guide, 9, 34.
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response should be subject to the laws and rules of the country in which it occurs, to ensure that 
the response is situated within a legal framework that is legally and constitutionally supported in 
that jurisdiction.11
It is important to recognise the following dynamics in mass fatality human identifications:12
• The human identification effort in response to the mass fatality is temporary in nature. 
Ultimately, the objective is to repatriate the remains of the dead to their families and 
determine the truth about what happened. Such a process might take decades.
• The resources needed to adequately respond to a mass fatality exceed existing forensic, 
law enforcement, and judicial capacities and will require temporary additional resources. 
• Identifications and repatriation of remains will take time and some remains might never 
be identified or returned to their families. 
• Expectations and consent of families regarding the use of DNA samples and the duration 
of the project need to be managed and addressed from the onset. 
• It is important to decide on criteria for when the identification effort is concluded.13 
Eventually the project will wind down and the remaining workload should be integrated 
into routine governmental operations.
• A human identification effort needs to address the rights of victims’ families to know the 
truth about what happened to their loved ones.
• The identification of human remains is a judicial decision based on forensic science to 
identify a particular set of human remains as the person they were identified as at birth. In 
many cases this will be by the state itself via a death certificate.
As mentioned, all human identifications are necessarily forensic in that the identification of 
human remains is an act of the state based on scientific inquiry. This scientific inquiry is the statutory 
duty of the medical examiner or coroner in most countries and should be the same in every death 
investigation so that each victim, whether one or 1000, is accorded the same consideration under 
the laws governing the investigation of and response to sudden or violent death.14 
Sometimes, overwhelmed resources necessitate altering the response. For example, following 
the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City, the Chief Medical Examiner 
decided that given the cause and manner (blunt force trauma, homicide) were not in question, the 
primary focus was not on establishing the cause of death but on providing positive identification 
of the human remains, issuing death certificates and repatriating the remains to the victims’ 
families.15 
A mass fatality overwhelms the resources that routinely are at the disposition of any medical 
examiner. As DNA has become an efficient tool in processing large numbers of samples for the 
purposes of identification, the outsourcing of DNA profiling work to private laboratories is often 
a temporary solution. In such cases though, it still is the medical examiner in their forensic role 
who ultimately decides whether an identification can be made based on the data generated by the 
contracted laboratory. In that sense, jurisdiction over the samples, as well as any data resulting 
from the testing (the genetic profile) and its analysis, should be considered the responsibility of 
the medical examiner in the local jurisdiction.16 In contexts where sample testing and analysis 
11 Ibid., 19.
12 Stefan Schmitt, Amanda Sozer, William Haglund, Nizam Peerwani, Howard Varney and Robert Lamburne, Libyan 
Human Identification Needs Assessment and Gap Analysis (Cambridge, MA: Physicians for Human Rights, 2013), 11.
13 National Institute of Justice, Lessons Learned From 9/11: DNA Identification in Mass Fatality Incidents, (Washington, DC: 
National Institute of Justice, 2006).
14 National Institute of Justice, Mass Fatality Incidents: A Guide for Human Forensic Identification (Washington, DC: National 
Institute of Justice, 2005), v.
15 Gaille MacKinnon and Amy Z. Mundorff, “The World Trade Center—September 11, 2001,” in Forensic Human Identification: 
An Introduction, ed. Timothy James Upton Thompson and Sue M. Black, (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2007), 487-488.
16 Disaster Victim Identification Guide, “Jurisdiction.”
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is outsourced, it is also recommended to retain duplicate samples to allow for duplicate testing 
and/or analysis by a third party.17 Such practice can be an important quality control measure 
and is particularly important where discrepancies or other doubts about the results given by the 
outsourced laboratory need to be independently reviewed.18 
The management of the identification process from DNA sample collection to the extraction 
of profiles in the laboratory, the matching of such profiles, to the final issuing of identifications 
and death certificates can be difficult to achieve in contexts where states simply do not have the 
forensic infrastructure, capacity or an adequate medico-legal framework within which such a 
human identification effort is to be situated. Any mass fatality human identification effort needs to 
be viewed in its local social, political, cultural and economic context with due consideration given 
to whether a human identification effort is even possible, let alone sustainable.19
In recognition of such challenges on an international level, Interpol recommends the formation 
of an Identification Board that makes final decisions regarding the identification of victims. The 
composition of this Board is dependant on existing legal frameworks and its final jurisdiction is 
to be the home country for the victim identification, such as a coroner, judge, medical examiner, 
military or police authority.20
Often a mass fatality situation is understood as one requiring an immediate humanitarian 
response to grieving families resulting in the marginalisation of the legal aspects of the identification 
of human remains.21 The following principles should be standard as part of any mass fatality 
human identification effort:22
• Victims have a right to their identity after their death;
• All victims are treated equally in the identification process—there is no discrimination on 
any basis whatsoever;23 
• Victims are identified on the basis of set standards; and
• A single error can seriously damage the integrity of the entire process and any future 
processes. 
How DNA Changed the Human Identification Landscape
Prior to the inclusion of DNA profiling as a tool in what for the purposes of this paper has been 
defined as primary means of identification, identifications relied on one to one body landmark 
comparisons.24 Those established as most reliable are comparison of existing dental, medical, or 
fingerprint records with the corresponding body landmarks of the deceased. This requires the 
existence of such records, which often do not exist in countries experiencing or emerging from 
armed conflict. The deceased may have never visited a doctor or a dentist, or if they have, records 
may have been destroyed or never kept. Fingerprint records are generally only available if the 
deceased has been fingerprinted previously.25 Medical records need to include documentation 
unique enough to establish a level of certainty in the positive identification that this could only 
be the deceased and none other. Even where records exist, they may be of little to no use in 
17 Lessons Learned From 9/11, 75. 
18 Amanda Sozer, et al, Guidelines for Mass Fatality DNA Identification Operations (Bethesda: AABB, 2010). 
19 Stefan Schmitt, Amanda Sozer and Dallas Mazoori, Securing Afghanistan’s Past: Human Identification Needs Assessment and 
Gap Analysis (Cambridge, MA: Physicians for Human Rights, 2013), 6.
20 Disaster Victim Identification Guide, 81.
21 Schmitt et al, Securing Afghanistan’s Past, 8.
22 Disaster Victim Identification Guide, 39.
23 Discrimination of victims on the basis of political (e.g. martyrs vs. missing) or other reasons is likely to introduce a 
sampling bias in reporting missing persons and consequently decrease the success rate at which identifications of 
human remains are made. See Schmitt et al, Libyan Human Identification, 19. 
24 Bruce Budowle, Frederick R. Bieber and Arthur J. Eisenberg, “Forensic aspects of mass disasters: Strategic considerations 
for DNA-based human identification,” Legal Medicine 7 (2005), 231.
25 For example, fingerprint identifications were successfully undertaken in Thailand following the December 2004 Tsunami 
as Thai citizens are routinely fingerprinted when they obtain their national ID card.
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circumstances in which remains are highly fragmented or degraded and for which such body 
landmark comparisons are impossible.
Why DNA is a Game Changer
DNA-based testing is a powerful tool for victim identification as data is not restricted to any 
particular body landmark comparison, nor does it require existing records (such as fingerprints, 
medical or dental records) for comparison purposes.26 DNA can be extracted from almost any tissue 
of the body of a deceased victim and can be compared to either pre-existing samples of a deceased’s 
DNA27 or in comparison with DNA from next of kin. DNA can be extracted from minute biological 
samples, diminishing the importance of the existence of a full mouth of teeth or the preservation of 
skin with sufficient ridge detail on the fingers in the remains of a deceased. Furthermore, whereas 
identifications based on one-to-one body landmark comparisons couldn’t generate a statistical 
level of certainty in an identification, DNA for the first time was able to generate statistics which 
quantified the level of certainty of an identification. DNA technology made positive identifications 
possible without the need for a preserved body with its unique individual features. 
DNA analysis effectively became the main tool for human identifications in mass fatality 
incidents. Consequently, the role of the DNA laboratory and its requirements for consistent sample 
collection and processing needed to be integrated into what traditionally had been the responsibility 
of death investigators in their efforts to locate and collect secondary means of identification as well 
as existing medical, dental, and/or fingerprint records for comparison purposes.  
Prior to the advent of DNA analysis in the international arena of mass fatalities resulting 
from conflict, the medical examiner and/or forensic anthropologists and archaeologists (in the 
case of mass grave exhumations) controlled the entire process from exhumation in the field to the 
postmortem analysis of the remains in the laboratory. Due to the need for strict quality control and 
assurance processes in a DNA laboratory,28 it became necessary to control consistency of biological 
sample collection in the field to their submission to the DNA laboratory. This needed to be linked 
with witness testimony (antemortem information) and postmortem analysis that established 
the biological profile of the unidentified human remains for purposes of narrowing down 
candidates for identification prior to engaging in costly DNA analysis. From an administrative 
and managerial aspect, the DNA laboratory came to dominate many aspects of the identification 
effort—from antemortem data/witness testimony gathering to exhumations and sample collection. 
DNA samples needed to be collected not only from the remains, but also from next of kin, and 
their relationship with the suspected missing person established. Effectively, anything collected 
in the field pertinent to DNA collection and analysis needed to be entered into the laboratory 
information management system and consequently had to comply with the laboratory’s quality 
assurance and control processes to ensure reliable results which includes chain of custody level 
handling of samples and data.29 
The efficiency with which DNA profile matching and analysis in mass fatalities can now be 
done has established it in many ways as the primary method of identification with traditional 
methods, such as fingerprints and dental records, verified by DNA analysis. Secondary means of 
identification, such as witness descriptions of the victim, general medical conditions during life, 
and circumstances of disappearance or death of the victim, are used in support of the DNA profile 
match.30 These means of identification equally have to be coordinated with the DNA laboratory 
and the management of that data has to be integrated into the DNA led identification effort. 
26 Lessons Learned From 9/11, 13. 
27 Reference samples can be collected from known personal items such as toothbrushes, hair brushes, razors, and others. 
See Lessons Learned From 9/11, 5. 
28 Sozer, et al, Guidelines for Mass Fatality DNA Identification Operations. 
29 Ibid.
30 For example, inconsistencies between information from secondary means of identification with profile matches in the 
laboratory can be indications of errors that might have occurred in the sample collection process, i.e. sample switches, 
or in the data collection effort, which need to be resolved.
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Relevance of Civil Identity to DNA Identifications
Right to an Identity under International Law
The provisions of international human rights treaties centered around birth registration and 
acquisition of nationality31 require states to grant each person a name and legal personality, typically 
by issuing identity documents that are linked to rights and responsibilities within the state. The 
issuing of a birth certificate grants certain rights and responsibilities, and is often instrumental 
to the exercise of a myriad of other rights including the right to education, the right to work, the 
right to the highest attainable standard of health and the right to recognition as a person before 
the law. It is also allows the State to assert its rights in respect of the citizen. Similarly, the issuing 
of a death certificate has important legal implications for surviving family members, including in 
areas such as inheritance, land title, custody of children and compensation and insurance. Equally 
importantly though, it is also the process through which the cause and manner of death is certified. 
The ruling of a death to be the result of a homicide places the legal responsibility to investigate 
and adjudicate the death on the state. The issuance of a death certificate is not just a judicial 
determination identifying a person as he or she was identified at birth—civil identity—but also an 
important part of maintaining the rule of law by determining the cause and manner of death and 
investigating suspicious deaths.32 
The Importance of Civil Identity in Mass Fatality Human Identification Efforts
The process of generating one’s civil identity is performed through forensic human identification. 
For forensic purposes, an identity in such a case can be based on various factors, ranging from 
documentary evidence (adoption papers), to fingerprints, to DNA (affiliation with biological 
parents). In some cases, a subjective identification based on recognition of the remains in a controlled 
environment by witnesses and circumstantial evidence (e.g., someone died in bed surrounded by 
family members) is confirmed judicially by the medical examiner. The exact method of forensic 
human identification depends on the circumstances surrounding the death and the available 
evidence. In armed conflicts where people have died in uncontrolled circumstances and their 
remains have been lost, DNA identification plays an important role in establishing an individual’s 
identity. However, DNA is only one piece of evidence in the human identification process and 
needs to be evaluated along with all other evidence.33
Civil identity takes on additional importance in mass fatality incidents, such as armed 
conflict. The humanitarian response to such incidents often overlooks the need for human 
identifications to be carried out within their proper legal context, according to standard forensic 
practices. Often death certificates are needed before inheritance and property transfers can 
proceed or before orphaned children can be placed in the care of guardians. In such contexts, 
an integrated system of civil identity that includes birth, death and marriage certificates play an 
important role in not only the human identification process, but also in the restoration of rights 
post-mass fatality. 
The Need for a Domestic Legal Framework in Human Identifications
Jurisdiction
In any mass fatality human identification or disaster response effort the establishment of a clear 
command and control structure headed by a local authority that operates in accordance with the 
local legal framework is essential. Foreign experts and law enforcement officers deployed as part 
of a response need to be mindful that in general they have no legal powers within the host country 
and remain guests of that country.34 
31 United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art 15(1), G.A. Res. 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd session, 183rd 
plen mtg., UN Doc A/810, 10 December 1948; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Arts. 24(2), (3), 
opened for signature 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force 23 March 1976; Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, Arts. 7, 8, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force 2 September 1990. 
32 Schmitt et al, Libyan Human Identification, 11-12; Schmitt et al, Securing Afghanistan’s Past, 9-10.
33 Ibid.
34 Interpol, Interpol Tsunami Evaluation Working Group: The DVI Response to the South East Asian Tsunami between December 2004 
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As science has advanced, the forensic expert witness has come to be an integral actor in the 
criminal trial. Regardless of the circumstances in which a forensic expert testifies, they must do 
so honestly, impartially and independently, and be able to attest to such independence as part of 
any prepared report.35  The domestic legal framework of the local jurisdiction provides not only 
the means by which the legitimacy of the scientific data, collection and analysis can be examined 
and reviewed, but also the means by which forensic experts are certified as competent to provide 
expert opinion evidence. Supervisory regulation allows for independent bodies to regularly check 
systems and evidence in individual cases.36 This type of mandated transparency is essential in 
establishing public credibility in the results obtained by forensic scientists.37 
Cross-examination and Review
Within a domestic legal framework, forensic evidence, like other forms of evidence, can—and 
should—be tested. In the adversarial trial evidence is tested in accordance with established rules of 
evidence and criminal procedure. The defence can cross-examine the prosecution’s forensic expert 
and, in most jurisdictions, can also call an independent forensic expert to advance an alternative 
case theory or create reasonable doubt in the evidence proffered by the prosecution.
Access to judicial review of DNA laboratories, their scientists, and records is particularly 
important when it comes to the resolution of discrepancies that arise in human identifications. This 
is particularly salient when DNA matches done in the laboratory between reference samples (from 
the unidentified remains) and alleged family members are contradicted by the data gathered in the 
field. Discrepancies such as this indicate a problem somewhere between the sample and antemortem 
data collection and the sample processing and DNA matching done in the DNA laboratory. 
This can include things such as quality control issues in laboratories or at any step prior, accidental 
sample switches or mix-ups, contamination of samples or equipment, or miscommunication between 
field investigators and sample collectors.  In a forensic setting these type of quality control issues 
are resolved by transparent technical, scientific and administrative responses, such as laboratory 
accreditations. This transparency is necessary to ensure confidence both in the science and technology 
behind the employed forensic science, and in the administration of justice as a whole. 
In most western democracies, forensic DNA laboratories are accountable to the judiciary 
and are often state institutions precisely for this reason. In cases where transparency, methods 
or findings are questioned by the public, defendants, or even the prosecutor, most legal systems 
allow for the review of evidence by independent experts. These experts are brought into the 
judicial process and granted access to evidence and reports, either for review processes or for re-
examinations/-testing of evidence and/or samples.
The need for independent review of scientific techniques involved in DNA profiling was 
highlighted early on in the development of DNA evidence by the decision of the New York State 
Supreme Court in People v Castro.38 The defendant was charged with two counts of murder in the 
second degree in respect of a pregnant 21 year old woman and her two-year-old daughter. The 
prosecution intended to prove at trial that a bloodstain on the defendant’s wristwatch was the blood 
of the murdered woman. Judge Sheindlin found that the Lifecodes testing laboratory failed in its 
responsibility to perform the accepted scientific techniques and experiments capable of producing 
reliable results in DNA identification.39 As a result, key DNA evidence was ruled inadmissible. 
Although Castro ended up pleading guilty, the ruling on admissibility had a significant 
impact upon the use of DNA evidence in criminal proceedings, not just in the United States but 
around the world. It showed, for the first time, that DNA evidence was not infallible. It led to 
and February 2006 (Interpol, 2010), 48. 
35 Roy Beran, “The Role of the Expert Witness in the Adversarial Legal System,” Journal of Law and Medicine 17, no. 1 (2009), 135.
36 Michael Kirby, “Forensic Evidence: Instrument of Truth or Potential for Miscarriage?,” Journal of Law, Information and 
Science 20, no. 1 (2010), 1. 
37 Schmitt et al, Physicians for human rights, 472. 
38 People v Castro, New York Supreme Court, August 14, 1989.
39 For further discussion of the Castro case see, for example, Ian Freckelton, “DNA Profiling: Forensic Science under the 
Microscope,” Criminal Law Journal 14, no. 1 (1990), 35.
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the establishment, by Castro’s defence lawyers, of the Innocence Project—an organisation that 
exonerates the wrongly convicted through DNA testing and reforms the criminal justice system 
to prevent future injustices.40 At the time of writing, the Innocence Project has seen 349 people in 
the United States exonerated by DNA testing—including 20 who served time on death row—and 
149 real perpetrators found.41 The Castro case shows how an adversarial system in which equal 
access to highly qualified experts is afforded is especially well-suited for revealing limitations and 
weaknesses in evidence that other evaluative methods, including scientific peer review, reputation 
and publication, may not necessarily uncover.42 One of the reasons for this is the power of courts to 
compel disclosure of what would otherwise be confidential information.43
Many states experiencing or emerging from armed conflict are lacking in forensic capacity and 
infrastructure. If a human identification effort is to go ahead it may be necessary to outsource by 
removing samples and/or evidence from the national jurisdiction for testing and analysis. Whilst 
this may result in identifications being made when they otherwise would not have been possible, 
it separates the DNA analysis from a local context in which it can be verified or challenged. 
Discrepancies between crime scene and lab can be difficult to reconcile where communication 
between the lab and the field, and especially surviving victims, is challenging at best.  
States experiencing or emerging from armed conflict may also lack an adequate legal framework 
and a legal culture that is conducive to independent review. There may not be a culture of robust 
criminal defence or a legal aid system. Defence counsel may be hampered by an inability to review 
substandard crime scene processes and documentation or to request access to physical evidence. 
There may not be a pool of independent forensic experts or a culture of independent expert opinion 
in the legal system. Corruption may be significant. There may be no ability to protect witnesses 
or witness and victim privacy, something that raises additional concerns where DNA evidence is 
involved.
The Right to Privacy
DNA is more than just a powerful piece of evidence admitted in the criminal trial. The personal 
information that can be obtained from DNA “has no parallel in the history of science and raises 
profound questions about the protection of privacy.”44 Unlike fingerprints, DNA can reveal 
information about an individual and their family that goes beyond profile matching for purposes of 
identification. This can range from discovering personal family relationships (e.g. that unbeknownst 
to a father, a particular individual isn’t their biological child to determining ancestry (the genetic 
affiliation with a particular group or population) to predispositions to particular diseases.45 Any of 
this information can be used to the detriment of the individual donating their biological sample for 
the purposes of DNA analysis.
The concern over genetic privacy with respect to the biological sample is therefore one as to 
what type of DNA testing is done, what kind of analysis is performed, and what is done with the 
biological sample after the analysis has been completed. An important aspect of DNA profiles/
fingerprints used in human identification efforts is that they are limited to a small section of DNA, 
which has been proven to be unique between individuals. Other than tracking family relations, 
it really can’t be used for much else. A biological sample can be used to extract an individual’s 
entire genome, containing the entire set of their genetic information, but this is an entirely different 
40 Innocence Promect, 2016, accessed March 21, 2017, www.innocenceproject.org. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Jennifer L. Mnookin, “People v Castro: Challenging the Forensic Use of DNA Evidence,” Journal of Scholarly Perspectives 3, 
no. 1 (2007), 78.
43 Ibid., 94.
44 Robin Williams and Paul Johnson, “Inclusiveness, effectiveness and intrusiveness: Issues in the developing uses of 
DNA profiling in support of criminal investigations,” Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 33, no. 3 (2005), 551, citing a 
submission by Liberty in the Marper case. See also “Intervention by Liberty,” December 14, 2007, accessed May 10, 2017, 
https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/sites/default/files/s-and-marper-v-uk-european-court-of-human-rights-2007.pdf. 
45 Khaleda Parven, “Forensic Use of DNA Information v Human Rights and Privacy Challenges,” University of Western 
Sydney Law Review 17 (2013), 45-46. 
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process. Hence, the need to outline the exact purpose of collecting biological profiles and their 
disposition, what type of DNA analysis is done and how long the biological sample remains stored.
In the case of S and Marper v United Kingdom46 the European Court of Human Rights found that 
the indiscriminate and indefinite retention of fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles of 
individuals who were suspected, but not convicted, of offences was a breach of the applicants’ right 
to respect for their private lives within the meaning of Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. The Court held that given the nature and amount of personal information contained 
in cellular samples, their retention per se must be regarded as interfering with the right to respect 
for the private lives of the individuals concerned.47 That only a limited part of this information 
is actually extracted or used by the authorities through DNA profiling and that no immediate 
detriment is caused in a particular case does not change this conclusion.48 The Court observed that 
DNA profiles—whilst in coded form, intelligible only with the use of computer technology and 
capable of being interpreted only by a limited number of persons—have the capacity to provide 
a means of identifying genetic relationships between individuals sufficient to conclude that their 
retention interferes with the right to the private life of the individuals concerned.49 The Court 
reiterated that it was essential to have clear, detailed rules governing the scope and application of 
measures, as well as minimum safeguards concerning, inter alia, duration, storage, usage, access of 
third parties, procedures for preserving the integrity and confidentiality of data and procedures for 
its destruction, thus providing sufficient guarantees against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness.50
Unlike DNA matches used in criminal investigations, human identification efforts require the 
informed consent of the donor of the DNA sample. In turn, this requires an established purpose 
for the biological sample collection, the subsequent DNA extraction, storage and analysis via 
specialized software in a database, and the final disposition of the sample and the DNA profile after 
an identification has been generated. The donor consent form generally details the purpose of the 
biological sample collection and requests permission for a donor’s DNA profile and any personal 
information necessary for identifications to be “placed in a confidential registry or database for 
identification and statistical analysis.”51
The centralization of genetic profiles in a database is necessary to perform the statistical 
analysis that leads to profile matches, which is done via specialized software programs made for 
this purpose. For verification purposes, the profile matches equally need to be compared against 
other personal identifying information—such as secondary means of identification. This in turn 
requires legal safeguards against the information and data to be used for anything else other than 
for identification purposes. Such safeguards set human identification databases in mass fatalities 
apart from criminal investigative DNA databases, and thus these safeguards guarantee that other 
than for identification and repatriation of remains, the information will not be used to the detriment 
of the donor and/or their families.
An important consideration in conflict mass fatalities is the right to truth, which may entail 
criminal investigations at some stage. This necessitates balancing the protection of personal and 
confidential data with information release, often in a context in which legal systems have collapsed 
and privacy and data protection laws may not be in existence.
Genetic Privacy
For the purposes of human identification efforts, genetic testing primarily relies on extracting DNA 
profiles from nuclear DNA of a person’s biological sample. The particular genetic characteristics 
that are analyzed are called “Short Tandem Repeats” (STRs). STR DNA profiles consist of a series of 
46 S and Marper v United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Application Nos 30562/04 and 
30566/04, 4 December 2008).
47 Ibid., 73. 
48 Ibid., 73. 
49 Ibid., 75. 
50 Ibid., 99. 
51 National Institute of Justice, Mass Fatality Incidents: A Guide for Human Forensic Identification (Washington, DC: National 
Institute of Justice, 2005), 65.
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numbers and do not contain any relevant information regarding genetic indicators of disease. On 
their own, these DNA profiles can only be used to establish paternity and kinship relations among 
relatively close family members. A second type of DNA analysis used in determining human 
identity via family relationships is mitochondrial and Y-chromosome testing. This type of DNA is 
more useful in making linkages to inheritable diseases, but this is dependant on known diseases 
existing in ancestors. This again doesn’t identify actual inherited genes which are associated with 
particular diseases. None of these tests even examine areas of the DNA strand that have been 
demonstrated to code for diseases, nor do the laboratory processes use methods to isolate genes 
relevant to diseases or other genetic characteristics that are linked to behavior or ethnicity. The only 
discrimination that might arise is one that is based on known personal information of someone 
identified via DNA profile matching, not on what is visible in the string of numbers that represents 
their DNA profile.
There is the potential in examining what are called Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs) 
in DNA to determine things such as inherited genetic traits. Due to the ability of laboratories to 
extract DNA from degraded biological samples, this has begun to play an important role in human 
identification efforts. Using the appropriate laboratory process, this type of DNA extraction can 
be used to determine things such as inheritance of diseases, skin and eye color, and their physical 
characteristics. However, for human identification purposes, the information that is extracted 
by the laboratory and then examined contains no real personal or private information about the 
donor.52 The laboratory extraction processes used in SNP DNA analysis for human identification 
purposes, much like STR DNA analysis, do not even isolate information that might be considered 
information relating to personal information of the donor of the biological sample. Such information 
simply isn’t necessary.
DNA profiles used in human identification efforts are different from genome sequencing, 
which is the actual ‘printout’ of the entire genetic strand of a person. DNA profiles look at small 
portions of a person’s DNA, and particularly at those portions that do not contain any information 
relevant to things such as what is expressed in a person’s genome. From an identity perspective, 
they only become important when they are related to either the parents, or close family members. 
Association with disease, or other genetic traits (for example, eye or hair color, specific behaviors) 
cannot be made based on these genetic profiles alone. In other words—the genetic profile extracted 
for human identity testing in nuclear, mitochondrial, Y-chromosome, and SNP DNA analysis in 
and of itself does not yield or look at any genetic information that could be used to discriminate 
against the individual. 
Such DNA profiles are only really useful to establish kinship between parents and a child, 
or between a person and their closer relatives, e.g. brothers/sisters, or even uncles/aunts and 
possibly cousins. The series of numbers that represent a single DNA profile doesn’t by itself 
provide any relevant personal information. The DNA profile only becomes relevant when it 
provides information on relationships to people that are known to exist—on whom there are 
civil identification records tied to an existing person. Any information that could be used to 
discriminate is based on the knowledge of such relationships. Knowledge of such relationships 
can be used for discriminatory purposes, for example ethnic profiling. A good example is when 
genetic information reveals unknown relationships, such as a child not being biologically related to 
the father. Uncontrolled release of such information can have devastating effects, the worst being 
in contexts where adultery is considered a crime and punished as such, and in some cases could 
lead to so-called honor killings. The responsibility to protect people from such devastating effects 
is great and provides the basis for the argument to securely limit access to DNA profile databases 
and their analytical results. 
Genetic Privacy at the International Commission on Missing Persons
The International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) was established in 1996 on the initiative 
of then US President Bill Clinton with the aim of securing the cooperation of governments to 
52 Bruce Budowle and Angela Van Daal, “Forensically relevant SNP classes,” BioTechniques 44, no. 5 (2008).
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locate missing persons in the former Yugoslavia.53 ICMP has since emerged as an impartial global 
organization undertaking individual human identifications in a variety of contexts around the 
world. 
In one of its information sheets the organization states that ICMP’s mandate and work is 
separate and distinct from that of criminal justice institutions.54 The organization nevertheless 
recognizes:55
ICMP’s policies provide that personal data must be adequate, relevant and not excessive 
in relation to the purposes for which it is collected and processed. In addition, it may not 
be retained longer than necessary. It is clear, however, that in missing persons’ processes 
generally, and in the context of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in 
particular, forensic evidence may have to be kept for a greatly extended period of time.
Obtaining data subject consent thus requires implementing a commensurate measure of 
protection. Such protections have been provided through granting ICMP, its premises, data 
processing systems and communications privileges and immunities under domestic and 
international law.
ICMP extends the protection of the genetic profiles to denying donors access to their own 
profile for uses other than identification purposes.56 Furthermore, genetic profiles are encrypted 
to protect a donor’s genetic privacy. In addressing criminal investigative needs, the organization 
states that it does not make personal information in its possession available without the consent 
of family members of missing persons.57  If necessary, however, ICMP may provide a DNA profile 
or other personal information to a public authority mandated to address missing persons cases 
for which the DNA sample is being requested, provided that public authority observes adequate 
standards of data protection with regard to genetic and other personal data and provides credible 
assurance that it will not use the data for purposes other than those for which it has been provided 
to ICMP without the donor’s consent.58
The ICMP bases its justification and need for genetic privacy on the argument that genetic testing 
may identify a disease for which there is no cure or find a gene mutation which may cause or increase 
the risk of a disorder and that this information could fall into the hands of a wrong person. The spectre 
of genetic discrimination, which could be based on knowledge of such gene mutations, is also raised. 
By this line of argument, the ICMP asks donors to release the organization “from any obligation to 
provide you or any other party with the results of genetic analysis performed by ICMP.”59
The argument that concerns for genetic privacy vis-a-vis information contained in a person’s 
genome does not apply when it comes to DNA analysis in human identification efforts. Where it 
does apply is in the disposition of a person’s biological sample, from which a person’s entire genetic 
sequence could be obtained. In the context of human identification efforts this isn’t done and isn’t 
necessary. It is therefore important that a clear distinction be made between what information can 
be gained from DNA profiles generated for human identification purposes and what type of DNA 
extraction is done with the biological sample. The discussion of the right to privacy in this context 
is more relevant to the disposition and potential use of the biological sample, rather than the actual 
DNA profile.
53 Jeremy Sarkin, Lara Nettelfield, Max Matthews, and Renee Kosalka, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Missing Persons from the Armed 
Conflicts of the 1990s: A Stocktaking (Sarajevo: International Commission for Missing Persons, 2014), 34.
54 International Commission on Missing Persons, “DNA Genetic testing and processing information sheet,” February 3, 2016, 
accessed March 20, 2017, http://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/allegati/icmp_st_ls_299_4_doc-scheda_dna.pdf. 
55 International Commission on Missing Persons, “Data Protection,” 2017, accessed March 20, 2017, http://www.icmp.int/
the-missing/approaches-and-standards/data-protection/. 
56 International Commission on Missing Persons, DNA Genetic testing and processing information sheet. 
57 International Commission on Missing Persons. “DNA Reports Guide,” December 16, 2010, accessed March 20, 2016, 
https://www.icmp.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/icmp-fsd-dna-50-2-doc.pdf. 
58 International Commission on Missing Persons, DNA Genetic testing and processing information sheet. 
59 Ibid.
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Changing the Genetic Privacy Discourse
The discourse around genetic privacy—and what is perceived as genetic privacy—needs to be 
closely examined and questioned when it is used to justify genetic databases being given immunity 
from judicial inquiry. Our intent in calling for such examination is not to diminish the need for 
witness and family members’ protection and privacy. This is imperative. Rather it is to ensure 
that the rights of witnesses and family members are balanced with the rights of an accused person 
to a fair trial, a necessary component of which is the ability to test the evidence against them. In 
war crimes trials this basic principle takes on increased importance as the perception of bias by 
the court or tribunal can lead to accusations of victors’ justice and further instill existing divisions 
within the affected society. A proper legal framework and use of legal mechanisms designed to 
balance victim and witness privacy concerns with prosecutorial disclose obligations could prevent 
the abuse of such human identification databases. Although this won’t always be feasible, it should 
not be assumed that a country is incapable and/or unwilling to provide such mechanisms.
The key to matching DNA profiles is the database and its analytical capability (software) to 
properly identify kinship relations between individuals to the point where a positive identification 
can be made. As outlined previously, this needs to be verified via the antemortem data which 
is collected in the field. Separating the database and its analytical capability from the local 
jurisdiction therefore runs the risk of leading to miscommunications that can complicate any 
discrepancy issues that might arise. This can result in DNA matches made public before they are 
verified by the antemortem information, or simply because biological sample collection in the field 
is inadvertently contaminated, or samples switched, leading to DNA matches which aren’t correct 
(misidentification) or delays and miscommunication in informing families about identifications that 
have been made. This is particularly pertinent in environments where the language used between 
those that control the DNA profile database and analysis is different from the one spoken in the 
local jurisdiction. DNA human identification databases start with a few cases, to which more are 
added over time, depending on the scope of the mass fatality. Starting such a database outside of 
a national jurisdiction may introduce a de-facto situation where the ownership of such a database 
and its software is not legally defined, resulting in a national effort that has no jurisdiction over the 
database and the necessary software. Since the DNA profile on its own renders little information 
about a person, it is much more important to determine who controls the analysis of the DNA 
samples stored in the database early on in the human identification process.
The International Legal Framework for the Identification of the Missing and Repatriation of 
the Dead
The duty to search for the dead was first codified in respect of international armed conflicts in the 
1929 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies 
in the Field.60 It was subsequently codified in respect of international armed conflicts in the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and in respect of non-international armed conflicts in Additional Protocol II 
to the Geneva Conventions.61 
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 prescribe examination of the bodies, if possible by medical 
examination, with a view to confirming death, establishing identity and enabling a report to be 
60 Art. 3, opened for signature 27 July 1929, 118 LNTS 303, entered into force 19 June 1931.
61 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Art. 
15, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31, entered into force 21 October 1950 (“First Geneva Convention”); 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea, Art. 18, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85, entered into force 21 October 1950 (“Second 
Geneva Convention”), Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Art. 16, 
opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287, entered into force 21 October 1950 (“Fourth Geneva Convention”), 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts, Art. 8, opened for signature 8 June 1977 1125 UNTS 609, entered into force 7 December 
1978 (“Additional Protocol II”). See also International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary International Law 
(ICRC), Rule 112, accessed March 20, 2017, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter35_
rule112. State practice establishes this rule as a norm of customary international law applicable in both international 
and non-international armed conflicts.
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made.62 State practice also establishes a customary rule that parties to an international armed 
conflict must endeavour to facilitate the return of the remains of the dead (and their personal 
effects) upon the request of the party to which they belong, or their next of kin.63 There is growing 
recognition of this rule in the context of non-international armed conflicts. Articles 33 and 34 of 
Additional Protocol I outline obligations with respect to missing persons and remains of deceased 
persons respectively, with the implementation of those obligations by States, parties to the conflict 
and international humanitarian organizations to be “prompted mainly by the right of families 
to know the fate of their relatives.” These words, found in Article 32 of Additional Protocol I, 
represent the first codification of the right to the truth.
The Right to the Truth
The right of families to know the truth surrounding the fate of a missing family member codified 
in Article 32 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions64 is recognised as a norm of 
customary international law applicable to all parties in both international and non-international 
armed conflicts.65
In the human rights context, the right to the truth is most often invoked in relation to enforced 
disappearances, one of the elements of which is a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of 
liberty or concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, placing that person 
outside the protection of the law. The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
From Enforced Disappearance66 expressly provides for the right of any victim, the definition of 
which includes relatives of a disappeared person, to know the truth about the circumstances of an 
enforced disappearance and the fate of a disappeared person.67
International human rights bodies have extended the right to the truth to the circumstances 
of serious human rights violations in general. In its study on the right to the truth, the OHCHR 
concluded that:
The right to the truth about gross human rights violations and serious violations of human 
rights law is an inalienable and autonomous right, linked to the duty and obligation of 
the state to protect and guarantee human rights, to conduct effective investigations and to 
guarantee effective remedy and reparations. This right is closely linked with other rights and 
has both an individual and societal dimension and should be considered as a non-derogable 
right and not be subject to limitations.68
The suffering experienced by the families of the disappeared by a refusal to provide them 
with information about the whereabouts or fate of a disappeared person has been recognised as 
62 First Geneva Convention, Art. 17; Second Geneva Convention, Art. 20; See also Geneva Convention relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135, entered into force 21 October 1950, 
Art. 120 (“Third Geneva Convention”); Fourth Geneva Convention, Art. 129.
63 ICRC, Customary International Law, Rule 114, accessed March 20, 2017, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/
docs/v1_rul_rule114. See also First Geneva Convention, Art. 17; Third Geneva Convention, art 120, Fourth Geneva 
Convention, Art. 130.
64 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, entered into force 7 December 1978 
(“Additional Protocol I”).
65 ICRC, Customary International Law, Rule 117, accessed March 20, 2017, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/
docs/v1_rul_rule117. 
66 Opened for signature 6 February 2007, 2716 UNTS 3, entered into force 23 December 2010. 
67 Preamble, Arts. 18 and 24(2). 
68 OHCHR, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Study on the Right to the Truth, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/91, 8 February 
2006. See also: Diane Orentlicher, Report of the independent expert to update the Set of Principles to combat impunity, 
Addendum, “Updated set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat 
impunity,” UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 February 2005, which updates the “Joinet principles”: Un Doc E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1, Annex II.  
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a human rights violation by regional human rights courts.69 In Croatia v Serbia,70 the International 
Court of Justice held that “the psychological pain suffered by the relatives of individuals who 
have disappeared in the context of an alleged genocide, as a result of the persistent refusal of 
the competent authorities to provide the information in their possession which would enable 
these relatives to establish with certainty whether and how the persons concerned died, can in 
certain circumstances constitute serious mental harm within the meaning of Article II (b) of the 
Convention.”71 The ICTY has also held that the suffering experienced by family members in not 
knowing what had happened to their missing family members in the context of genocide itself 
amounts to serious mental harm as an act of genocide.72
The right of individuals, families and communities to know the truth about the identity of 
victims and the circumstances of mass fatalities is integral to any human identification effort. In 
countries experiencing or emerging from armed conflict it also provides the foundation for any 
legitimate transitional justice effort.  The role of the State is integral as it is the State that makes 
the ultimate decision to identify an individual and confirm their death. Any foreign actors—
whether private service providers, NGOs or UN auspiced bodies—need a clear exit strategy that 
includes developing the necessary conditions for handover of human identification operations 
to local authorities at some point. Not addressing such an exit strategy at the onset of a human 
identification effort in conflict-affected and post-conflict settings runs the risk of counteracting 
any national efforts to address the right of families to know the truth surrounding the fate of 
missing family members. Divorcing human identification efforts from the right to truth can feed 
into political efforts that are discriminatory against certain groups or that altogether ignore truth 
seeking, factors which may contribute to ongoing cycles of violence. 
The Right to the Truth and the Role of NGOs
Despite the early codification of the obligation to search for and repatriate the dead in the context 
of international armed conflicts, the issue of repatriation of remains in the context of civil wars and 
following repressive regimes has been primarily advanced by civil society movements in affected 
societies. 
States experiencing or emerging from armed conflict face many challenges, not least the re-
establishment of order and the rule of law. Such states rarely if ever, have the necessary forensic 
infrastructure in place to deal with the mass fatalities that have occurred. Even where capacity 
does exist, governments may be unwilling to support a human identification effort due to its 
own involvement in crimes, perpetrators continuing to occupy positions of power, or a belief that 
addressing past crimes will destabilise a transition to peace. 
In many states experiencing or emerging from armed conflict or periods of egregious human 
rights violations witnesses won’t come forward to government authorities to have their testimonies 
recorded out of fear of reprisals by the perpetrators, who often remain in power and benefit from a 
culture of impunity. Lists naming missing persons, along with accounts of massacres and summary 
executions by witnesses, are sensitive information that, if released openly, could lead to reprisals 
against victims’ families and their communities. In such circumstances it is not uncommon for 
NGOs who gain the trust of witnesses to emerge as an alternative repository of witness accounts, 
as well as the safeguard of data and witness privacy.
Family associations in affected communities were among the first to collect and safeguard such 
information. They also became the focal and entry point for the forensic NGOs that were established 
69 Kurt v Turkey, European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application No 24276/94, May 25, 1998, para. 134; Bazorkina 
v Russia, European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application No 69481/01, July 27, 2006, para. 146. See also 
Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Ser C) No 4, July 29, 1988.
70 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v Serbia) International Court 
of Justice, February 3, 2015.
71 Paras. 356 and 160.
72 Prosecutor v Karadžić, Trial Chamber Judgment, March 24, 2016, IT-95-5/18-T, para. 5664-5665; Prosecutor v Blagojević and 
Jokić, Trial Chamber Judgment, January 17, 2005, IT-02-60-T, para. 653; Prosecutor v Popović, Trial Chamber Judgment, 
June 10, 2010, IT-05-88-T, para. 846. 
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in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Latin America.  Some of these NGOs, including the Argentine 
and Guatemalan Forensic Anthropology Teams,73 earned the trust of these family associations 
and gained legitimacy. At the time, the principal means of identification rested on methodologies 
rooted in forensic anthropology. Positive identifications, if they were even possible, were based on 
the comparison of body landmarks found in the skeletal remains with the antemortem data that 
had been collected from victims’ families and witnesses.
By effectively privatizing forensic exhumations and identifications, some actors and 
victims’ families undoubtedly felt that their right to truth was addressed without the need 
to wait for the state to lead such efforts. The NGOs could provide immediacy in responding 
to repatriating the dead and the right to truth where the state could not. Privatisation may 
also provide a means to empower victims of human rights violations who are advocating 
for the truth to be told in a climate of impunity in which official acknowledgement is not 
forthcoming. In Spain the government itself abrogated its obligations under international 
human rights law and through the Law on Historical Memory effectively privatised human 
identifications, granting subsidies to individuals and NGOs willing to perform the search, 
identification and exhumation of mass graves. However, State granting of subsidies to NGOs to 
perform these activities cannot replace the State’s duty to investigate disappearances and offer 
integral reparations to the victims.74 Further, the law remains silent as to what happens post-
exhumation when there is a need for identification with families generally left to cover the expenses 
with their own resources, although in some cases subsidies have also been used to pay these 
expenses.75 
Undoubtedly NGOs are an important actor in the human rights and human identification 
landscape. However, human rights, including the right to the truth, remain the overall responsibility 
of the State. The work of private DNA labs to match profiles and identify a set of remains in that 
way cannot fulfil the right to the truth, the essence of which is State acknowledgment of what 
happened. The DNA lab can provide a positive DNA match but it can’t tell you what happened, 
when, how, why, or by whom. And it can’t formally acknowledge the truth of what happened. 
Even if combined with credible NGO documentation efforts, state acknowledgement is key to the 
right to the truth. Most importantly though, where human rights NGOs are taking the lead in 
doing this work, such as the EAFG/FAFG in Guatemala, they are located within the host country’s 
jurisdiction and work within the national legal system.
Human Identifications in Armed Conflicts: Case Studies
In this section we present a number of case studies illustrating the above-mentioned challenges 
of conducting human identification efforts in countries experiencing or emerging from armed 
conflicts.
Guatemala
The first mass grave exhumations in Guatemala were conducted in 1992 under the then EAFG. The 
objective was to exhume and document the suffering of the victims of the country’s civil war in 
the 1980s, many of who were buried in mass graves. The primary drivers were family associations, 
who wanted the victims’ remains repatriated, and above all, to have the truth told. These first 
exhumations in the Department of El Quiché of sites at Chontolá and San José Pacho Lemoa were 
carried out in accordance with judicial orders and the under the direction of the regional medical 
examiner of the Department of El Quiché in 1992, Dr Garcia de Crocker and her assistant, Flavio 
Montufar. Dr Crocker was particularly supportive of a forensic anthropology team, as she wasn’t 
receiving any support from the central government in Guatemala City. This relationship with the 
medical examiner in El Quiché was the foundation that led to the formation of EAFG with funding 
73 Equipo Argentino de Antropología Forense (EAAF) and the Equipo de Antropología Forense de Guatemala (EAFG), 
which in 1997 became the Fundación de Antropología Forense de Guatemala (FAFG). 
74 Patricio Galella, “Privatising the search and identification of human remains: the case of Spain,” Human Remains and 
Violence 1, no. 1 (2015), 62.
75 Ibid. 
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received from the American Association for the Advancement of Science’s Human Rights and 
Science Program.
To document what had happened and lend credibility to witness statements taken by the 
team during the antemortem interviews with surviving family members, it was necessary for the 
EAFG to link the victims in the mass graves to the survivors and their accounts. There was also a 
need to individually identify human remains, not only to repatriate them to their families, but also 
to provide evidence that specific individuals had been killed in the incidents that were reported 
by witnesses. This in turn required witnesses to trust the EAFG to collect, store, and analyse this 
information while protecting the data from misuse.
In the early 1990s positive identifications of individual human remains with the help of DNA 
were not possible. The technology was just beginning to develop and was inaccessible in countries 
like Guatemala. Compounding any human identification effort was the fact that the victims in 
Guatemala were generally from a population that had very limited access to healthcare and as 
a consequence there were no dental X-ray records or other medical records on file to assist in 
the identification of remains. Following the exhumations, very few positive identifications were 
achieved by the EAFG on the basis of comparisons of antemortem interview data from surviving 
family members and the data derived from the postmortem forensic examinations.
Positive identifications were limited to a comparison of the biological profile established by 
forensic anthropologists in the lab with the antemortem information, taking into account secondary 
means of identification. They were relatively few and limited to those contexts where the burial of 
those that had been killed as a result of human rights violations were relatively controlled. That 
is, surviving family members were able to identify the mass graves and testify to the identities of 
those in the grave as they often had buried the victims themselves. At that point, biological profiles 
(i.e. age, sex, stature, handedness, individual dental/medical traits) were used to distinguish 
individuals that had been reported in that grave. If these biological profiles varied sufficiently to 
distinguish between the individuals that were exhumed from the grave, the antemortem data and 
secondary means of identification (e.g. description of the burial, clothes worn by victims at the 
time of burial, etc.) were justification enough to generate a positive identification. Even though 
these deaths by no means occurred under controlled circumstances, the identification process was 
based on the concept that the context of the mass grave was sufficiently controlled by witness 
statements in order to allow for positive identifications without primary means of identification.76 
Based on this methodology, some positive identifications were generated by EAFG for the mass 
graves exhumed in the 1990s. Many of the exhumed remains though could not be identified this 
way and were repatriated to their communities without identification for communal burial. These 
communal burials allowed communities to grieve, to bury their dead with dignity and also served 
as a form of memorializing the truth as documented by the NGO team of forensic anthropologists 
and archaeologists.
The Guatemalan experience highlights the importance of access to surviving witnesses 
and family members and gaining their trust that the information they provided wouldn’t be 
used against them by the perpetrators, most of which were free and remained in power. EAFG 
established itself as a forensic support NGO to the Legal Medicine Department and its staff were 
judicially appointed as experts for the families requesting the exhumation of the remains of their 
loved ones. To those involved, it was clear that truth and justice could only be achieved within a 
judicial framework, even if this meant working within a corrupt judicial system that was skewed 
towards maintaining silence about the crimes of the former regimes that continued to hold military 
power in the country. From the start, those that founded EAFG believed that working within the 
judicial system would be key to any future trials.
Today, FAFG’s experts regularly testify in domestic trials in Guatemala. Key to the organization’s 
evolution has been its ability to build upon existing levels of trust with victims’ families and 
maintain ownership of the database and analytical software enabling them to produce DNA 
matches and positive human identifications within a national investigative and legal framework. 
76 This would include a list of the dead in a mass grave, sufficient variety in biological profiles reported in antemortem 
data (i.e. age, sex, stature, handedness, dental/medical traits), and a description of clothing worn at burial.
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The Former Yugoslavia
Unlike Guatemala, the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia, perhaps due to its geographical 
location in Europe, garnered international attention. On October 6, 1992 the UN Security Council in 
Resolution 780 established a Commission of Experts to examine and analyse information gathered 
with a view to providing the Secretary-General with its conclusions on evidence of grave breaches 
of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in 
the territory of the former Yugoslavia.77 Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) provided a team of 
international forensic experts, including the first author, to the Commission, whose work was to 
inform the nascent International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
The ICTY was established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in May 1993 and empowered to 
prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed 
in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991. The tribunal exercises jurisdiction 
over grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, violations of the laws or customs of war, 
genocide and crimes against humanity.78 
Over five years from 1996-2001, the ICTY investigated and exhumed a number of mass graves. 
These investigations were primarily focused on the gathering of evidence necessary to prosecute 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.  For ICTY investigators, the group identity 
of victims was important to establishing the elements of crimes against humanity and genocide. 
Evidence of the identity of individual victims was considered of lesser importance than the evidence 
necessary to establish the “broad pattern or practice of the commission of such crimes for reasons 
of political, ethnic, or religious persecution.”79 Mass grave sites were exhumed on the basis of their 
link to an existing indictment, or ongoing investigation where it was felt an indictment would be 
issued.80 There was little consideration given to understanding the enforcement of humanitarian 
law as one aspect of a larger project of healing the psychological wounds resulting from armed 
conflict.81 As a result, many families were denied information about their loved ones, not because 
it was unascertainable, but because investigations were handled improperly.82
PHR carried out the first exhumation for the ICTY in the Srebrenica area in July of 1996. Early 
on though, PHR recognized the need for scientifically sound identification of those that were 
exhumed in order to address the clamoring of families searching for the missing—something 
that the ICTY wouldn’t address. In addition to its obligations to provide forensic expertise to 
the Tribunal, PHR began compiling an antemortem database of suspected victims in Srebrenica. 
The first identifications of Srebrenica victims were made in 1997, following which the database 
effort was expanded to include information from missing persons elsewhere in Bosnia. These 
identifications were supported by PHR’s antemortem data base effort, using mitochondrial DNA 
analysis to confirm cases where antemortem wasn’t sufficiently conclusive.83 By 1998 about 30 
identifications had been carried out in this manner.84 
This first identification effort driven primarily by local forensic pathologists was integrated 
into ICMP’s operations in 1999. In November 2001, ICMP obtained its first DNA match leading 
to an identification of a set of remains. Prior to that, identifications were primarily made utilising 
“traditional” methods of anthropological examinations, visual inspection of remains by family 
77 United Nations, Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council 780, May 27, 1994, UN 
Doc. S/1994/674.
78 United Nations, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, May 25, 1993, UN Doc S/
RES/827.
79 Aryeh Neier, War Crimes: Brutality, Genocide, Terror, and the Struggle for Justice (New York: Random House, 1998), 17.
80 Admir Jugo and Senem Skulj, “Ghosts of the past: The competing agendas of forensic work in identifying the missing 
across Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Human Remains and Violence 1, no. 1 (2015), 43. 
81 Jose Pablo Baraybar, Valerie Brasey and Andrew Zadel, “The Need for a Centralised and Humanitarian-based Approach 
to Missing Persons in Iraq: An Example from Kosovo,” The International Journal of Human Rights 11, no. 3 (2007), 266.
82 Ibid., 269. 
83 Laurie Vollen, “All That Remains: Identifying the Victims of the Srebrenica Massacre,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare 
Ethics 10, no. 3 (2001), 339.
84 Ibid., 339. 
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members, witness interviews and the comparison of medical and dental records. As of 31 July 2014 
just under 23 000 identifications had been made with 14 792 being made through DNA-assisted 
methods and a further 8192 being made through “traditional” methods.85 
In any human identification effort there is a need for a robust security, privacy and evidentiary 
framework in order to protect data, DNA profiles, biological samples and safeguard victim and 
witness information. This is a challenge in any context, but particularly challenging in states 
experiencing or emerging from armed conflict where perpetrators may still be in power, were 
impunity may still reign, and where the necessary infrastructure, resources, capacity and funding 
are lacking.  In Bosnia, as in many states experiencing or emerging from armed conflict, there 
was no domestic legal framework governing the use of DNA evidence. Instead, the State used an 
international agreement with the ICMP “to compensate for a gap in domestic capacity by assigning 
a public investigative function to an international public organization capable of performing that 
function.”86
The ICMP’s efforts to ensure data protection and safeguard the privacy of witnesses and 
families led to the establishment of unprecedented levels of immunity in separate agreements with 
the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1998)87 and the Government of Croatia (2002).88 
The Headquarters agreement provides immunity for property, assets, and staff of the ICMP from 
“every form of legal and administrative process, except insofar as in any particular case the ICMP 
has expressly waived its immunity.” 89 It also provides for the inviolability and immunity of ICMP 
premises, property and assets from “search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation, and any 
other form of interference, whether by executive, judicial, administrative or legislative action.”90 
Practically, this also meant that biological samples and profiles became the property of the ICMP 
as a means to protect witness information and data. Only the ICMP could decide on whether 
information was to be shared with authorities or not. Compliance with writs such as a subpoena 
compelling production of material or witness attendance to give evidence was subject to the ICMP 
waiving their immunity. In other words, the ICMP received diplomatic status as a technical and 
scientific human identification operation. For a DNA laboratory or human identification effort, this 
was unprecedented. 
Radovan Karadžić challenged ICMP’s identification methodology and approach to 
safeguarding data and privacy during his trial on genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity charges at the ICTY. In determining the number of dead in the Srebrenica mass graves 
the Chamber relied heavily upon ICMP’s DNA identification data. This was an important part 
of the Chamber’s assessment as to whether the intent to destroy at least a substantial part of a 
particular group required for genocide could be inferred from the factual circumstances.91 Although 
there is no numeric threshold to be reached for mass killings to constitute genocide,92 and what is 
85 Sarkin et al, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 11. These identifications reportedly represent around 70% of those missing as a 
result of the armed conflict: 21. 
86 See International Commission on Missing Persons, “Bosnia and Herzegovina,” June 18, 2014, accessed March 21, 2017, 
https://www.icmp.int/where-we-work/europe/western-balkans/bosnia-and-herzegovina/. 
87 International Commission on Missing Persons, “Headquarters Agreement between the International Commission on 
Missing Persons and the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” April 26, 1998, accessed March 21, 2017, 
http://www.icmp.int/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/hq-agreement-with-bih-mofa.pdf. 
88 International Commission on Missing Persons, “Agreement between the International Commission on Missing Persons 
and the Government of the Republic of Croatia regarding the status of the International Commission on Missing 
Persons office in the Republic of Croatia,” September 3, 2002, accessed March 21, 2017, http://www.icmp.int/wp-
content/uploads/2014/08/agreement-icmp-roc.pdf. 
89 ICMP Headquarters Agreement, Art 3. 
90 Ibid., Art 4.
91 Prosecutor v Krstić, Appeals Chamber Judgment, April 19, 2004, IT-98-33-A, paras. 8, 12, 34; Draft Code of Crimes against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind with Commentaries in Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-
eighth session 6 May – 26 July 1996 (UN Doc A/51/10) Article 17, Comment (8).
92 Prosecutor v Semanza, Trial Chamber Judgment, May 15, 2003, ICTR-97-20-T, para. 316; Prosecutor v Stakić, Trial Chamber 
Judgment, July 31, 2003, IT-97-24-T, para. 522. 
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substantial can also be measured qualitatively,93 establishing the numeric size of the targeted part 
of the group is the necessary and important starting point for considering whether or it constitutes 
a “substantial part.”94 
Over a number of years Karadžić unsuccessfully sought access to ICMP’s database in full, or, 
in the alternative, the exclusion of all of ICMP’s DNA analysis. While the Chamber agreed that 
Karadžić should be able to engage his own DNA expert and run DNA identification tests similar to 
those conducted by ICMP for the purposes of checking the accuracy of ICMP’s identifications and 
challenging the evidence, ICMP refused to provide the database without obtaining the consent of the 
affected families, a process that would take a significant amount of time given the number of samples. 
An agreement by which Karadžić would have access to 300 cases fell through after the family 
members of 14 of these 300 victims refused to consent to their sample being disclosed. The Chamber 
refused to issue a binding order or subpoena to the ICMP compelling it to produce the material 
relating to those 14 cases on the grounds that the sample of 286 cases was sufficient for testing ICMP’s 
results and challenging the evidence of the Thomas Parsons, ICMP’s Director of Forensic Science.95 
Karadžić fought a similar battle over 11 tendered documents provisionally admitted under seal 
during Parsons’s evidence.96 The Prosecution argued that this was necessary on privacy grounds 
to protect the genetic information of the alleged victims and their family members, as well as their 
genetic relationships or lack thereof; prevent the public from knowing that certain family members 
had participated in the ICMP DNA identification process as they might not want this disclosed; 
and remove any possibility that family members may find out about the deaths of their relatives 
through the trial, as it appeared that several DNA matches that had been made years earlier had 
not led to family notifications at the time of the hearing.97 The Prosecution also argued that family 
members had become “unwitting witnesses” to the proceedings by donating their genetic material 
and were therefore entitled to the protections afforded victims and witnesses under Rule 75 of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.98 The Chamber did not accept that family members had 
become “unwitting witnesses,” however, it held, citing S and Marper, that in light of “its highly 
sensitive and personal nature” the information relating to the genetic material of the alleged 
victims—extending to that of their family members—should be kept out of the public domain, if 
not under Rule 75, using the discretion afford the Chamber under Rule 54. The Chamber dismissed 
as “speculative at best” the Prosecution’s submission that some family members might not want it 
known that they had participated in the DNA identification process.99 Further, the argument that 
family members should not find out from the proceedings that their relatives are dead needs to 
be assessed on a case-by-case basis.100 Where matches were made several years ago, the Chamber 
found it reasonable to assume that family members would have been informed of the death.101 
The Chamber ordered the unsealing of seven exhibits containing no genetic data and ordered the 
prosecution to redact the remaining documents in dispute for genetic data and then tender them.102
93 For example, an intent to destroy the most representative members of the targeted community may be significant 
enough to have an impact on the group as a whole: Prosecutor v Krstić, Appeals Chamber Judgment, April 19, 2004, 
IT-98-33-A, para. 8; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, 43, para. 198; Prosecutor v Jelisić, Trial Chamber 
Judgment, December 14, 1999, Case No IT-95-10-T, para. 82. See also Prosecutor v Tolimir. Appeals Chamber Judgment, 
April 8, 2015, IT-05-88/2-A, 263.
94 Prosecutor v Krstić, Appeals Chamber Judgment, April 19, 2004, IT-98-33-A, 19 April 2004, para. 12. See also para. 15. 
Cited with approval in Prosecutor v Popović, Appeals Chamber Judgment, January 30, 2015, IT-05-88-A, para. 493; 
Prosecutor v Tolimir, Trial Chamber Judgment, December 12, 2012, IT-05-88/2-T, para. 749.
95 Prosecutor v Karadžić, Decision on the Accused’s motion to exclude DNA evidence, Trial Chamber, April 16, 2013, IT-95-
5/18-T, para. 7. 
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid., para. 9.
100 Ibid., para. 11. 
101 Ibid., para. 15-17.  
102 Ibid., para. 19.
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The Prosecution subsequently invoked Rule 70 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, that rule being an important rule, the purpose of which is to encourage states, organizations 
and individuals to share sensitive information with the Tribunal by guaranteeing protection to 
providers of that information and their sources.103 The Chamber ordered further redactions 
in respect of personal contact information of family members of alleged victims and of all references 
to 118 individuals involved in the most recent round of DNA matches, who had yet to be informed 
of the matches.104 The Chamber also ordered the Prosecution to liaise with ICMP and track the 
progress of notification of the families of these 118 individuals, with the exhibits to be reclassified 
as public once this has been done.105 In its concluding remarks the Chamber expressed “serious 
concern” regarding the Prosecution’s practices for recording and disclosure of Rule 70 material.106
The Karadžić case highlights a number of issues. Firstly, that some family members had not 
been informed of DNA matches several years after they were made is possibly indicative of a 
communication problem somewhere along the chain. Clear communication between all actors 
is essential to mitigating the risk of any discrepancies that might undermine the legitimacy of 
the human identification effort. Secondly, distinctions can be drawn between different types of 
information accrued during the human identification effort and the level of protection to be afforded 
to them. Thirdly, the importance of clear, consistent and implemented standards in information 
flows and recording between those involved in all aspects of the identification, witnesses, family 
members, investigators and prosecutorial bodies. This is generally important in the administration 
of a fair trial and for ensuring that each of the actors involved knows where they stand. In the 
context of a war crimes trial it takes on added importance in allaying fears of victor’s justice among 
those who may feel that the indictment of the Accused is an indictment of their entire community. 
Finally, a court with jurisdiction and an appropriate legal framework is best placed to adjudicate 
on and balance the competing right of victims and their families to privacy with prosecutorial 
disclosure obligations and the Accused’s right to a fair trial.
Libya
Libya’s revolution began on February 15, 2011 with demonstrations by family members of the 
1, 276 prisoners massacred by the Qaddafi regime in Abu Salim prison in 1996. As the protests 
against the regime widened, so did the crackdown against them, leading to a full scale revolution. 
Following the collapse of the regime, on October 23, 2011 the revolutionary authorities declared 
“Liberation Day” with the capture and subsequent killing of Muhammar Qaddafi.
Early on, a quest began to not only locate the remains of the massacred prisoners of Abu Salim 
prison, but the many other victims of Qaddafi’s 40 year regime, as well as to identify the remains 
of those that were killed during the revolution. In December 2011, the Ministry of Martyrs and 
Missing (MAFMM) was established to provide support to the families of the martyrs and missing 
and locate and identify the remains of those reported missing. Under MAFMM two departments 
were established: the Department of Martyrs’ Affairs and the Department of Missing Persons’ 
Affairs. The former was tasked with supporting martyrs and their families; and the latter with 
collecting data and identifying the remains of the missing and distributing financial support to 
martyrs’ families.107 
MAFMM was tasked with establishing a DNA laboratory to aid this effort. By March 2013, 
when PHR published its “Libyan Human Identification Needs Assessment and Gap Analysis,” the 
Ministry had reportedly collected family DNA reference samples for approximately 2,100 reported 
missing cases.108 The number though was a reflection of those that felt comfortable reporting their 
103 Prosecutor v Karadžić, Decision on the Prosecution’s  Motion for Partial Reconsideration or Clarification of the 
Chamber’s Decision on the Accused’s Motion to Unseal ICMP Exhibits, Trial Chamber, September 5, 2012, IT-95-
5/18-T, paras. 2-3. 
104 Ibid., paras.10, 19, 22.
105 Ibid., paras. 25, 29. 
106 Ibid., para. 70.
107 Schmitt et al, Libyan Human Identification, 15. 
108 Ibid., 37. 
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missing loved one as a martyr, understood to be an individual, whether combatant or civilian, who 
had died at the hands of the Qaddafi regime. An unknown number of families who lost their loved 
ones fighting on the side of the Qaddafi regime did not feel able to report a missing family member 
due to fear of the potential repercussions of being associated with the deposed regime.
The political and social dynamics immediately after the revolution resulted in hastily and 
inexpert exhumations and collection of biological samples for eventual DNA analysis, often 
conducted extra judicially due to a breakdown of rule of law and in a political environment where 
existing national governmental institutions were struggling to remain relevant post-revolution. 
The urgency to recover and identify remains was in part due to the pressure of families seeking the 
repatriation of their dead and in part due to the need for the new Libyan society to honor those that 
had fought against the Qaddafi regime and liberated the Libyan people from its terror. A variety 
of ad-hoc local Missing Persons’ Commissions were formed, each representing regional efforts by 
victim families around the major cities, such as Tripoli, Benghazi, and Misrata.  The presence of 
unregulated local armed groups throughout the country also contributed to limiting the central 
government’s ability to implement nationwide policies. 
The dynamics surrounding the identification effort in Libya are perhaps best demonstrated 
by the example of what happened to the remains of those that had been killed fighting Qaddafi 
forces in early March 2011 in the town of Bin Jawad, close to Sirte. Initially there was a proper 
jurisdictional response to these deaths by the local medical examiner, who collected the remains 
that weren’t claimed by families and reportedly kept them in a refrigerated container for four to five 
months in the hope of being able to repatriate them to their families. In the end, they were buried 
in Bin Jawad, but not before the local medical examiner had taken photographs of the bodies and 
their faces for identification purposes. The remains were reportedly buried in numbered graves, 
as the medical examiner had identified them in the photographs with the numbers to facilitate any 
future identifications made on the basis of facial recognition. There were reportedly 167 bodies 
which were assigned a number and buried. 
In February 2012, political pressures on Libya’s new government and MAFMM led to public 
demands to repatriate the unidentified remains of those killed in Bin Jawad to Benghazi, from 
where they reportedly originated. MAFMM had already begun collecting DNA samples and 
conducting exhumations at this time.  After witnessing one of MAFMM’s exhumations in Tripoli, a 
medical examiner at the Forensic Medicine Department there wrote to Libya’s Prosecutor-General’s 
Office raising concerns that these inexpertly conducted exhumations would result in damage to 
the remains to the extent that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to determine cause and 
manner of death.109 Regarding the early collection of DNA samples, the medical examiner raised 
the point that any inconsistency in collecting DNA samples would require that both exhumation 
and collection efforts of such samples would have to be repeated at a later time, unnecessarily 
raising families’ expectations of speedy identification and repatriation of remains. Despite 
the Prosecutor-General’s Office suspending one such exhumation, MAFMM continued with 
its efforts. 
In March 2012, MAFMM oversaw the exhumation of the remains that had been reburied by the 
local medical examiner in Bin Jawad the previous year. The primary purpose of this exhumation 
was the repatriation of the unidentified remains to Benghazi. Due to the intense pressure from 
families and politicians alike to repatriate the remains of these martyrs, the MAFMM went ahead 
with the re-exhumation of these remains, despite the first author’s recommendations against it. In 
the end, out of the 167 numbered plots, 43 of the remains were reported to have been identified 
during the exhumation at the gravesite and taken away by family members. 
The remaining majority of the remains were then taken to Benghazi and reburied as martyrs, 
again in numbered plots and after MAFMM had collected biological samples for DNA analysis. 
The first author made MAFMM aware it was likely that visual identifications made by families at 
the site of the exhumation were inherently unreliable and that the possibility of misidentifications 
needed to be taken into account in going forward with identifying the remaining bodies. 
109 Dr. Anwar Arbie correspondence with the Deputy General-Prosecutor’s Office, February 26, 2012.
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Furthermore, collecting biological samples from both families and the remains was going to lead 
to heightened expectations that identifications of the unidentified remains were going to happen 
relatively quickly thereafter. Additionally, the lack of chain of custody over the samples and the 
reburied remains would require confirmatory testing upon attempting the repatriation of the 
reburied remains. MAFMM turned to the ICMP for support, who offered to process the samples 
and generate DNA matches in their lab outside of Libya as a means to expedite identifications.
The possibility that biological samples were to be sent outside of Libya for DNA testing and 
matching purposes raised concerns among several academics and scientists in the country, amongst 
them a Libyan geneticist who had returned from Canada and established a DNA laboratory in 
Tripoli. All of these individuals had advanced degrees from leading international universities. In a 
letter to Libyan authorities, including the Prime Minister, the Prosecutor-General, and others dated 
May 31, 2012, they raised the following concerns:
• That biological samples of the Libyan population were being transferred outside of the 
country’s control, raising concerns about the misuse of these samples and their final 
disposition.
• That sending the samples outside of the country would not benefit the families in that it 
might not make the process of identifications any more expedient than using the laboratory 
in Libya, especially if re-sampling/testing would be necessary.
• The elevated cost of outsourcing the DNA testing.
• Outsourcing would ignore the necessary development of Libya’s own national resources 
in human identifications.
The signatories also recommended that MAFMM coordinate with the established DNA 
laboratory at the Ministry of Interior and that biological samples should not be sent abroad until 
the National Safety and Biological Ethics Committee had given its permission. At the time, the 
MoI laboratory was able to extract DNA profiles from 192 samples per day.110 From this letter, 
the earlier letter of Tripoli’s medical examiner regarding Bin Jawad, as well as a later stakeholder 
conference on April 4, 2013 on the role of truth seeking and human identifications held organised 
by the National Safety and Biological Ethics Committee, it was clear that Libya had the capacity and 
willingness to develop DNA human identification operations, as well as integrate them into the 
State’s criminal investigation and truth seeking efforts. There certainly was no reason to exclude 
this expertise and infrastructure from the overall development of human identification expertise 
in the country, which would include developing a national database with the necessary analytical 
capabilities.
PHR’s Human Identification and Needs Assessment also concluded that the bias at 
MAFMM towards those who were deemed martyrs was affecting the human identification 
effort in Libya. The report concluded that MAFMM’s lack of cooperation with existing 
Libyan governmental institutions such as the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice, and 
Prosecutor-General’s Office, and with the legal framework, was detrimental to any potential criminal 
investigations.111 
Despite these concerns, the biological samples were transferred to the ICMP and DNA profiles 
were extracted and analysed at their laboratory. The ICMP generated DNA matches were made 
between family reference samples and samples from the remains from Bin Jawad which had been 
reburied in Benghazi. On March 16, 2013 the ICMP issued a press release entitled “ICMP Submits 
95 New DNA Match Reports to Libyan Authorities to Expedite Identification Efforts” in which 
110 Dr. Ahmed Elageili Zaid, Vice Dean of Faculty of Medicine, University of Tripoli; Dr. Abdullah Masoud be Sheen; 
Dr. Othman Abdel Jaleel Mohamed, Head of Forensic Laboratory Supervision Committee; Dr. Muftah Abdulatti al 
Fitoory, Professor, Faculty of Medizine, Benghazi University; Dr. Nabeel Sabri Enattah, Head of the Biotech Center, 
Tripoli, letter to Head of the NTC; the Prime Minister, Minister of MAFMM, Minister of MoI, Minister of MoEH, 
General Prosecutor, Head of the National Scientific Research Authority; Head of the Biological Ethics Committee; May 
31, 2012.
111 Schmitt et al, Libyan Human Identification, 49.
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they reported that they had matched 93 of the remains from Bin Jawad to families: “We hope that 
by expediting this process we will bring long awaited answers to families of the missing who have 
waited to learn the fate of their loved ones.”112 Shortly after the press release, in conversation with 
MAFMM leadership over the identification effort, it became clear that the remains had yet to be 
exhumed for repatriation.113 Furthermore, MAFMM was uncertain about which buried remains 
corresponded to the samples that had been tested. As expected, their chain of custody over the 
numbering of the gravesite after the exhumation and transport of the bodies to Benghazi from Ben 
Walid was not as certain as they had thought. 
The families, after having been informed about the DNA matches, were now rightfully 
demanding the repatriation of the remains. Even though DNA matches had been expedited, it was 
clear that preparations for a second round of tests hadn’t been made and families were expecting 
the bodies to be repatriated without any additional delay. It appears that some families went ahead 
and exhumed numbered remains based on the ICMP matches and those that remained at the site 
were assigned a name to the number on the grave.114
What happened with the matches that were made regarding the DNA samples from the Bin 
Jawad case is indicative of a communications problem between what was going on in the field and 
the ICMP DNA laboratory. In the end, as predicted by the author at the time, there was no reliable 
chain of custody between the field and the ICMP laboratory that conducted the DNA analysis and 
matching. These problems arose from the disregarding, primarily by MAFMM, of existing national 
capacity, resources, and the necessary judicial framework.
Unlike many of the Latin American countries, where families distrusted their governments for 
good reasons, Libyans were emerging from the conflict in the hopes of that their new government 
would be transparent and treat everyone equally. Nor were there no capacity and resources at all 
in Libya, as was the case in the post-Yugoslav context. In Libya, the arguments for short term goals 
of expediting human identifications to satisfy victims’ families demands came at expense of an 
inclusive, independent, transparent and credible process driven and owned by Libyan institutions 
themselves who were willing and capable at high levels to do so. 
The Libyan case of Bin Jawad is an example of where the argument of expediting DNA assisted 
human identifications resulted in countering the possibility for an integrated solution within the 
country’s transitional justice context where accountability needed to be addressed as part of a 
political solution. In a very real sense the MAFMM’s bias towards the martyrs in the conflict led to 
ignoring national jurisdictional stakeholders which should have had a controlling role in any DNA 
assisted human identifications. 
Conclusion
The emergence of human identification methods based on the comparison of DNA profiles has 
had a significant impact upon human identification efforts, which, prior to the advent of DNA 
technology, relied on traditional methods such as body landmark comparisons. States experiencing 
or emerging from armed conflict face a myriad of challenges, among them, how to find, identify 
and repatriate the dead. DNA is an important tool in human identification efforts involving large 
numbers of unidentified victims, but many states facing such an effort lack the necessary forensic 
infrastructure, capacity or legal framework. 
The DNA laboratory has come to dominate many aspects of human identification efforts 
as information management needs to be centralized around biological sample collection, DNA 
laboratory extraction, and DNA database analysis through the use of specialized databases and 
software. The DNA profile only gains importance when it is entered into and analysed by a database 
and its software. Key to the overall human identification effort therefore is not so much who runs 
the laboratory that extracts the genetic profiles, but who owns the means to generate DNA matches. 
112 International Commission on Missing Persons, “ICMP Submits 95 New DNA Match Reports to Libyan Authorities to 
Expedite Identification Efforts,” March 16, 2013, accessed March 21, 2017, http://www.icmp.int/press-releases/icmp-
submits-new-dna-match-reports-to-libya/.
113 Personal communication with MAFMM staff, March 2013.
114 Personal communication with former MAFMM staff, 2016.
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Laboratory work can be outsourced, provided there are clear agreements defining exactly what 
type of DNA extraction is used, the purposes for which it is to be used, the circumstances in which 
it can be shared, and a clear framework for jurisdictional oversight and review. 
The string of numbers that represent unique DNA profiles for human identification purposes 
in and of themselves do not relay any personal information, and at present do not contain any 
information other than the gender of the individual. The DNA profile only gains significance when 
it is compared via specialized software to other profiles in a database and then can only identify 
biological relationships between individuals, leading to the actual identification of the remains. This 
can lead to the discovery of previously unknown or unreported sensitive biological relationships—
and the social and legal issues that this may entail—but can not shed any light on the ethnic, 
religious, or political affiliations of specific individuals or groups. In contrast, the biological sample 
can be used to extract a wealth of personal genetic information beyond that required for generating 
the DNA profile. This though is done using entirely different laboratory procedures than those 
applied in the extraction of a DNA profile for human identification purposes.
Key to any success in generating DNA matches, which then lead to positive identifications, 
are chain of custody level standards at all stages of the human identification effort, from collecting 
samples and antemortem data in the field to coordination with the DNA database effort and 
official acknowledgement of the death. The antemortem data and biological samples are collected 
in the field and can not be effectively separated or outsourced to a DNA database and its analytical 
capabilities as they are subject to national legislation and judicial responsibilities. As the Libyan 
example highlights—where not only the DNA profile extraction but also the DNA analysis 
and matching were outsourced—the argument for expediency in the case of Bin Jawad lead to 
uncertainties in the identification process and the repatriation of remains.
The authors maintain that human identification efforts in states experiencing and emerging 
from armed conflicts need to be owned by national actors within that state’s jurisdiction. Human 
identification efforts cannot be separated from the need for an integrated solution within a transitional 
justice context in which accountability and the right to the truth are addressed as part of a political 
solution. The legitimacy and effectiveness of human identification efforts in transitional contexts 
depends on local engagement, knowledge, capacity and legal frameworks. Success should not be 
measured by number of DNA matches alone. Equally important is enabling national stakeholders 
with the needed scientific means—DNA database and its analytical capabilities—rather than 
separating them from it. Attempts to minimize delays at the expense of building local knowledge 
and skills, as well as developing the necessary legal frameworks, may risk undermining the 
legitimacy of the human identification effort. Whilst outsourcing DNA matching has undoubtedly 
led to positive identifications in some cases where they otherwise might not have occurred, in the 
absence of local ownership and enabling, it is likely to increase the myriad of political, legal, and 
social challenges faced by states experiencing or emerging from armed conflict. 
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Introduction
Archives are not neutral. They exert social and political power.1 This power is a product both of the 
content of an archive and the norms and assumptions that guide its curation. It has traditionally 
been deployed on behalf of the elite to preserve the political order.2 When used in historical 
scholarship, archives make certain aspects of the past visible while obscuring others, whether 
through selective culling or selective analysis.3 Over the past few decades, however, archivists and 
historians have increasingly recognized that the power of archives can be redeployed to advance 
the cause of governmental accountability, human rights, and social justice.4 
At the same time, there has also been a move to preserve more than just the documents and 
records of governments, businesses, the wealthy, and the famous. Archives and archiving projects 
are increasingly concerned with preserving the physical traces that ordinary people leave behind, 
including their diaries, letters, and records of commerce, activism, and community organizing.5 
This broadening of scope not only breaks down the hierarchies of knowledge that have been 
critiqued by social theorists, historians, and archivists alike, but also makes possible the telling of 
history from multiple perspectives.6 
Rather than focus exclusively on the development, justification, and implementation of policy 
by the elite, we can see how such policies actually affected the lives of ordinary people.7 We can 
hear the voices of those who are silenced in contemporary society because they are not viewed as 
important to listen to (e.g., female homemakers, subsistence farmers, unskilled labor, the LGBTQ 
community, or the racial and ethnically marginalized), and learn more about their lives.8 The shifting 
conception of the archive’s social value has been paralleled by another development: the dramatic 
expansion of the role of the Internet, computers, and mobile devices in human communication and 
the corresponding requirement of archivists to respond to this trend.9 
This article will explore the convergence of these trends in the intentional, third party 
preservation of images and video of human rights abuse or war crimes created by witnesses, victims, 
or perpetrators and shared via social media platforms.10 It is meant to provide a broad introduction 
for practitioners, advocates, journalists, and policy makers who have not had formal training in 
this domain and are working outside of institutions with well-developed archival practices. It 
explains why preservation of this content is crucial and seeks to help human rights practitioners 
1 Randall C. Jimerson, Archives Power: Memory, Accountability, and Social Justice (Chicago: Society of American Archivists, 
2009); Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Beacon Press: Boston, 1997).
2 Joan M. Schwartz and Terry Cook, “Archives, Records, and Power: The Making of Modern Memory,” Archival Science 2 
(2002), 1–19.
3 Ibid.; Trouillot, Silencing the Past.
4 Jimerson, Archives Power; Verne Harris, Archives and Justice: A South African Perspective (Chicago: Society of American 
Archivists, 2007); Kirsten Weld, Paper Cadavers: The Archives of Dictatorship in Guatemala (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2014).
5 Catherine Hobbs, “The Character of Personal Archives: Reflections on the Value of Records of Individuals,” Archivaria 52 
(2001), 126-135.
6 Mark A. Greene, “The Power of Meaning: The Archival Mission in the Postmodern Age,” The American Archivist 65 
(2002), 42-55.
7 Hobbs, The Character of Personal Archives.
8 Susan Tucker, “Tacitly the Work of Women: Personal Archives and the Public Memory of Families,” in Perspectives on 
Women’s Archives, ed. Tanya Zanish-Belcher and Anke Voss (Chicago: Society of American Archivists, 2013).
9 See, e.g., The Digital Curation Centre http://www.dcc.ac.uk/; Digital Preservation Coalition: http://www.dpconline.
org; COPTR: http://coptr.digipres.org/Main_Page; Library of Congress Digital Preservation Resource: http://www.
digitalpreservation.gov/; Open Preservation Foundation: http://openpreservation.org/; Preserving (Digital) Objects 
with Restricted Resources (POWRR): http://digitalpowrr.niu.edu/.
10 For the sake of clarity and space, this article will not address text-based Internet media, such as tweets, blogs, or other 
social media postings, or historical video that is stored or archived in a non-digital format.
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embed preservation into the process of media collection and human rights documentation without 
assuming that these organization will want, or be able, to implement a full-scale archiving operation. 
To borrow a phrase routinely repeated in investigations of the ethics and practice of preservation, 
this study will provide more questions than answers.11 
The Duty to Preserve
Video and images of human rights abuse and war crimes are constantly at risk of disappearing from 
the public domain. The creator or uploader could decide that the risks of posting such material 
are too great to justify its continued existence online (i.e., that its existence puts individuals or 
communities at risk); a nefarious actor could threaten them and demand that they take the content 
down or close their account all together; or they could become overwhelmed by the publicity 
they are receiving from the media or the public.12 Content can also be taken down by the hosting 
company because it violates community standards, the end user agreement, or copyright law. This 
might occur because viewers of the content flag it as violent, sexual, or inflammatory in nature, or 
if copyrighted music or video are used to supplement the creator or uploader’s message or point of 
view.  Those with a vested interest in rendering the content of the media invisible will often deploy 
these strategies in order to facilitate its disappearance. Additionally, private companies may shut 
down the accounts of blatant human rights violators in order to make it harder for them to get their 
message out, which has the unintended consequence of hiding evidence of their activities from 
human rights investigators. The uploader’s account might be hacked by nefarious actors and either 
taken offline entirely or stripped of certain content. This threat of disappearance provides all the 
more reason for smaller organizations to preserve a copy of their content regardless of whether or 
not they choose to share it, and for larger organizations to provide support and resources to these 
groups in this endeavor.13
No matter what the cause, the disappearance of content relevant to human rights investigations 
and conflict monitoring occurs on a regular basis.14 For those who believe in the inherent value 
of human rights documentation, there is a pressing duty to preserve this content for use in 
humanitarian, justice and accountability, and historical investigations. This duty is shared by 
individuals and institutions whose missions are explicitly human rights-oriented and who are 
capable of doing so in a safe and secure way, as well as the privately operated platforms that 
serve as de facto public forums for media that clearly depict human rights violations and war 
crimes. This preservation, of course, must be done with the explicit intent to protect and promote 
human rights and has precedent in the way that the preservation of child pornography is handled 
by these platforms. WITNESS, the Human Rights Center at UC-Berkeley and other groups have 
been discussing the idea of an evidence locker—a repository for human rights media that will 
likely be taken down by content platforms—but numerous questions remain about whether it 
should be done, and if so, who would house and govern this archive if maintained separately from 
other content. One challenge in this context that will require additional ethical deliberation is the 
reality that the preservation process will directly undermine the decision of particular creators or 
uploaders to return their content to the private domain for legitimate reasons. 
The Importance of Images and Video
The creation of video or images of human rights abuse or war crimes may be accidental or explicitly 
for the purposes of documenting wrongdoing. In some cases, the creator shares this media directly 
online, and in others local or international content aggregators operating social media channels 
11 See, e.g., Elena S. Danielson, The Ethical Archivist (Chicago: Society of American Archivists, 2010), who provides a list of 
the questions her study generated at the end of each chapter of her book. 
12 David Crunelle, “The Art of Being in the Wrong Place At the Right Time: Behind the Scenes of Social Media 
Newsgathering,” accessed September 19, 2016, https://medium.com/@emhub/the-art-of-being-in-the-wrong-place-at-
the-right-time-behind-the-scenes-of-social-media-3ee558630e93#.7ls6u8wln.
13 Yvonne Ng (WITNESS), personal communication, May 24, 2016. 
14 In my own work on videos from Syria and Ukraine, between 20-50% of the videos originally identified on public 
platforms are no longer publicly accessible.
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that focus on specific issues or regions post it. The value of such material in improving our 
understanding of these events has been amply demonstrated in the Syrian conflict, unrest and 
demonstrations in Ukraine, episodes of violence in Nigeria, and situations of police brutality in the 
United States (to name just a few diverse cases). 
Video and images often compliments official narratives and press accounts of an event or 
situation, adding detail and nuance. At other times, they directly rebut certain factual claims and 
contradict particular narratives. However it is important to remember that images and video are 
framed—the viewer can only see what the cameraperson chooses to focus on or the editor choses 
to include in the final cut. One advantage of citizen media is that a given event is often filmed 
from multiple locations, allowing for its multi-perspectival reconstruction. The availability of 
numerous accounts of an event can hopefully shed light on the limitations of any one view. It can 
also provide a richer accounting of what happened by expanding the amount of information that 
can be gathered about an event, as well as what happened immediately before and after it. 
It is also important to note that people only record and share certain kinds of events with 
their cameras—usually dramatic moments taking place in public or semi-public places, and they 
only post certain kinds of content on the Internet. Thus, crimes like intimate partner violence 
(IPV) and labor law violations are generally not captured on video. There are notable exceptions 
to this trend—see, e.g., the surreptitious investigative work of Videre est Credere in the labor 
domain; or incidental capture of IPV by closed circuit surveillance systems—but at the moment, 
they are few and far between. Further, some crimes require documentation of systematic, ongoing 
violations over time. While the first few instances of a crime may be captured by witnesses or 
victims, perpetrators will eventually become aware of their actions and will alter their behaviors 
accordingly. 
Human Rights Archives
There is by now a well-developed literature on crucial role that archives can play in historical 
clarification and justice and accountability efforts in the aftermath of human rights abuse and 
war crimes—particularly when it comes to preserving the administrative records of wrongdoers. 
Louis Bickford was among the first human rights advocates to voice the “archival imperative.”15 
In 1997, the UN Commission on Human Rights articulated the core principle that human rights 
abuse victims’ right to know necessarily implies the preservation of archives and, further, that 
every effort should be undertaken both to prevent destruction of relevant material and to inform 
and protect those individuals whose names appear in the records.16 Such actions were seen as key 
to ending impunity. Further, the International Council of Archives 2009 report on archives and 
human rights highlighted the crucial work that archives can do in societies transitioning from 
repressive regimes to democracy.17 
These sources make it clear that because human rights abusers and war criminals could erase 
evidence of their wrong-doing by destroying or hiding their records, it is incumbent upon the 
human rights community to prioritize preservation of these records before they disappeared.18 The 
most obvious reason to preserve the records of human rights abuse and war crimes is the need to 
hold perpetrators responsible for their misdeeds, to acknowledge the suffering of victims, and to 
begin the process of healing societies torn apart by violence and suffering. This requires knowing 
what happened to the extent that it is ever possible to do so.
15 Louis Bickford, “The Archival Imperative: Human Rights and Historical Memory in Latin America’s Southern Cone,” 
Human Rights Quarterly 21, no. 4 (1999), 1097-1122.
16 Louis Joinet, “The Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of Detainees Question of the Impunity of 
Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (Civil and Political),” E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20 (1997).
17 Antonio González Quintana, “Archival Policies in the Protection of Human Rights” (International Council on Archives, 
2009). The International Council of Archives also has produced a draft set of principles for archivists involved in 
human rights work, but this document has not been finalized as of the publication of this article. International Council 
on Archives Human Rights Working Group, “Basic Principles on the Role of Archivists in Support of Human Rights 
(Draft),” accessed June 9, 2016, http://www.icarchives.webbler.co.uk/15999/news-and-events/basic-principles-on-the-
role-of-archivists-in-support-of-human-rights-give-your-opinion.html.
18 Harris, Archives and Justice; Weld, Paper Cadavers.
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But Bickford makes the case for preservation on numerous other grounds as well: first, the 
need to disprove claims by revisionists who almost always emerge to deny, or at least minimize, 
crimes against humanity. Second, archives allow “future generations, from historians to family 
members, to thoroughly investigate what happened and reach their own conclusions.”19 Third, it is 
impossible for any justice and accountability effort to provide a complete picture of the past because 
time, resources, mandates, political imperatives, and imagination are always finite. While these 
institutions might produce significant truth or clarification, there is always “more to be learned 
about what occurred, especially, in terms of human rights violations, within the inner-workings 
of authoritarianism, inter-regional and international aspects of military rule, and contemporary 
human rights movements.”20 
These endeavors all contribute to determining what is known and not known in a given 
society, whose perspectives play into the development of collective memory, and what resources 
members of society have to question and challenge the historical accounts that structure the 
reconstruction of their world.21 But archives are not simply records of what happened. They are 
symbolic, and constitutive, of what kind of knowledge is valued and what kinds of knowledge 
projects are possible. As such, they possess power that exceeds the way they are deployed by any 
given interested party. 
At the same time it is important to recognize the numerous hazards of collecting large amounts 
of sensitive information and storing it in one or a few places. In the context of videos and images, 
there are obvious concerns regarding the safety and security of creators and those portrayed in 
them, as well as the presumption of innocence of the individuals who are accused of, or appear 
to be committing, crimes in images or video. Large-scale preservation of digital content begs the 
question of who owns this information and what can be done with it. How much control should 
content creators and social media uploaders retain over the preservation and use of their content by 
third parties—even those with the purest motives and best of intentions—when it has significant 
historical, political and legal value? Should the wishes and privacy of victims depicted in human 
rights related video be privileged over the important social goal of preserving the historical record? 
Should the goal of preservation supersede the desire of such individuals to take down and privatize 
images or videos that were publicly available for a period of time—even when we know that access 
to information often fails to lead to justice or accountability in politically contentious situations? 
Should collected audiovisual material related to human rights abuses and war crimes be made 
public or kept private, and if kept private, how should access and use be governed? What rights do 
the accused/perpetrators have when they can be seen in videos or images committing what appear 
to be crimes and human rights abuses?
On a related note, large international justice organizations now have even greater potential to 
extract preserved information from smaller more regional organizations and use it to pursue their 
desired ends. Sometimes these ends are at odds with, or at least not the priorities of, the groups 
or individuals who document conflict and human rights violations at the local level. Rather, they 
often reflect the normative frameworks and imaginaries of international institutions and the 
individuals who staff them.22 Finally, the archival imperative rests on the positivist notion that 
the preservation of information about human rights violations and war crimes is an inherently 
good thing, and that its use will lead to positive outcomes for affected individuals, communities, 
and societies. Recent scholarship, including the work of archivist Verne Harris and writer David 
Rieff, suggests that this may not always be the case.23 It is not possible to give this particular issue 
19 Bickford, The Archival Imperative, 1099.
20 Ibid.
21 Graham Stinnett, Rebel Collectors: Human Rights and Archives in Central America and the Human Rights Commission of El 
Salvador and the Resource Center of the Americas, 1978-2007 (Winnipeg, Manitoba: University of Manitoba and University 
of Winnipeg, 2010).
22 Elena Baylis, “Tribunal-Hopping With the Post-Conflict Justice Junkies,” Oregon Review of International Law 10 (2008), 361-390.
23 Verne Harris, “Claiming Less, Delivering More: A Critique of Positivist Formulations on Archives in South Africa,” 
Archivaria 44 (1997), 132-140; David Rieff, In Praise of Forgetting: Historical Memory and Its Ironies (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2016).
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the space and consideration it deserves, but it is crucial to at least recognize the assumptions and 
normative frames that undergird this analysis. 
Human Rights Media Preservation Landscape
A great deal of human rights-related media is being collected and stored outside of traditional 
archives or libraries by journalists and human rights activists. Sometimes the individuals and 
organizations doing this work have training in archiving or are being advised by professional 
archivists, but this is not always the case. Many journalists, especially those employed by media-
centric organizations like Storyful, have well-developed practices that are tied into their business 
models, but there is no default professional code of conduct that regulates preservation and sharing 
of human rights-related content and it would be difficult to create one.
On the activist side, the independence of what are sometimes called community archives from 
elite actors and dominant institutions may reflect the marginalization and powerlessness of those 
involved in the creation and collection of materials, or it may reflect a conscious decision to work outside 
of power structures that are perceived as discriminatory or disempowering.24 There is increasing 
effort in the archivist profession, however, to work directly with community members to help them 
document and preserve their own histories.25 There is also a robust tradition within the archiving 
community of conceiving of human rights archives as any material that can illuminate injustice, 
not just administrative records or official documents, and also framing principles and practices 
in terms of their social impact rather than the purely technical principles of archival science.26 
While it would be valuable if professional archivist with significant experience in human 
rights documentation were available to advise every human right media preservation effort that 
requested such support, this is unlikely to occur given the number and diversity of such endeavors 
and the barriers that often separate lay and professional communities. That said, archivists can 
still work together with the human rights community and front-line journalists to play a vital role 
in preserving human rights related digital content in a way that is mindful of the technical, legal, 
ethical, political and cultural challenges in this process, and that privileges the needs and desires 
of human rights abuse victims.27  
 
Archiving Human Rights Media
There are many kinds of human rights media archiving efforts. First is the long-term preparation 
and storage of proprietary content by the creator or an organization/repository selected by the 
creator as the recipient of such content. Second is the acquisition and storage of content found 
on public social media and the Internet, or shown on live-streaming services such as Periscope, 
Meerkat, Facebook, or Twitter. And third is the collection of material that doesn’t fit neatly into 
either of these categories: namely that sent privately on social media or through sharing applications 
such as Snapchat, WhatsApp, Yik Yak, and Telegram. In many cases, media from this category are 
widely circulated even if they are never made explicitly public on the open Internet.  A fourth kind 
of archiving involves the surreptitious collection of media by an unauthorized source who has 
access to it for purposes of whistleblowing. While these archives are not initially public, they may 
either be captured and made public by the opposition or leaked by individuals who want the world 
to know what is happening. The Caesar photos from Syria and audiovisual and textual resources 
regarding U.S. military actions provided to Wikileaks by Chelsea Manning are two examples of 
this phenomenon. 
The focus of this article will be primarily on the second and third form of archiving. This is 
partly because self-preservation of materials fits squarely with the traditional model of archiving, 
24 Michelle Caswell, “Toward a Survivor-Centered Approach to Records Documenting Human Rights Abuse: Lessons 
From Community Archives,” Archival Science 14, no. 3-4 (2014), 307-322.
25 Ibid.
26 See the 2014 special issue of Archival Science on human rights archives, especially the excellent introduction: Michelle 
Caswell, “Defining Human Rights Archives: Introduction to the Special Double Issue on Archives and Human 
Rights,” Archival Science 14, no. 3-4 (2014), 207-213.
27 Caswell, Toward a Survivor-Centered Approach.
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and partly because the non-governmental organization WITNESS has already produced an 
excellent guide for advocates to archive their own materials.28 That said, there are many areas of 
overlap (the WITNESS guide is referenced several times here), and there are many organizations 
that archive both their own content and found material, so this document can be read in parallel 
with that guide. The bottom line in both cases is that preserving media requires technical skill and 
a willingness to put time and labor into setting up the necessary infrastructure with thought and 
care. Cutting corners to save time in the short run will often lead to significant expenditures of time, 
or worse, loss of data or data integrity, in the long-term. Both also include significant legal and 
ethical questions that may require counsel and definitely require conscientious deliberation within 
the archiving institution. Further, it is crucial to recognize that while preserving evidence for use 
in humanitarian response, long term justice and accountability efforts, and historical clarification 
is important, the safety of creators, those depicted in the media, and their families is paramount. 
As WITNESS notes:
Inherent in video’s power to convey an individual story is the potential for a video to impact 
the safety, dignity, and privacy of individuals and communities captured in the footage. A 
video of sexual assault, for example, has the potential to shame, re-victimize, and endanger 
the abused individual. Widely circulated footage of human rights defenders could make 
them targets of arrest or violence by repressive governments. Testimony of a police officer 
describing corruption among his superiors could put that officer at risk of losing his job or 
worse.29 
It is important to note that a crucial source of evidence in many human rights investigations is 
media created by perpetrators, rather than victims, eyewitnesses, or rights advocates. This content 
raises additional questions that must be carefully considered as part of the archiving process—
such as whether to make this material public, how to protect the privacy of victims depicted in 
the media, and how to preserve the due process legal rights of those who are depicted committing 
potential crimes or abuses.
Appraisal
The first step of any preservation effort takes place before any content is collected: the preserving 
organization or individual must decide what its purpose is and what the scope of its collection will 
be—i.e., what it is going to collect, what it is not going to collect, how it makes that assessment 
for specific content, how the collection will be used, and who will have access to it. The answers 
to these questions may evolve over time, but it is crucial that any preservation project begin with 
a clear mission in mind. This mandate may be all encompassing, such as the Syria Justice and 
Accountability Center’s desire to collect and preserve documentation of any type (including 
hundreds of thousands of videos) of all “violations of human rights, humanitarian, and international 
criminal law in Syria,” regardless of perpetrator, “in order to facilitate transitional justice and 
accountability efforts.”30 Or, it may be narrowly tailored, such as WITNESS’s new effort to collect, 
analyze, and contextualize video of hate crimes against transgender people in the United States.31
The storage method chosen and availability of human labor will at least in part determine 
what media is actually kept. If either are limited, the preserving organization may have to be extra 
selective about what to preserve and what not to. An organization with limited storage or labor 
might decide to keep only video from established sources or close collaborators in original, raw 
format and ignore anything that has been edited or is available on social media. Organizations that 
28 WITNESS, “Activists’ Guide to Archiving Video,” accessed June 15, 2016, https://archiveguide.witness.org/.
29 WITNESS, “Ethical Guidelines: Using Eyewitness Videos in Human Rights Reporting & Advocacy,” accessed June 13, 
2016, https://library.witness.org/product/video-as-evidence-ethical-guidelines/, 4.
30 Syria Justice and Accountability Center, “Collect and Preserve Documentation,” accessed September 19, 2016,  
https://syriaaccountability.org/what-we-do/.
31 Karen Stevenson, “Curating Eyewitness Videos for Data on Transphobic Violence,” WITNESS (June 2016), accessed 
September 19, 2016, https://lab.witness.org/curating-eyewitness-videos-data-transphobic-violence/.
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have access to large amounts of storage, and a lot of labor, might elect to collect everything with 
little initial evaluation, and then go back at a later date to filter out extraneous results, authenticate 
the media that is kept, and evaluate its content. All are logical decisions that are based on mission 
and resources. In a world of limited resources, significant value can be gained when organizations 
work together in the mode of “collaborative collecting” to secure as complete a record of a situation 
as possible.32
Acquisition
Once the scope and mission of the effort is specified, the next step is to determine how to acquire 
of the most authentic version of the relevant media possible. The original, complete, unedited 
file is preferred, but this will often be impossible when video or images shared via social media 
are involved. If the creator of the media is known and can be contacted, the preserver should 
consider doing so, but only after carefully considering the risk associated with reaching out to 
the individual. They should ask for as much background about the circumstances in with the 
media was filmed as possible—especially date, location, and what they captured in the video. 
If possible, the archiving organization should request the master copy, and, if the video has 
been edited, also consider collecting the original, raw sources of the selections that were brought 
together. 
The preserving organization should also try as best as it can to request permission to store, 
utilize, and share the image or video. This conversation should also directly address issues of long-
term ownership and control of the material, which is discussed below. The organization should 
be as explicit as possible about how the media will be stored and all the potential uses to which it 
may be put, and also find out whether the creator would be willing to be contacted in the event 
that the media is used for investigatory, legal, or historical purposes. The organization should 
also ask whether the creator would like to be credited in any way if the content is used, and if so, 
how. This can be a monumentally large and difficult process when dealing with large volumes of 
video, and impossible when a creator or uploader cannot be discerned. In addition to the issue of 
personal harm and violation of privacy, those engaged in preservation must think carefully about 
what to do when content they have preserved from the Internet is taken down or goes private. Do 
organizations have a duty to delete this material from their collections, preserve it for posterity, or 
endeavor to strike a balance—however imperfect—between the two? There is no clear answer to 
this question.33
Whether or not the creator can be contacted, the organization should document all aspects of 
the acquisition process (time, date, source, location, etc.), as well as any preservation metadata—
i.e., a record of any action performed on the media by the archive, including: changes in format 
to ensure continued accessibility; information about hardware used in storage process; usage 
data; and rights information. There are many guidelines for preservation metadata, including the 
Library of Congress’s PREMIS standard.34 Without such documentation, assurance of chain of 
custody and the ability to authenticate a video will be compromised moving forward.35 In the case 
of publicly available/shared content for which it is difficult or impossible to contact the creator, 
the first known version, in the highest resolution available, should be acquired. In either case, 
acquisition should involve the collection of all public metadata available at the time of collection, 
not just the media itself, and a record of how the resource looked when it was acquired (either in the 
form of a screenshot or preservation of html code). This package should then be cryptographically 
hashed (given a unique alphanumeric identifier produced through a computational process and 
time-stamped) using a trusted source to ensure their authenticity and makes it possible to detect 
subsequent tampering.36 
32 Danielson, The Ethical Archivist, 53. 
33 WITNESS, Ethical Guidelines: Using Eyewitness Videos.
34 Library of Congress, “PREMIS,” accessed June 15, 2016, http://www.loc.gov/standards/premis/.
35 WITNESS, “Activists’ Guide to Archiving Video,” accessed June 15, 2016, https://archiveguide.witness.org/.
36 For an explanation of cryptographic hashing, see: Enrique Piracés, “Trusted Timestamping,” accessed September 19, 
2016, https://www.rightslab.org/vault/faq.php#Trusted_Timestamping.
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Courts, tribunals, and other fact-finding bodies will differ in exact requirements for collection of 
metadata and formats, so it is best to collect as much information as possible when acquiring human 
rights-related media and store it in the most flexible database possible. Preservation specialists 
and human rights practitioners have discussed the merits of adopting a single preservation policy 
for the human rights community (or at least those human rights organizations that are hooked 
into dominant internationally-oriented networks), such as one based on the International Criminal 
Court’s eCourt Protocol (which lays out the evidentiary standards—and therefore many preservation 
requirements—for the use of electronic evidence in its legal proceedings), but no such action has 
been taken at the time of the publication of this article.37 Whether the content is privately collected 
or gathered from public sources, as noted above, it is imperative to preserve as much original 
metadata as possible and record all modifications made to the file once it enters your possession.
Many human rights practitioners who specialize in documentation, including those who run 
Amnesty International’s Citizen Evidence Lab, are using a tool called VideoVault for acquiring 
online content.38 It is available both as a standalone web application in a browser, or as an extension 
for the Google Chrome browser that automatically preserves a video and all relevant additional 
information and metadata with the click of a button. It then sends this data to the user as a 
preservation package to be stored in a location selected by the user. 
Storage
Acquired media should be stored in the most secure way possible. There is no single solution to this 
task. The best storage method will be determined by the situation and the resources available to the 
individual or institution acquiring the media. In all cases, though, efforts should be undertaken to 
ensure the security of the system, and that it is at least minimally redundant (i.e., more than one 
copy is kept). The Responsible Data Forum (RDF) recently published its first handbook, which 
contains a useful chapter on archiving and preservation of digital content in human rights and 
humanitarian contexts.39 RDF suggests that organizations that will have difficulty creating a “home 
for healthy data”40 should consider partnering with one of the established human rights archives 
connected with a major university or large NGO, including Open Society, Duke University, or 
Columbia University. Many human rights organizations already rely on these institutions to 
archive their finished work products and inactive business records. Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch, and Physicians for Human Rights, for instance, deposit many of their materials in 
Columbia University’s Archive.41 Duke University’s archives have an extensive collection of Latin 
American human rights-related material as well as the collection of the International Center for 
Transitional Justice.42 The Open Society Archives contain extensive documentation of human rights 
struggles in the former Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including over 11,000 
hours of audiovisual material.43
37 Enrique Piracés and Jay D. Aronson, “Human Rights Media Central Workshop Summary Report” (October 2015), 
accessed June 15, 2016, http://www.cmu.edu/chrs/documents/HRMC-Meeting-Report.pdf; International Criminal 
Court, “eCourt Protocol,” accessed June 15, 2016, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1695618.pdf.
38 VideoVault is being developed by Enrique Piracés, my colleague at the Center for Human Rights Science at Carnegie 
Mellon University. He is carrying out this work independently of the center and the university as a public service to 
the human rights community. He has no financial stake in the software. See: Enrique Piracés, “VideoVault,” accessed 
April 24, 2017, https://www.bravenewtech.org.
39 Responsible Data Forum, “Closing a Project: Archiving and Preservation of Content,” accessed June 15, 2016, https://
responsibledata.io/resources/handbook/chapters/chapter-03-closing-a-project.html. Other archival models exist as 
well, including the International Organization for Standardizations’ Open Archival Information System (http://www.
iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=57284), and the National Digital Stewardship Alliance (http://www.
ndsa.org) offers a variety of useful resources for organizations and individuals interested in preservation of digital 
materials.
40 Responsible Data Forum, “Managing Data: Setting Up the Data Infrastructure,” accessed June 15, 2016, https://
responsibledata.io/resources/handbook/chapters/chapter-02-managing-data.html#a-home-for-healthy-data.
41 Columbia University Libraries/Information Services, Center for Human Rights Documentation & Research, accessed 
June 16, 2016, http://library.columbia.edu/locations/chrdr/archive_collections.html.
42 International Center for Transitional Justice, accessed February 24, 2017, https://www.ictj.org/. 
43 Vera & Donald Blinken Open Society Archives, accessed June 16, 2016, http://www.osaarchivum.org/archives.
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Yet, this is clearly not a viable approach for smaller organizations that lack trust in larger 
institutions to safeguard their material or fear that they will lose control of their content if it is 
under the care of a third-party. Further, the initiatives above tend to follow a more traditional 
archiving model, in which completed work products and inactive business records are processed 
and stored. These organizations tend not to rely on third-party repositories for the immediate 
storage of material being collected for future analysis and use.44 Further, in most cases, organizations 
that preserve content will potentially be in violation of terms of service of the social media and 
Internet platforms where they initially discover the content, which will likely cause problems when 
negotiating with larger archiving institutions. 
For organizations that do not wish to enter into any form of partnership, but want to store their 
material off site, numerous cloud-based services (e.g., Box, Dropbox, Apple iCloud, or Amazon) 
provide simple, relatively low-cost, and relatively secure45 storage solutions. Before uploading 
material to these services, it is important for organizations and activists to understand that they 
might be legally required cooperate with law enforcement or other state agents if formally asked 
to provide access to content. Such services are also liable to hacking and other forms of password 
theft. It is also important to recognize that the cloud is really just somebody else’s server. It does not 
denote a magical, mythical 100% dedicated and secure repository, despite the marketing efforts by 
large companies that provide such services. For web-based material, the Internet Archive (archive.
org), which includes perpetual storage on their secure servers for no cost, is another viable option. 
The Internet Archive also serves as the backend storage site for the digital content of the major 
academic archiving organizations just mentioned, and will soon be compatible with VideoVault. 
They also offer their own (paid) subscription-based tool and system called Archive-It that offers 
more control over content once it is uploaded. It should be noted that Archive-It is not optimized 
for video and is generally used by universities and institutions that have a dedicated, specialized 
archiving staff. 
Finally, media can be stored on a hard drive, or a non-networked server, although care must be 
taken to ensure redundancy and guard against physical theft or destruction of the storage device. 
As strategies for ensuring the continued health of stored material, WITNESS recommends making 
at least two copies (preferably three), checking files regularly, controlling access, and regularly 
updating the storage mechanism to keep up with changing technologies.46 Encryption should be 
used if transmitting content to a secure location, but files should be stored unencrypted if at all 
possible to prevent problems accessing the media in the future. 
Organization/Cataloging and Content Tagging
Collections of preserved video and images have little value if their content cannot be easily 
determined and searched. The starting point for all media cataloging efforts is the metadata 
collected at time of acquisition, including information provided by sources of directly acquired 
content, technical metadata, and anything related to chain of custody. Catalogues should also 
include keywords, a basic description of what can be found in the media, what rights restrictions 
might be placed on the content, and whether the identities of any of the people depicted in the 
video need to be protected. The richer the catalogue for any given collection, the more value it has 
to human rights advocates, researchers, and historians.47 There is, of course, an inherent trade-
off in the cataloguing process that archivists have been discussing and debating for a long time: 
cataloging is very labor intensive, can be highly subjective and biased, and every moment spent 
extracting information from a one resource means that another resource might languish unnoticed 
or uncatalogued.48 
44 Yvonne Ng (WITNESS), personal communication, May 24, 2016. 
45 Cloud storage providers offer a wide variety of security levels, ranging from simply password protection to measures 
that governments feel comfortable using for sensitive information.
46 WITNESS, “Store: Introduction,” accessed June 16, 2016, https://archiveguide.witness.org/store/introduction.
47 WITNESS, “Catalog: Introduction,” accessed June 16, 2016, https://archiveguide.witness.org/catalog/introduction.
48 Mark A Greene and Dennis Meissner, “More Product, Less Process: Revamping Traditional Archival Processing,” The 
American Archivist 68 (2005), 208-263.
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Although it is unlikely that an archiving institution or human rights group will have the 
capacity to extract all relevant information from a collection (this, after all, is generally not the 
task of an archive), the following types of information can at least conceivably be added to a 
catalogue by analysts working with the archiving institution or using the collection for research or 
accountability purposes:
• Using geolocation tools available on Citizen Media Lab’s Toolbox, it is often possible to 
determine the location of a filmed event by matching features using services like Google 
Earth, Google Street View and satellite imagery. 
• It is sometimes possible to determine the date and approximate time of day using 
shadows, weather, sun position, and other climactic and clues in the footage.
• Perpetrators can sometimes be identified (either individually or at the group level) based 
on uniforms/clothing, weapons, vehicles, and other physical possessions provided they 
can be matched to verified footage or images elsewhere.  
• Approximate counts of people, whether victims, participants in events or bystanders can 
be determined within the region that is captured in the footage.  
• Types of weapons, vehicles, tools, and other possessions or other implements can be 
discerned. This information can help link particular actors to events as supporters even if 
they are not physically present.
• Forensic clues about the incident can sometimes be determined using images of wounds, 
blood splatter patterns, position of victim, and overall view of crime scene.  
• Patterns of activity can sometimes be detected when there are multiple videos or images 
from a particular situation—this can be crucial evidence for a claim that a particular action 
was part of an orchestrated plan and not a one-off mistake by a “bad apple.”
The Center for Human Rights Science at Carnegie Mellon is currently developing semi-automated 
methods of categorization, tagging, and information extraction from videos and images that lack 
metadata, but for the moment this work is generally done manually.49 
Authentication
Once media has been acquired, stored, and catalogued, it must be authenticated before it can be 
used for legal, scholarly, or advocacy purposes.50 Organizations preserving video and images for 
human rights documentation purposes need to know whether the material they have collected 
actually depicts what it is claimed to show. Authentication is the first step in the longer process of 
verifying whether the claim made about it is true or not. In other words, a video could actually be 
authentic (i.e., filmed at the time and place claimed and not altered in any way) but still not be a 
full, truthful account of what happened there (i.e., it could leave out important parts of a scene or 
not show the event in its entirety). However, if a video is not filmed at the time and place claimed, 
or is altered in certain ways, there is no way it can be truthful account of what happened at a 
different time or place. Such non-authentic videos should not be discarded, however. They may 
be crucial to understanding how particular parties are seeking to alter understandings of a crime 
or event. 
A robust set of practices has emerged around the authentication and verification of human 
rights media in recent years. The Verification Handbook, published by the European Journalism 
Centre, provides instructions and case studies for the authentication of video and images in a 
journalistic or emergency response context.51 Amnesty International’s Citizen Evidence Lab 
provides step-by-step tutorials, case studies, test exercises, and an updated list of tools for human 
49 Jay D. Aronson, et al., “Video Analytics for Conflict Monitoring and Human Rights Documentation” (Pittsburgh: 
Carnegie Mellon University Center for Human Rights Science, 2015).
50 Craig Silverman, Lies, Damn Lies, and Viral Content: How News Websites Spread (and Debunk) Online Rumors, Unverified 
Claims, and Misinformation (New York: Tow Center for Digital Journalism/Columbia Journalism School, 2015).
51 Craig Silverman (ed.), The Verification Handbook (Maastricht, the Netherlands: European Journalism Center, 2013) is 
available online at http://verificationhandbook.com/ in English and several other languages. 
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rights researchers faced with verifying content.52 The site also contains a valuable reading list 
regarding authentication and media in the human rights context.
Christoph Koettl, Citizen Evidence Lab’s founder, has produced a framework for reviewing 
and verifying human rights related media. This framework begins with metadata review. Koettl 
provides an updated list of free and open source tools for reviewing video and image metadata in the 
Citizen Evidence Lab Toolbox.53 When video or photograph is acquired in its original, unprocessed 
format, metadata and image analysis can be used to determine when and where the footage was 
shot, on what equipment, and whether it has been modified in any way.54 Unfortunately, when 
a video or image is uploaded to social media platforms, its technical metadata is replaced by 
metadata created when it is processed for streaming. This public metadata can tell you when was 
uploaded, and sometimes from where, but it has limited value for authentication.
In addition to metadata review, the Citizen Evidence Toolbox provides several other 
verification methods, including using reverse image search to look for the earliest available posting 
of a particular image or video. Koettl highlights several cases (including examples from Nigeria, 
Syria, and Palestine, among others) in which content from one time or place was passed off as 
evidence of human rights abuses in another time or context. Such deception can be intentional (i.e., 
done explicitly to deceive or falsely accuse an individual or agency of a crime) or, especially in the 
age of viral video and online activism, unintentional (i.e., passing along incorrect information in 
the hope of improving a situation, or misreading the context of a particular piece of media). 
Other attributes of the source can be helpful in determining the extent to which it can be trusted. 
For instance, a video or image is released of a human rights violation in a conflict situation by a 
person who has a long history of posting either from that location or about that location might be 
accorded more credibility than another image or video posted by someone (or some organization) 
who either just opened a social media account, or has only posted from or about other locations 
before. Further, a video or image from someone who is deeply embedded in social networks in the 
place that is the subject of the report may be more credible than one posted by an individual or 
organization that is not well-known in the community. These are not definitive markers of veracity, 
of course, but provide additional information that can be used in such a determination.
Before images or videos are used in court or for advocacy purposes, subject matter and regional 
specialists should be consulted to verify interpretation and provide historical or cultural context, 
although this is not the primary responsibility of the organization or individual preserving them. 
They may also need to be examined by technical experts who have access to proprietary (and 
expensive) software used to identify edited or manipulated media.55 Further, as Koettl and others 
note, video and images do not speak for themselves, however visually compelling they may be. 
Media will both strengthen a case, and be strengthened, through integration with information from 
other sources, including eyewitness accounts, satellite data, military reports, official government 
documents, NGO findings, and other forms of evidence. Such corroboration is already a core 
practice of human rights documentation, and should continue even as digital evidence becomes 
more prevalent.
Ethical and Legal Considerations
This section will address some of the main ethical and legal challenges associated with the 
preservation of human rights-related media—including the notion that preservation of evidence of 
human rights violations is always an inherently good thing to do. There are numerous frameworks 
one could use to address these issues, but the global norms of the international human rights 
approach makes the most sense in this case. When other kinds of rights claims are at issue 
52 Amnesty International, “Citizen Evidence Lab,” accessed June 15, 2016, https://citizenevidence.org/.
53 Citizen Evidence Lab, “Toolbox,” accessed June 15, 2016, https://citizenevidence.org/toolbox/.
54 Specially engineered technologies, such as Guardian Project’s CameraV project and the International Bar Association’s 
eyeWitness to Atrocities app (which is based on CameraV’s technology) add additional metadata to a video or image 
as it is shot to enhance subsequent verifiability.
55 Christoph Koettl, Citizen Media Research and Verification: An Analytical Framework for Human Rights Practitioners 
(Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge Centre for Governance and Human Rights, 2016), 9.
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(especially claims to copyright/intellectual property or property ownership), the promotion of 
basic human rights, the prevention of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and respect for 
the dignity of survivors and victims should take precedence. Further, promotion of civil and 
political rights, and economic, social, and political rights should be given precedence whenever 
possible.  
There is an equally powerful viewpoint in this context that states that the preservation 
and availability evidence of human rights violations and war crimes ought to be governed, if 
not determined, by the wishes of victims’ families and survivors of such abuse—not norms 
generally associated with international non-governmental human rights organizations or 
archiving institutions generally centered in the global north. Survivors, victims’ families, and local 
documentation groups may want to retain control of evidence so that they can use it in seeking 
justice, prevent the perpetrators or other enemies from gaining access to it and using it for purposes 
that go against their mandate, prevent it from ever being made public, delay access to it for some 
period of time, or even in rare circumstances, destroy it.
Archivist Michelle Caswell has made a practice-oriented version of this argument in numerous 
publications. She argues for a “survivor-centered approach” to archiving that recognizes that “past 
victims of human rights abuse depicted in these records did not choose to be documented.”56 In order 
to restore and honor their agency as human beings with dignity and basic rights we ought to allow 
survivors to “maintain control over the decision-making processes related to records documenting 
their abuse, regardless of the nature of the institution— intergovernmental, governmental, or 
nongovernmental—that maintains custody over such records.”57
Thus, rather than seeking to preserve as much evidence as possible, Caswell argues that the 
“primary ethical concern” of all involved in the human rights documentation process should be to 
honor the wishes and desires of those who survived violations and war crimes, and the relatives 
of those who were killed as a result.58 In her view, this doesn’t require turning all records over 
to community groups for archiving, but rather that those individuals most affected by war and 
human rights abuse should have a say in the archiving process through consultation, participation, 
and a seat at the decision-making table.  
In traditional archiving situations, such questions and governance issues can be addressed 
through the process of negotiating donor agreements, setting restrictions on a collection, and 
determining conditions of use. In the context of preservation of video and images from social 
media and the Internet, however, such negotiations do not take place. Further, since many human 
rights preservation endeavors happen outside of academia and other archiving institutions, it will 
not always be possible to directly consult those affected by human rights abuse and war crimes. 
One potential way of reconciling the survivor-centered approach with the realities of social 
media preservation would be to continue to monitor the status of the original instance of a publicly 
available video obtained from social media or the Internet in order to keep track of whether it goes 
private or is taken down by the host. If such a practice is put into place, the preserver would then 
have to decide whether it should flag this change in status as part of its preservation metadata, or 
even remove the material from its collection. 
 
Security Concerns
Wherever one stands on the question of whether shared video and images should be archived without 
explicit consent and input of the creator, it is without question that when any kind of human rights-
related content is preserved, the archiving individual or institution has an undeniable obligation 
to ensure that its actions are in the best interest of the affected individuals and communities, and 
also to protect the safety and security of the creator and all people who are depicted in the image 
or video. In the absence of explicit input from creators and those depicted, access to preserved 
material (especially videos and images that are taken down from social media platforms) should be 
56 Caswell, Toward a Survivor-Centered Approach, 309.
57 Ibid., 308.
58 Ibid., 309.
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limited to those individuals and institutions that are involved in the protection and promotion of 
human rights or have a direct interest in knowing exactly what happened as a survivor or relative 
of a victim. Other interests, such as historical clarification or academic research, will have to be 
handled on a case-by-case basis. There is unfortunately no easy way to determine the legitimacy 
of a particular request, or to identify exactly who has the authority to make such determinations. 
The ultimate goal of access policies must be to limit harm to vulnerable individuals and groups, 
and to promote a deeper understanding of a human rights abuse or conflict situation. At the end 
of the day, these are all judgment calls, and are debates in which survivors and relatives of victims 
should be central. 
These issues are not unique to the human rights context—academic and institutional archives 
have been dealing with them for decades. Unfortunately, there are no simple answers. Each case 
involves accepting some degree of ambiguity and balancing of principles that may be in direct 
conflict with one another.59 Institutions and individuals engaged in preservation must decide what 
lengths they are willing to go to control access to sensitive material. Most importantly, are they 
prepared to go to jail to protect the content, and what resources should they devote to security, 
both in infrastructure or legal defense?
Thus, the institution or individual will need to determine in advance of engaging in preservation 
whether it has the resources, political capital, and institutional mandate to guard against demands 
for access to material by law enforcement, states, and other nefarious actors whose goal is national 
security, or protection of power or reputation, not the promotion of human rights in a country 
or region. At the end of the day, preservers will be faced with making judgments about what 
constitutes the public’s interest and right to know. They will likely require strong legal counsel and 
very clear-cut data sharing policies to help them in this effort.60 
Access 
According to the Society of American Archivists’ statement of values, “Archivists promote and 
provide the widest possible accessibility of materials, consistent with any mandatory access 
restrictions, such as public statute, donor contract, business/institutional privacy, or personal 
privacy. Although access may be limited in some instances, archivists seek to promote open access 
and use when possible.”61 The hedges included in this statement highlight the reality that the ethics 
of providing access to archival materials is a “thorny problem.”62 It is not a one and done policy 
decision, but instead requires constant deliberation and negotiation. 
It would not make much sense to argue for open access to human rights media archives (even 
when all of the material collected may have public at one point), partly because this is not the goal 
of most human rights organizations (unlike, say an academic research archive) and partly because 
doing so would put many people at great risk. Preservers of human rights-related content must 
decide how much access to be granted for specific media, at what time, under what circumstances, 
and for what use.
Ideally the creator of the media, and those any victims or bystanders portrayed in it, should 
have the opportunity to determine how their creations and likenesses are used, but in the human 
rights context, this is not always practical, or even possible. In cases where this isn’t possible, 
and where preserved material is nonpublic and particularly sensitive, one potential option is to 
convene a knowledgeable and empathetic board of trustees for a particular collection—made up of 
a mix of survivors, relatives of victims, affected community members, human rights advocates and 
investigators, lawyers, and other relevant specialists—to set policies and also act as a co-custodian 
or steward of a collection. 
59 The history of some of these debates can be found in Menzi L. Behrnd-Klodt and Peter J. Wosh, eds., Privacy and 
Confidentiality Perspectives: Archivists and Archival Records (Chicago: Society of American Archivists, 2005) and 
Danielson, The Ethical Archivist.
60 Danielson, The Ethical Archivist.
61 Society of American Archivists Core Values and Statement of Ethics, accessed June 17, 2016, http://www2.archivists.org/
statements/saa-core-values-statement-and-code-of-ethics.
62 Elena S. Danielson, “The Ethics of Access,” The American Archivist 52 (1989), 52-62.
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Michelle Caswell notes that consensus will not always be possible in such circumstances, so 
policies should accommodate multiple viewpoints whenever possible. This board can either set 
criteria for access (i.e., what should be public, if anything, and what should be restricted), review 
specific requests for restricted material when they arise, or set general guidelines for the use of 
material in the collection and the way that it is credited. It can also establish a date or circumstance 
at which a closed image or video collection might become open or at least less restricted. The board 
can also determine whether investigators from criminal tribunals, truth commissions, or other 
official investigative bodies should be give unrestricted access to preserved materials. Trustees and 
advisors must be mindful that the perpetrator in and inquiry will have a legitimate case or access 
to the material as well—potentially exposing creators or those portrayed in media to various levels 
of intimidation or actual physical harm. 
Integrating such advisory groups present numerous challenges in the archiving context, but 
Caswell provides several examples of successful community partnerships including the University 
of Texas Human Rights Documentation Initiative’s South Asian American Digital Archive 
(SAADA). SAADA involves partnerships with two grassroots activist networks documenting 
forced deportation of immigrants from the Indian subcontinent after September 11 and several 
initiatives currently taking place on Indigenous archives in Australia.63 
Privacy and Safety
Whenever access is granted to a human rights media collection, the preserving institution or 
individual has a strong obligation to protect the privacy of the sources of the audiovisual media, 
their creators, and the individuals who appear in them. It will likely be impossible to fully 
anonymize any of these actors, and indeed, the interests of justice and accountability might not be 
served by doing so, but every effort must be undertaken to ensure their safety. This might require 
redacting certain metadata before a collection is accessed, or using a blurring tool (such as that 
offered by YouTube or other video/image processing software) to hide the faces of individuals 
before a particular video or image is made public or released to the custody of another institution, 
researcher, or human rights advocate. It will also certainly require the signing of a nondisclosure 
agreement, although such documents are unlikely to provide full privacy protection.  
Again, such issues are nothing new—the requirement to balance personal privacy and the 
public interest has been the subject of debate for decades.64 The stakes are dramatically heightened 
in the human rights context, where much more than personal reputation or propriety (or national 
pride) is at stake. There are numerous examples of this kind of situation in the archiving world (e.g., 
the Boston College Troubles Archive or the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Archive), and each case seems to be handled as a unique challenge. In some cases, the desire to 
protect basic human rights will require restricting access to a collection, and in others in might 
require making collections available that will almost certainly generate risks to personal privacy 
and security. In some cases, compromises will need to be worked out in which metadata for a 
particular piece of media is available, but not the image or video in question. This will of course 
prevent full use of the material, but it will at least alert investigators that such content exists. 
A guiding principle ought to be that any disclosure of private data or individual or community 
identity must be directly related to the protection and promotion of basic human rights or historical 
clarification. It must either provide evidence that a violation has taken place or information about 
perpetrators. Such information should not be released upon request without scrutiny or into the 
hands of individuals or institutions that do not have human rights and truth telling as core objectives. 
Actors who are suspected of wanting to use media collections to target activists or community 
members should be denied access whenever legally possible. Disclosure of information should not 
harm the ability of an individual to lead a decent life unless that person has committed war crimes 
or crimes against humanity, or has information that is directly linked to such event. Further, the 
use of face-blurring and other privacy enhancing techniques should be used whenever possible.
63 Caswell, Toward a Survivor-Centered Approach.
64 Behrnd-Klodt and Wosh, Privacy and Confidentiality Perspectives.
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This is an evaluation of the privacy/access conundrum that is not binary, but rather is 
contextual.65 Decisions about whether to grant access to a collection or piece of media is based 
upon an evaluation of the use to which it will be put, the context in which it will be used, who will 
be using it, what the potential harms are to the individuals portrayed in the media, to communities, 
and societies, and what they potential benefits are to those same entities.66 Whenever possible, these 
decisions should be made with affected individuals and community representatives at the table. 
One potential solution to the challenge of privacy, security, and consent that gives primacy to 
the desires of creators, can be seen in a recent project involving the collection of tweets surrounding 
the Black Lives Matter Movement by Deen Freelon, Charlton D. McIlwain, and Meridith D. Clark. 
It must be noted, however, that the policies they developed to manage a large collection of tweets 
purchased from Twitter for research purposes (and therefore in compliance with the companies’ 
terms of service) might hinder the preservation of the most relevant images and videos in the 
human rights context. Specifically, in their public-facing report, they provide only a link to a tweet 
rather than quoting it in print, which gives the user the opportunity to delete the material if he or 
she does not want it to be disseminated in such a way. Further, they limit their discussion of specific 
tweets to those that were posted by users who had 3,000 followers or more, or where verified by the 
company, and had a minimum of 100 retweets by the time that they conducted their analysis. They 
noted that this would minimize the potential for shining an “unwanted spotlight on previously 
obscure content” or “exposing relatively unknown users to unwanted public scrutiny.”67 
While the authors of this study recognize that they could have made some Twitter users 
unhappy by including their names or tweets in the report, they feel that their “ethical choices 
strike a balance between the individual rights of the parties to this conversation and the right of the 
public to know how a movement of such political significance rose to prominence online.”68 They 
also made it clear that anyone who felt they were harmed by the report should contact the authors 
to discuss ways of mitigating the harm of their inclusion, and that when they made the database of 
tweets available to the public after an embargo period, they would release only tweet IDs to limit 
access to material that had been deleted or otherwise protected.69 While the authors presumably 
retain the original content in their collection, outside users would not have access to at least some 
content that could be useful in an investigation or inquiry. This would of course protect creators 
from unwanted publicity, but it limits the value of the collection as a whole. 
Conclusion: Tension Remains
A core tension remains after this analysis of the preservation of human rights-related video: 
whose needs are being met by its preservation and who ought to control the storage and use of 
this content? One perspective focuses on the need to preserve evidence of violations for justice 
and accountability efforts (both at the national and international levels), advocacy, and historical 
clarification. This position is most often voiced by international human rights organizations and 
institutions and their affiliates. Another viewpoint focuses on the ethical duty to protect individuals 
and respect their wishes even when higher-level justice and accountability efforts may suffer. 
People and organizations closer to actual production of evidence—whether they are activists or 
organizations that support them directly—most frequently express this view to me. Obviously 
most human rights practitioners recognize the value of both, but opinions differ on which one 
ought to be prioritized. 
65 Steven Bingo uses this term in a similar way. See: Steven Bingo, “Of Provenance and Privacy: Using Contextual Integrity 
to Define Third-Party Privacy,” The American Archivist 74 (2011), 506-521.
66 See Sonia Yaco, “Balancing Privacy and Access in School Desegregation Collections: A Case Study,” The American 
Archivist 73, no. 2 (2010), 637-668 for an excellent discussion of this issue in the context of U.S. school desegregation 
records. She highlights the legal distinction between disclosing private information and making it public. This could 
be a useful fulcrum for publishing some metadata regarding a particular video or image while not releasing the 
content itself.  
67 Deen Freelon, et al., Beyond the Hashtags: #Ferguson, #Blacklivesmatter, and the Online Struggle for Offline Justice 
(Washington, DC: Center for Media and Social Impact, 2016), 86.
68 Freelon, et al., Beyond the Hashtags, 86.
69 Ibid., 87.
Aronson
©2017     Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, no. 1 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.1
97
Perhaps one possible source of guidance on this issue is the recent European Court of Justice’s 
decision on the right to be forgotten, in which it recognized that citizens could petition to have 
online links removed from search engine results that contained inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant, 
or excessive information, but that such requests would be subject to balancing tests against other 
fundamental rights. Specifically, decision makers would have to evaluate “the type of information 
in question, its sensitivity for the individual’s private life, and the interest of the public in having 
access to that information.”70 The court ultimately made it clear that the individual’s right to be 
forgotten must always be balanced with the public’s right to know. While the ruling does not 
present a clear-cut answer for every case, it does provide a normative framework for determining 
whether or not content should be preserved and/or made accessible in the absence of explicit 
permission by the creator and those individuals portrayed in it. 
A second source of guidance is the growing movement to erase the silences that exist in 
current archives, accountability efforts, and academic scholarship. These efforts rest upon the twin 
pillars of widening the scope of collection efforts, and giving the people whose lives are being 
documented a say in how these collections are created, stored and used. An excellent example in 
this context is the “Documenting the Now” project, which seeks to archive Twitter, social media, 
and Internet resources relating to activism surrounding race, police brutality and similar topics in 
the United States. The team leading this project acknowledges that our understandings of the past 
are “deeply tied to the traces that are created and remain in our archives,” and that what is absent 
from archives speaks just as loudly as what is present.71 Thus, preservation efforts have an obligation 
to ensure that no groups are being intentionally or inadvertently silenced, and that the people 
and communities whose voices and creations are being archived must retain at least some control 
over what is collected, how it is collected, and how these collections are governed in the future.
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Introduction
Much of the excitement in the past decade about the potential for new technologies such as mobile 
phones, wireless high-speed Internet, and social media software to aid in the prosecution of mass 
atrocities has evolved into deeper analysis of whether these tools can really do everything we 
thought possible. The development of the ICTs for atrocities research and response field is at a stage 
where praxis, the use of practice to inform the development of theory, is crucial. Deeper theory, 
grounded in empirical examples, can lead to better data collection and thus a better understanding 
of the impact of ICTs on atrocities response in both research and practice. This collection of articles 
theoretically and empirically pushes these issues further, building on existing policy and field 
experience to develop frameworks that can guide both empirical research and policy development 
for using ICTs in atrocities monitoring.
The articles in this Special Issue invite readers to think about how the relationship between 
digital technology and atrocities response has evolved over the past 15 or so years. Levinger’s 
analysis of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum’s (USHMM) Crisis in Darfur and 
Amnesty USA’s Eyes on Darfur offer a good starting point for understanding how the ICT for 
atrocities response field has developed.1 Specifically, we may ask how this evolution has created 
the need for better theoretical and practical frameworks for ethics, privacy, and technical acumen 
in the humanitarian and human rights communities. Levinger’s examples of digital data collection 
on mass atrocities relied on commercial satellite imaging and trusted reporters on the ground. 
This method evolved rapidly in 2008 when Ushahidi, a mapping and crowdsourcing platform, was 
designed in a matter of days in Kenya to allow citizens to report on violence via text message. The 
messages could then be coded and visualized on a map for the public to see. This piece of software, 
developed by a small group of Kenyan lawyers, journalists, and developers to gather local data and 
provide a voice for Kenyans affected by the violence, brought the process of crowdsourcing, big 
data, and ICTs to humanitarianism’s center stage. This shift to using data submitted by the public 
via mobile phone and social media introduced a host of ethical, risk management, institutional, 
and legal issues, many of which we are only fully grasping nine years after Ushahidi was initially 
deployed.
This context raises serious thematic and methodological questions regarding how we study the 
role of ICTs in mass atrocities response. The theme is inherently cross-cutting: within this collection 
of articles are references to law, political science, anthropology, public administration, and 
informatics with a particular focus on the need for a corresponding pedagogy to learn about data 
collection through the use of ICTs to respond in distinct phases of mass atrocities.2 The mix of fields 
makes defining a driving research methodology difficult. Indeed, it could very well be that there 
is not yet enough data available to measure the causal impact of ICTs on mass atrocities response. 
Nathaniel Raymond and Kristin Bergtora Sandvik’s contribution to this collection focuses instead 
on establishing ethical norms for engaging in the scientific process of using population-generated 
data to better understand the impact of ICTs on localization outreach as well as developing new 
tools and methods for data gathering.3 Theirs is a concern pertaining to risk consciousness as ethical 
1 Matthew Levinger, “Geographical Information Systems Technology as a Tool for Genocide Prevention: The Case of 
Darfur,” Space and Polity 13, no. 1 (2009), 69-76.
2 Colette Mazzucelli and Anna Visvizi, “Querying the Ethics of Data Collection as a Community of Research and Practice 
The Movement toward the ‘Liberalism of Fear’ to Protect the Vulnerable,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An 
International Journal 11, no. 1 (2017), 2-8.
3 Nathaniel Raymond and Kristin Bergtora Sandvik, “Beyond the Protective Effect: Towards a Theory of Harm 
for Information Communication Technologies in Mass Atrocity Response,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An 
International Journal 11, no. 1 (2017), 9-24.
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practice, which informs the articles in the Special Issue. The meta level argument is practically 
grounded in Karen Naimer, Widney Brown and Ranit Mishori’s article on the MediCapt mobile 
phone application, which is used for gathering forensic evidence of sexual violence in conflict-
affected contexts, namely, the Democratic Republic of Congo, with implications drawn for other 
areas in which Physicians for Human Rights is engaged in the field.4 
The two articles converge in a challenging space: we can build technology applications that 
serve the technical function of data collection, coding, and storage; yet, what are the ethical steps 
and processes necessary to go from data collection to the inherently open process of scientific 
analysis and public peer-review? In 2013, the ICRC released its updated Professional Standards for 
Protection Work, which included specific processes and considerations for effectively and ethically 
gathering and using data collected via ICTs in conflict-affected and humanitarian contexts.5 This 
study represented a start; yet, given the complexity of the digital environment, we need to push 
farther. The methods, tools, and procedures that have guided human subject research for the last 50 
years, while informative, are less well suited for managing the legal, ethical, and technical challenges 
that come with using ICTs in mass atrocities research. Raymond and Sandvik challenge readers to 
think more comprehensively about the ethics of using ICTs in atrocities research, pedagogy, and 
response. In this context, as the field expands, we may have the necessary normative and ethical 
bases to use the ICT-gathered data effectively for research and practice.
While Raymond and Sandvik make a theoretical argument for defining ethics that can feed 
back into the scientific process of understanding ICTs in atrocities response, Christoph Koettl 
focuses on the practical issues of how to use satellite and mobile phone data to gather more 
accurate information about atrocities.6 He outlines a very real challenge for NGO and human rights 
organizations: getting the correct information out to the policy makers and public while limiting 
the risk that an organization will report false information and damage its credibility. His analysis is 
both descriptive, in terms of techniques for using imaging and cellular phone video data to verify 
incidents, as well as instructional in that it explains the steps organizations can take to improve 
their own capacity for using these tools. The article speaks to a broader issue in the innovation for 
public good space: What do organizations that innovate in this space look like? Koettl discusses 
the need for training of staff; yet, for the wider field of atrocities research and response, a larger 
question persists in how organizations build staffs that have the technical know-how to use these 
tools effectively and safely. This builds on work by Martin-Shields which argues that a key aspect 
of effectively using ICTs in humanitarian organizations is training of staff.7 In a world where 
non-technical users have access to open source software, a key way to make sure data is ethically 
captured and analyzed is to build knowledge of best practices among non-technical staff.
Ethics and operations also require technology for gathering and archiving ICTs-gathered data. 
This is a space that has received less coverage in part because of the stove-piped nature of how 
we address mass atrocities. These stove pipes broadly include the research, advocacy, and legal 
fields. They aim to answer interrelated, yet different, questions: why do atrocities happen; what 
are the atrocities that are happening; and how do we prosecute future atrocities? Binding all these 
questions are the processes for gathering new data and then archiving data as evidence so that 
standards required for research, advocacy, and legal validity are met. Jay Aronson discusses the 
legal and informatics issues involved with archiving digital content on atrocities, exploring the 
important yet easily overlooked aspects of how digital archiving alters the underlying information 
4 Karen Naimer, Widney Brown and Ranit Mishori, “MediCapt in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: The Design, 
Development, and Deployment of Mobile Technology to Document Forensic Evidence of Sexual Violence,” Genocide 
Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 11, no. 1 (2017), 25-35.
5 ICRC, “Professional Standards for Protection Work,” accessed January 20, 2017, https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/
other/icrc-002-0999.pdf. 
6 Christoph Koettl, “Sensors Everywhere: Using Satellites and Mobile Phones to Reduce Information Uncertainty in 
Human Rights Crisis Research,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 11, no. 1 (2017), 36-54.
7 Charles P.  Martin-Shields, “The Technologist’s Dilemma: Ethical Challenges of Using Crowdsourcing Technology in 
Conflict and Disaster-Affected Regions,” Georgetown Journal International Affairs 14, no. 2 (2013), 157-163.
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about a video, image or social media post.8 These kinds of informatics issues can prove crucial 
when an organization is trying to determine the location an image came from or establish a chain 
of custody during legal proceedings. In this way, Aronson’s and Naimer, Brown, and Mishori’s 
articles are thematically reflexive. Read in relation to each other, they improve our understanding 
of how to gather information and the issues that will arise when it is time to archive the data for 
later use. 
Providing a bridge between Raymond and Sandvik’s and Naimer, Brown, and Mishori’s articles 
is Stefan Schmitt and Dallas Mazoori’s contribution on the role of DNA technology in identifying 
victims of mass atrocities.9 Schmitt and Mazoori bring a legal approach to discussing and laying 
out the ethical standards that the state and response agencies must meet in order to serve the needs 
of victims and families. This article is compelling from an academic perspective since it lays out 
the complex legal issues around identification and data ownership. As a practitioner, their analysis 
spoke to me because its premise is based on what responders owe victims. Schmitt and Mazoori 
provide a micro-level argument pointing out that DNA data collection must lead to identification 
of the victim both for legal and humanitarian purposes. How does technology, whether it be DNA, 
sensors or satellite imaging, help humanitarians and governments achieve legal ends such as 
repatriation of the dead or the rights of families to know the truth about a victim’s whereabouts? 
These are questions that can be asked at all levels of technology use in atrocities response and 
are best asked before developing a new tool or beginning a new data collection process. At times, 
especially when working with tech and data, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that we are dealing 
with traumatized societies and families; for humanitarians and responders the questions that 
Schmitt and Mazoori raise can help keep the focus on how best to support and provide for victims 
of atrocities and their families as well as their local communities.
What this Special Issue provides for those working in atrocities research and response are 
1) new analyses of what we have learned over the past fifteen years using ICTs in our work as 
well as 2) new analytical and theoretical frameworks for how to continue moving the study of 
mass atrocities forward ethically and effectively in an increasingly digital environment. These 
articles, taken collectively, also demonstrate the inherent challenges with creating a unified stream 
of research in a field, which is, by nature, multidisciplinary. Indeed, what ICTs may be doing is 
easing those of us involved in research, advocacy, and response out of our stovepipes and into 
what is, at the moment, both a challenging discussion and a critical need for pedagogy about how 
to bring the best of our fields together in responding to mass atrocities. ICTs provide the liminal 
space for researchers and activists, for educators and technical experts, to collaborate while the 
shape of this space is still developing. This collection of articles provides multiple reflexive levels 
of theoretical and practical analysis for scholars, advocates, and technologists to learn from – and 
to bond over – as we continue to push for justice, accountability, and a necessary response to the 
ethical imperative of “never again.”
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Since the early 1990s, international interventions have grown in size and complexity. Kurt Mills, 
a Senior Lecturer in International Human Rights at the University of Glasgow and the Director 
of the Glasgow Human Rights Network, brings his wide experience to bear in exploring this 
complexity, paying particular attention to international efforts to respond to mass atrocities. Mills’ 
book International Responses to Mass Atrocities in Africa details the complicated, and contradictory, 
nature of international responses to mass atrocities and explores the fine line that the international 
community must walk when fulfilling its responsibility to protect.
The core concern of this book is to answer the question: How have and should mass atrocities 
be addressed? The book does a good job of addressing the former, specifically; it explains the 
successes and failures of responses to past or ongoing mass atrocities and the challenges that 
arose in each instance. In doing so, this book provides interesting insights into the crucible in 
which the concepts of protection of civilians and responsibility to protect were forged. However, 
when addressing how the international community should respond to mass atrocities, the author 
provides few answers.
To craft his argument Mills assesses four case studies (Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Uganda, and Sudan) using a matrix of three main types of international responses: 
protection, prosecution and palliation, which he calls R2P³. We start with the belated and 
incomplete response to the Rwandan genocide as the book discusses the downside of humanitarian 
interventions. Mills makes a strong argument that the botched international response to Rwanda’s 
genocide sets the stage for the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, covered in his next 
chapter. Here, Mills’ case study details the difficult dynamics between civilian and military actors 
striving to find a coherent approach to protection and where the international community begins 
to assess the emerging idea of protection of civilians. This case highlights the disconnect between 
the normative promise of protection with realities on the ground. The Ugandan Case illuminated 
the important, and problematic, role of the fledgling International Criminal Court in responding 
to atrocities. Finally, the crisis in Darfur is cast as the first real test of the nascent responsibility to 
protect and illustrates the challenges of sovereignty as an obstacle to preventing mass atrocities 
and the international community’s struggle to articulate what taking responsibility would actually 
look like.
Mills’ R2P³ typology allows the reader to see each case from three interacting, and often 
conflicting, perspectives: the military perspective of peace operations (protection), legal perspective 
of the International Criminal Court (prosecution) and the humanitarian perspective (palliation). 
This approach provides a more holistic view of each intervention than those available from works 
focusing on just one or even two of these aspects. These multiple perspectives also provide the two 
major takeaways from the book. First, even taken individually, there are moral ambiguities around 
any type of intervention. Second, when international interventions include two or more types of 
intervention there are political, practical, and normative trade offs that must occur; trade offs that 
might ultimately make the conflict last longer than if there had been no intervention at all.
Mills argues that moral ambiguities exist whenever the international community applies any 
one of the tools of his R2P³ framework. In almost every case he is successful in showing how, 
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on one hand, each intervention provides aid in ways specific to the organization’s key goals, i.e. 
providing shelter, disarming militants, etc. On the other hand, interventions also make atrocity 
situations worse, for example, the shelter provided by humanitarians also provides lodging for 
rebels. These dilemmas are well demonstrated in the case studies provided in the book. In Rwanda 
(Chapter 2) humanitarian efforts to help those fleeing the genocide also allowed the génocidaires 
time to establish a firm grip on power in refugee camps, giving them a base for future attacks. In 
Uganda (Chapter 4) the Ugandan government used the ICC to legitimize military action against 
the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) while at the same time downplaying its own culpability for the 
atrocities. Though the moral ambiguities of international interventions are well known to those 
who study them, Mills adds value by placing three different types of interventions side by side to 
show that the ambiguities inherent in an intervention are an issue, not just for the particular type 
of intervention, but for all types of interventions attempting to address the mass atrocity.
Mills’ main contribution comes when he connects the different types of interventions to each 
other. As Mills shows, when humanitarian, military and legal responses are combined, there are 
large political, practical and normative trade offs that must occur. At the core of this issue is the 
fact that each type of intervention has its own goals, Mills demonstrates that these end goals, while 
they overlap, may not align. In fact, when they are combined they may actually extend or foster 
conflict. Though these trade offs occur in every case study Mills provides, the intervention in Darfur 
(Chapter 5) is particularly telling. In Darfur, every aspect of R2P³ was in play to disastrous effect. 
The initial humanitarian intervention allowed the international community to put off deploying a 
military force to provide protection to civilians in conflict. When a force was deployed, it slowed 
the rate of killing but was unable to stop it. However, when the ICC issued an arrest warrant 
for Sudanese President Bashir, there was a backlash against both humanitarian and peacekeeping 
interventions, making their work that much harder. Each type of intervention at best hindered, 
and at worst endangered, the work of other actors. Beyond this, Mills argues that not only must 
interveners negotiate amongst themselves, but the very presence of one type of intervention may 
facilitate or prevent the application of another type of intervention. For example, the humanitarian 
interventions in Uganda and Darfur allowed the international community to initially avoid 
deploying forces to protect civilians addressing difficult political and security issues.
This book does a good job of problematizing the current tools in the human rights and 
humanitarian toolbox when it comes to responding to atrocities. It demonstrates not just how 
these tools are underused, but also that even when they are used they may undermine each other. 
Mills does a good job of pointing out where additional thought is needed in how the international 
community coordinates and configures responses to mass atrocities. However, there are two areas 
where this book falls short of its potential. 
First, Mills’ R2P³ framework is based upon an uneven interpretation of the original tenets of 
the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The concept of the responsibility to protect, as enshrined in the 
2005 UN Summit Outcome document, has three distinct pillars arranged in order of preference. 
The first pillar places responsibility for protection of a population with each individual state, the 
second calls for the international community to assist the state in providing that protection and the 
third, the first two having failed, states that the international community has a responsibility to take 
collective action to protect populations at risk. Collective action covers the gamut from dialogue to 
sanctions to military interventions. This conception of R2P clearly shows that military intervention 
is the last resort when addressing mass atrocities. However, in the R2P³ framework promoted by 
Mills in this book, protection is overwhelmingly understood as military intervention. The first two 
pillars of R2P and many of the tools provided in pillar three are given only cursory consideration. 
This means that the entire spectrum of protection from targeted development to capacity building 
to sanctions is not considered. This produces a very lopsided and, arguably incorrect, conception of 
what protection means. There continues to be a significant amount of debate at the United Nations 
as to the meaning and use of the responsibility to protect. However, one of the few things that is 
generally agreed on is that the responsibility for protection first and foremost lies with the state 
and any outside efforts, particularly those that involve interventions, are a distant last.
Second, Mills’ final chapter poses and attempts to answer three overarching questions that 
arise at the intersections of protection, prevention and palliation. One, do labels such as war 
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crimes and genocide matter? Second, have international norms around human rights outstripped 
our ability to implement them and should states recognize limits to their responsibilities? And 
third, what is the cause for failed or delayed international responses to atrocity crimes? Is it 
the international bureaucracy or lack of political will? While these are important questions that 
deserve answers, they are not particularly new. Here, Mills misses an opportunity to draw on the 
insights provided by his R2P³ framework to help answer these old questions or to pose new ones 
based on the dilemmas unearthed by this more holistic assessment on international responses to 
mass atrocities. The chapter closes with the unsurprising conclusion that, while there have been 
significant developments in the way the international community conceives of human rights and 
humanitarian norms, how they respond to violations of these norms, either with efforts to protect 
civilians, prosecute the worst offenders or relieve the suffering of those most effected, still lags far 
behind the ideal.
This book is accessible for lay audience. Mills takes pains to provide definitions and the history 
of key elements in the book such as the evolution of humanitarian intervention, the ICC and the 
Responsibility to Protect. He also provides an adequate, if somewhat simplified, background on 
each of the case studies. It would also be of interest to those interested in moral and ethical issues 
in humanitarian intervention and the evolution and impact of the ICC.
Zimmerman
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Books on the Nuremberg trials are many, and Kim Priemel’s The Betrayal is one of the most 
ambitious. What makes Priemel’s study stand out is the scope of research, the breadth of analysis, 
and a well-defined thesis. What Priemel attempts in a single monograph is quite impressive. He 
assesses judicial proceedings of fifteen interrelated trials between 1945 and 1949 involving a total 
of 205 defendants. The transcript of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) alone 
takes up 16,793 pages, plus the 4,600 prosecution exhibits. The subsequent twelve trials (NMT) left 
as significant a paper trail: 135,000 pages of transcript and more than 185,000 pages of trial evidence. 
Not to stop at trial proceedings, numerous memoirs, and scholarly publications, Priemel has done 
research in forty-four (!) different archives and research libraries for his book. What scholars and 
college students would probably appreciate most about Priemel’s study is his ability to weave all 
the tribunals into a single, uninterrupted narrative. 
The four countries occupying the prosecution stand—the United States, the Soviet Union, 
the United Kingdom, and France—arrived at IMT with different legal backgrounds and political 
agendas. That alone makes it fairly difficult construing a single overarching thesis, which would 
also cover the subsequent trials. Priemel believes he succeeded at that by developing a discourse 
on German divergence. According to Priemel, the Allies essentially determined that Germany 
as a nation was redeemable. This notion comes from a broader intellectual discussion whether 
Germany belongs to Western Civilization or not. A majority of scholars—many of them refugees 
from Nazi Germany in the United States—answered this question in the affirmative. Consequently, 
the prosecution built its case on the premise that the defendants betrayed the best interests of the 
German nation by veering off the Western liberal tradition. 
The thesis in itself is convincing, insofar as it projects the American perspective on the trials. 
This caveat exposes a structural crack in Priemel’s argumentation. Priemel argues against the 
notion that the Nuremberg was essentially an American project—the case typically made by the 
defense council. Yet the facts that Priemel cites undermine his conclusion. As he writes on page 
71, “between the four Allies, the US were now firmly in the driver’s seat,” and again on page 222, 
“the NMT functioned very much like American courts.” The US delegation at the IMT was nearly 
as large as the other three combined and many a legal innovation were American. Major figures in 
the Nazi German leadership were in US and British custody. The Americans toyed with the idea of 
staging a trial all by themselves, but eventually opted for an international tribunal in the spirit of 
wartime cooperation. By the same token, with the Cold War in full swing, the United States made 
a conscious decision to carry out the subsequent trials singlehandedly.        
The Soviets, as Priemel attests, had a threefold agenda at IMT: to condemn Hitler’s regime, 
to extract reparations, and to conceal their own unsavory deeds such as the Secret Protocol to 
the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The Soviets were not the only one whose reading of German 
history differed from that of the Americans. The French, too, appeared to be primarily interested 
in checking the German aggression once and for all. In effect, these two delegations made a cause 
for Germany’s foretold derogation rather than divergence The British, for their part, though not in 
opposition to the American baseline, were preoccupied with the legal aspect of the IMT. The four 
opening statements were complimentary, except in those parts that contradicted each other. 
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There are a few other discursive threads in Priemel’s book one may take issue with. Priemel 
construes the Nuremberg trials as a quintessential example of transitional justice, from dictatorship 
to democracy and from the Nazi war of extermination into the Cold War. There is an unintentional 
element of circular logic in Priemel designating it as transitional proceedings first and then arguing 
that in this very capacity the Nuremberg served as both the subject and object of history-making. 
A larger issue that the Nuremberg trials had bequeathed us is whether history didactics belong in 
a court of law. Priemel’s unequivocal yes represents one side in an ongoing debate.                             
The few problems with Priemel’s interpretation put aside, The Betrayal is a remarkable work 
of scholarship. Priemel delivers on his promise to produce a truly comprehensive history of 
Nuremberg. Despite the ideological divide, the four delegations tacitly agreed that prosecution 
of major Nazi war criminals should entail a rehabilitative element, yet all defendants should be 
convicted in the end. On certain issues, such as linking slave labor to the Nazi war of aggression, 
the Soviets and the Americans saw eye to eye. When it comes to the Nazi mass murder of the Jews, 
the Soviet exposé proved to be the most detailed. The gruesome atrocities perpetrated by some of 
the defendants did not match up to their physical appearance, though. Legal teams and the general 
public alike were disappointed to see in the dock non-descript individuals rather than proud Aryans 
they claimed to be. The defense council did not try to negate the crimes committed by their clients, 
using such strategies as evoking non-retroactivity and superior orders. Another popular tactic was 
shifting blame onto the deceased Nazi leaders. Thus, Hitler’s name was mentioned some 12,000 
times during the IMT. At the end of the day, the defense lawyers were more or less satisfied with 
the verdict. The double concept of conspiracy and aggressive war, central to the American approach, 
obviously did not work very well. Despite this and other shortcoming, the IMT was nevertheless a 
success. Priemel believes the prosecution made a convincing case, whereas the judges’ backstage 
compromises never became public knowledge. Most crucial, the IMT made it virtually impossible 
for ordinary Germans to claim ignorance of the mass crimes committed in their name.
None of the Allies showed much enthusiasm for a second IMT. The US military weighed 
in on the internal debate, expressing a preference for war crimes trials in the American zone of 
occupation. By the time the IMT pronounced its verdict on October 1, 1946, working together 
with the Soviets was no longer in the cards. The newly appointed chief prosecutor Telford Taylor 
identified several categories of defendants, specifically within the industrial circles, the SS, the 
police, and the military. While the focus of the subsequent trials was narrowed down, Priemel 
argues that their overarching objective became more ambitious, namely to explain the workings of 
the Nazi regime. Some of the trials never got off the ground due to lack of proof, interest, and/or 
star defendants, for example the destruction of Warsaw or the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA). 
Among those trials that did take place, Taylor and his staff prioritized IG Farben, Krupp, Ministries, 
and High Command. As the medical experiments on humans made for a strong impact in the IMT, 
Taylor decided to start off with the so-called Doctors’ case. The Medical Case promised to be an 
easy and quick trial with convictions all assured. When it comes to the professed goal of making 
the historical record straight, the didactical value inbuilt in this and other trials did not serve the 
purpose. To give just one example, the emphasis put on medical experiments downplayed the 
significance of the Nazi euthanasia program. As Priemel speculates, it had to do in part with the 
delicate issue of international eugenics—accepted as science during the interwar period, also in 
America—versus German racial hygiene. What the prosecution sought was metaphor, linking 
the men in the dock to the Nazi regime via their professional affiliations, thus underlining the 
German divergence thesis. The Cold War punched further holes in the historical master narrative, 
as illustrated most potently by the High Command trial. The October 1948 verdict occurred in the 
midst of the Berlin blockade and preceded the establishment of West Germany by seven months. 
By that time, it was already the Soviets who gained the status of a chief villain.                   
From the perspective of Holocaust studies, one of the most important cases was that of the 
Einsatzgruppen. Counterintuitively, Justice Robert Jackson did not make the SS case a centerpiece 
of the IMT. Priemel explains that, ironically, it did not fit well into the historical narrative Jackson 
was building. So overwhelming was the evidence of mass murder in the shape of notorious 
Einsatzgruppen reports that it nearly seemed lacking in complexity and storyline. Neither did 
Case 9 contribute much to the legal analysis of genocide. By making a case for pathology of 
Weiss-Wendt
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the SS leadership, the prosecution engaged in oversimplification. Furthermore, it unwittingly 
marginalized other Reich agencies. The closer the defendant might be tied up to Himmler’s SS, the 
more likely was a death penalty (in many cases subsequently commuted to life imprisonment and 
eventually early release). Priemel concludes that, on balance, the SS defendants fared worse than 
others in the NMT, yet better than expected at the outset of the trials.        
The evidence of Nazi criminality that emerged from the Nuremberg has long been superseded. 
There is no doubt, however, that Germany’s path after 1945 might have been different without it. I 
fully share in Priemel’s conclusion that no story of political reconstruction of Germany is possible 
without a reference to the Nuremberg precedent. The Betrayal is a superbly researched and argued 
book on its way to becoming a standard work.
Book Review: The Betrayal
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Genocide occurs with disturbing frequency. A large body of research from scholars writing 
in a variety of disciplines seeks to explain why genocides happen. This scholarship has identified 
factors associated with genocide—such as armed conflict, autocratic governments, ethnic divisions, 
and a low level of trade openness—and has led to the development of advanced statistical models 
to forecast genocide. Scholars and practitioners pay close attention to the possibility for genocide 
when new armed conflicts emerge or instability breaks out around elections or other contentious 
events.
Yet, while genocide is distressingly common, it is relatively rare when compared to the factors 
identified as associated with it. Many countries are autocratic, ethnically divided, and experience 
armed conflicts without genocide occurring. Forecasting models do a reasonable job of predicting 
occurrences of genocide but generate many false positives, in which the likelihood of genocide 
is seen as high but it does not happen. While the scholarship on genocide has made significant 
advances, it has been limited because it has tended to focus on cases of genocide without making 
comparisons to similar cases where genocide was plausible but did not occur.
In this excellent book, Scott Strauss sets out to advance the literature on genocide by theoretically 
and empirically treating it in a comparative context. Theoretically he does so by both analyzing the 
factors that encourage actors to contemplate genocide as well as the factors that encourage restraint 
when there is a real possibility of engaging in genocide. Empirically, Strauss conducts detailed case 
studies in which he compares cases of genocide to others where he argues genocide was possible, 
but did not happen.
Strauss’s argument focuses on national elites, because he argues that genocide almost always 
requires elite coordination and, while local leader and individual participation is important, in 
the absence of leadership by national elites it is very unlikely. He argues that genocide is a type 
of political violence with a fundamentally different agenda than other kinds such as insurgency, 
terrorism, riots, or counter-insurgency because it is designed to eliminate a perceived enemy, rather 
than to change the behavior of that actor. As such, Strauss argues that elites will only contemplate 
genocide when they believe they face a grave and immediate threat.
The focus on threat is not new, in fact, it is one of the main arguments in the existing literature. 
However, Strauss views threat by itself as an insufficient explanation, as elites have multiple options 
for responding to grave and immediate threats and because these types of threats to leaders are 
much more common than genocide. Strauss argues that leaders, in the face of grave and immediate 
threats, will only choose genocide if preexisting ideological frameworks—which he refers to as 
“founding narratives”—view the primary political community (such as a specific ethnic group) as 
a sub-set of the overall population of the state and see a specific group of people as representing 
the threat to that primary community. It is thus the combination of the strategic environment 
(armed conflict which represents a significant threat) with ideology that determines when 
genocide occurs.
Strauss examines and develops this argument through five cases, two in which genocide and 
mass killing occurred (Rwanda and Darfur) and three that had similar circumstances as those two 
but where genocide did not occur (Cote D’Ivoire, Senegal, and Mali). All five cases are in Africa, 
©2017     Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, no. 1 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.1
111
which allows him to hold constant a number of other factors that could influence genocide and also 
to examine the role of founding narratives in states that are relatively young.
Strauss’s argument is most clearly supported in the case of Rwanda, which is also the case 
he has researched in the most depth. In Rwanda, there was a clear military threat, as the rebel 
Rwandan Patriotic Front had the upper hand militarily over the Rwandan army in a civil war at 
the signing of a peace agreement in the summer of 1993. That peace agreement led to a temporary 
suspension of hostilities, but was not fully implemented, and it broke down completely when the 
plane carrying Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana was shot down and he died. There has 
been much controversy over who is responsible for the downing of the plane, Strauss argues (and 
I agree) that it was almost certainly the RPF. To some degree the question is irrelevant, as many 
Rwandan Hutu elites believed the RPF shot down the plane to re-start the war, and the RPF did 
in fact return to the battlefield very quickly. Massacres of Hutu opposition politicians and Tutsi 
civilians began hours after the plane crashed, and over the next 100 days around 75% of the Tutsi 
resident population was killed.
All of these details are well known, and the typical story of the Rwandan genocide is that 
Habyarimana’s plane being shot down allowed Hutu hard-liners in the Rwandan military to begin 
a genocide they had been planning for months. However, Strauss demonstrates convincingly, 
drawing on years of research by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda as well as his own 
extensive field research, that the initial response to the resumption of the war was more focused 
on countering the RPF threat directly, and that the plan to wipe out the Rwandan Tutsi population 
developed in the days that followed. Genocide was enabled by the founding narrative that Rwanda 
was a state for the Hutu that had come into existence by both defeating the European colonizers 
and Tutsi-led monarchy and feudalism. This narrative allowed for overcoming forces for restraint 
at the individual, local, and national level and combined with the grave and imminent threat of the 
RPF (who did, three months later, win the war) to allow the slaughter of 500,000-800,000 Rwandan 
Tutsi.
The case of Darfur is an interesting one for Strauss. It has similar elements to Rwanda, in 
that the founding narrative of Arab-Islamic nationalism excluded a large element of Sudan’s 
population. However, the Darfuri conflict had a key difference—while the RPF was a very real 
military threat to the Rwandan government, the Darfuri rebels never posed a direct military threat 
to the government in Khartoum. However, the fractious nature of politics in Sudan and the history 
of armed conflict meant that the government saw any threat to the Arab-Islamic identity of the 
state as grave and responded very harshly to it. In doing so, it worked with groups on the ground 
in Darfur who saw the rebels as a very real direct threat to their interests.
The three “negative” cases all share similarities with Rwanda and/or Darfur, but have key 
differences in the ideology guiding elite decision-making. In Cote D’Ivoire, international actors 
saw genocide as a real possibility, as two civil wars and controversial elections combined with 
the emergence of an explicitly nationalist ideology (“Ivorité”) seemed to set the stage for mass 
categorical violence. Yet, the country avoided genocide, and Strauss argues that this is because 
of several domestic factors, the primary of which was the first President Houphouet’s founding 
narrative emphasizing dialogue and multiethnicity. In Mali, like Darfur, a peripheral insurgency 
was fought between groups divided along a racial cleavage, but again genocide did not occur, 
which Strauss attributes to an elite-led ideological focus on dialogue as the way to resolve political 
disagreements. In Senegal a Christian ethnic minority has fought a long-running secessionist war 
against a majority ethnic group that is primarily Islamic and the conflict is very clearly perceived 
in identity terms. However, a founding narrative of pluralism prevented genocide from occurring 
in Senegal.
The five case studies in this book are very well researched and provide strong support for the 
theoretical argument. The reader of this book learns much about these individual cases, genocide, 
as well as nation-building in African states. I finished the book hungry for more, which is not a 
criticism, but rather a reflection of how stimulating and thought-provoking it is.
In particular, I would be interested in seeing more research in two areas. First, the book here 
is focused on Africa, a concentration which makes sense both for telling a clear story about nation-
building there and from a research design standpoint. Strauss does make reference to other cases 
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outside of Africa, including Guatemala and Nazi Germany. However, it would be interesting to 
see how well the theoretical argument here works to explain cases outside of Africa, particularly 
in countries that are not nearly as new as the states studied here. In many cases, the “founding 
narratives” emphasized here were established at or soon after independence, less than fifty years 
before the events being analyzed and some of the people instrumental in these events were present 
at the formation of these narratives. Looking at states that are outside of Africa could allow for 
analyzing how and when founding narratives shift and the effect that this has on genocide.
The second area is related. I was persuaded by the discussion of the role of founding narratives 
in each of the five cases here. However, I was less clear on how one would identify a founding 
narrative prior to a period of crisis where it is anticipated to have an effect. While I find the 
argument here very helpful in understanding cases that have occurred, I wonder about the utility 
in predicting future genocides. Strauss provides a very helpful appendix focused on identifying 
the risk of genocide, but future research that established more objective indicators of ideological 
narratives that are likely to be related to genocide would be useful.
In summary, Strauss’s book makes a clear theoretical and empirical contribution to scholarly 
understanding of genocide and the process leading up to it. It should be required reading for 
anyone interested in understanding this important topic and should generate substantial additional 
scholarly research. 
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“Je Tue, donc Je Suis! 
I kill, therefore I Am! 
I beat you, Descartes—mine is more powerful. 
You die. I live.”1
Professor Israel Charny is an educator, family therapist, scholar, and clinical psychologist. 
He is among the founders of a discipline that we now call genocide studies. It is with the help 
of these four rhythmic lines—Charny’s own, in fact, a snippet of a longer poem he wrote—that 
he introduces the reader to his latest courageous effort animated by his desire to understand the 
perpetrator of atrocity. The Genocide Contagion is an attempt to grasp why people kill and why 
they imbibe killing as existentially meaningful. “How could they do such a thing?” is Charny’s 
starting point.2 Charny’s goals in undertaking this task are neither lurid nor voyeuristic. Rather, 
they are preventative: he seeks to stymie such a cancer from metastasizing in the first place. Charny 
does not endeavor to understand in order to forgive. His reformulation of Descartes is not one 
of tout comprendre, c’est tout pardonner. His language is open, but his tone remains firm: without 
understanding, there cannot be any deterrence. 
In this regard, then, Charny’s book situates itself within the burgeoning literature of perpetrator 
studies. One decade ago, in my own work situated within the field of international law,3 I grappled 
with the conundrum that, when it comes to genocide and massive discrimination-based crimes 
against humanity, it seems that the violence—however deformed—is the product of those who 
conform to a social norm rather that deviate or depart therefrom. Bystanders and side-standers, 
moreover, also matter, without them, and without the many much more active collaborators, the 
furor of the conflict entrepreneurs would never normalize.  Approaching these questions from his 
discipline of psychology, Charny’s work also approaches genocide as an ecological, social, and 
collective phenomenon. Genocide cannot be unspooled without unfurling the effects of the group 
on the individual. Genocide cannot be meaningfully analyzed without looking at the “psychological 
processes at the core of the human psyche.”4 Again, this is not to excuse or dissipate; this is not to 
submerge the acts of the individual within the murky occlusion of the group. Rather, the purpose 
is to deracinate the etiology of mass atrocity.
In my opinion, the core contribution of Charny’s book is to examine the linkages between 
violence in “everyday life” and violence in extraordinary times. Charny guides his reader through 
the connections between the cruel spouse, the indifferent bureaucrat, the abusive parent, the small-
minded boss, and the narcissistic academic on the one hand, and the functionary of atrocity, on the 
other. By focusing on the harshness of human agency in the everyday, Charny calls in to question 
1 Israel W. Charny, The Genocide Contagion: How We Commit and Confront Holocaust and Genocide (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2016), 20. 
2 Ibid., 23.
3 Mark A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
4 Charny, The Genocide Contagion, 31. 
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the uniqueness of genocide. He reminds us that when we intone “never again” it is because that 
“again” could happen anywhere and, in fact, happens in little bits and pieces in ordinary time in 
the blandest and balmiest of moments. Thwarting hatred in public life begins by purging hatred 
in private life. Charny’s bold fusion of the extraordinary to the everyday, of the massive to the 
mundane, shatters scale in favor of substance, just as it favors cause over effect. Charny’s efforts 
are groundbreaking in coming to terms with the psychology of mass violence. 
Charny’s book achieves three major goals. First, it elucidates why people inflict grievous pain 
upon others, and how the social kinetics of this pain become contagious, like a virus: a spreading, 
thickening stain that gives rise to the book’s title. It is here that the book contributes great heft 
and gravitas to the “new” field of perpetrator studies, championed elsewhere by scholars such as 
Christopher Browning, Vahakn Dadrian, Alex Hinton, Alette Smeulers, and Barbora Holá. Second, 
Charny’s book obliges the reader to question him or herself in the everyday, to assess his or her 
own quotidian lapses and agencies, with a view to interrogate whether the concatenation of daily 
duplicities, “creative deceit,”5 and imposed humiliations could, in turn, gel into a fertile basis for 
extirpation. Charny actualizes these moments of reflective rumination through his deployment 
of a number of exercises (independent study questions) and thought experiments in which he 
invites the readers’ participation. Thirdly, Charny makes it clear that, although genocide is a social 
tragedy contoured by the collective, the elements that fuel genocide are not culturally reductionist – 
these elements, and discomfiting glimmers thereof, can arise anywhere and everywhere. Charny’s 
courageous work on attitudes of Israeli students and soldiers,6 his advocacy for the universal need 
to condemn all genocides, and his exposition of the horrors of denialism(s) ground a book that 
challenges, compels, and convinces all at once.
Charny does not explore all types of perpetrators. One type that slips through his book is the 
victim who victimizes others. Members of the persecuted group may come, largely by coercion 
and survivalism, but also by opportunism to persecute other members. Here is the “grey zone,” of 
which Primo Levi eloquently wrote and of which Tim Blake Nelson made a haunting film of the 
same title in 2001. Nelson’s film portrays Sonderkommando Group XII. This group led a rebellion at 
Auschwitz that destroyed several of the crematoria, yet all the while its’ members eked out more 
months of life and alcohol and unheard of rations in exchange for their services incinerating the 
bodies of the dead who while alive they had led into “delousing.”  Other than a series of trials of 
Kapos and ghetto police held in Israel in the 1950’s and 1960’s, the role of the oppressed in “prisoner 
self-administration” in the Nazi camps has been poorly understood by law. It is Levi, and other 
expositors of the iniquities of Auschwitz, who have addressed the phenomenon of these utterly 
compromised perpetrators. Perhaps psychology has something to contribute as well.
Delivered in lively, accessible, and approachable format, The Genocide Contagion is suitable for 
a broad array of audiences and learners. Charny neither minces words nor overloads (or overlords) 
with agony. His work is neither human rights stenography nor human rights pornography. Charny 
emphasizes the capacity of the human spirit to harm and to recover, to injure and to atone: and, 
all the while, he maintains a cool faith in the power of pedagogy, prevention, and perseverance in 
draining the contagiousness of genocide and ultimately eradicating this blight upon humanity.
5 Ibid., 136. 
6 Set out in the Appendix, pp. 185-197.
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Given that genocide studies is no longer a field in its infancy, it has generated surprisingly 
few overarching introductions to its subject matter.1 This is one reason to welcome Colin Tatz’s and 
Winton Higgins’s new volume, The Magnitude of Genocide, in which the authors seek to produce 
a comprehensive framework for understanding how genocide should be conceptualized and 
explained, illustrated by presentations of a wide range of historical and recent cases. Their project 
is organised into four parts: first, a discussion of the definition of genocide and the evolution of 
its practice from premodern to modern times; second, a lengthy five chapter analysis of “genocide 
at work”—the causal dynamics involved in producing genocide and determining the character 
of particular cases, as well as rescues and interventions; third, an analysis of the contrasting ways 
states behave in the aftermath of genocide; and finally, a consideration of the trends of genocide 
into the future, and the prospects for its prevention.
There is much to commend here. The Magnitude of Genocide is impressive for its historical and 
geographical reach. Whilst “classic cases” such as the Holocaust and Armenian Genocide recur 
with some frequency, Tatz and Higgins make a much more sustained effort than most to bring 
a broader universe of genocides to the reader’s attention. Alongside a plethora of premodern 
cases, the authors give attention to violence in Burundi, Rwanda, Mao’s China, Darfur, the Nuba 
Mountains, Bangladesh, East Timor, Liberia, Cambodia, the Ukrainian Holodomor and the wars 
in Yugoslavia, plus colonial rule in Canada, Australia, German South West Africa, the Congo, and 
Ireland, as well as recent atrocities by Daesh. Tatz and Higgins’ extensive consideration of cases 
perpetrated by Western democracies or their colonies, alongside those of more obviously vicious 
regimes, is particularly welcome, and the general empirical breadth supports the authors’ analysis 
of genocide throughout the book. However, its strongest sections—perhaps reflecting the balance 
of their past work—offer impressive analyses of the contrasting ways groups and organizations 
respond to genocide. Chapter 8 provides an excellent comparative discussion of several cases 
of rescue, resistance, and intervention, contrasting these with cases of inaction, passivity, and 
bystanderism by states and non-state actors. Two lucid chapters follow on “Denialism” and 
“Punishment and Impunity”—the latter (bar a slightly dismissive critique of reconciliation efforts 
in South Africa), provides a particularly informative overview of successes and failures in efforts 
to create an effective punitive regime for genocide.
These are all real strengths, but this is an uneven book with some significant weaknesses. 
For a start, whilst the prologue and opening chapter emphasize that the book “offers neither a 
compendium nor an encyclopaedia of genocide,” Tatz and Higgins are strangely vague on what this 
book does seek to contribute, beyond the very general claim to “present a framework of concepts 
and ideas for a better understanding of the nature and place of genocide in human history.”2 At least 
two more contributions are implied but remain elusive. First, Tatz and Higgins repeatedly express 
1 Two notable exceptions are: Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2010); 
Scott Straus, Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention (Washington D.C.: United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum, 2016).
2 Colin Tatz and Winton Higgins, The Magnitude of Genocide (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2016), 15.
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the hope that their book will help efforts to prevent genocide’s recurrence. Perhaps any book that 
generally helps people understand genocide supports this objective indirectly, but The Magnitude of 
Genocide makes few more concrete contributions to genocide prevention. Its valuable comparative 
analysis of past cases of rescue and intervention is, unfortunately, not used as a basis for any 
detailed prescriptive conclusions. The one section which does consider future prevention, in the 
last few pages of the book’s closing chapter, is esoteric: Tatz and Higgins briefly declare the need 
to wage a conventional ground war against Daesh before, in a section awkwardly titled “Genocide 
studies segues into a civics masterclass,” suggesting that the future prevention of genocide requires 
a restoration of republican civic democracy in the West. This is not an uninteresting idea, but with 
a compressed exegesis in barely four pages it seems to reflect the authors’ desire to digress on the 
problems facing contemporary democratic politics more than a serious examination of genocide 
prevention. Regrettably, there is little consideration of the specific challenges that presently vex 
preventive efforts in practice.
The second elusive project of the book is more puzzling. The prologue and opening chapter 
raise an argument that is, presumably, the source of the book’s title: Tatz and Higgins suggest that “a 
metaphorical rather than literal Richter scale” for the magnitude of genocide should be developed, 
since “genocide studies needs to find common ground on terminology, and yardsticks with which 
to assess degrees and gradations of the crime.”3 This is an interesting albeit controversial claim—
Tatz and Higgins acknowledge the need to avoid a rather gaudy “league table of horror.”4 Strangely, 
however, this argument then seems to disappear from the book until its very last page. Here, Tatz 
and Higgins abruptly state that whilst they “don’t advocate a logarithmic or arithmetical scale of 
immensity and intensity…the resort to even a rough categorization of genocides into genocide 1, 
2, 3 and 4 would help to distinguish between often dissimilar genocides.”5 This is the first time 
such a typology is mentioned and Tatz and Higgins provide no further explanation regarding 
what these different numbers would denote. It is a peculiar and confusing trajectory for the book’s 
eponymous theme. 
More generally, Magnitude of Genocide often leaves its more original and provocative ideas 
undercooked. Early mention is made of Tatz’s concept of the “doctorhood of genocide”—the 
ideologues, professionals, and technocrats who provide the quasi-scientific intellectual backdrop 
to genocidal practices. But this idea is not developed in detail, and whilst it is used to set up a 
descriptive discussion of the professions generally involved in genocides,6 Tatz and Higgins do 
not explain how this significantly advances understanding of why they occur. And whilst their 
associated claim that “too little research has focused on the occupational status of the major actors 
involved”7 may be correct, it is undermined by the authors’ neglect of several recent works which 
do seem to operate in this area (Michael Thad Allen’s The Business of Genocide seems particularly 
notable by its absence). Another interesting suggestion is that the “gestation process” behind 
genocide is better understood as a “sequence of discursive shifts”8 rather than—à la Gregory 
Stanton’s Ten Stages of Genocide—a “model of discrete stages.” Again, however, Tatz and Higgins 
do not explain why a model of discursive shifts is superior, instead spending most of their single 
page discussion simply outlining Stanton’s sequence and their own. There is also no consideration 
of the main problem with schemas of this type—that they imply a singular and linear pathway 
to genocide, when most contemporary scholarship would emphasis dynamic processes and 
equifinality.
Ultimately, The Magnitude of Genocide is weakest in its attempt—largely in Part II—to 
convincingly synthesize causal explanations of genocide. Again, Tatz and Higgins marshal an 
impressive range of explanatory themes from existing scholarship, but these are haphazardly 
3 Ibid., xiii.
4 Ibid., 7.
5 Ibid., 249.
6 Ibid., 114 -122. 
7 Ibid., 114.
8 Ibid., 113.
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connected, and the two most prominent analytical devices deployed are not entirely convincing. 
First, Tatz and Higgins devote chapter 4 in its entirety to “The Race Factor,” suggesting that “race 
and racism are the common denominators in modern genocidal history.”9 Given their very broad 
conception of racism—“all practices that arise from a labelling and stereotyping that inevitably 
carries with it undesirable (and intractable) social characteristics”10—this strong explanatory 
prioritization of race may be defensible, and it is followed by some typically clear and illustrative 
consideration of specific cases. But this chapter is problematically untethered from much leading 
research on race, ethnicity, and mass violence—Tatz and Higgins make no mention of the extensive 
quantitative literature which finds weak correlations between ethnic fractionalization and mass 
atrocities, nor do they get to grips with the paradoxical picture that emerges from studies of the 
identity-mobilization that does occur. Briefly: genocide involves killing along lines of identity, 
yet it is increasingly clear that the identities and associated prejudices involved often appear to be 
weakly internalized by many perpetrators of genocide and their supporting populations. Modern 
scholarship has therefore gained considerable sophistication by studying the conditions under 
which such identities can be politically “activated,” the complicated and interactive way in which 
those identities are constructed and negotiated (including the way they undergo critical changes 
during violence), and the specific and diverse causal mechanisms through which mobilisation 
of identity is actually implicated in practices of killing.11 This is largely absent from Tatz’s and 
Higgins’s analysis of race, which therefore seems theoretically thin and not up to speed with 
contemporary thinking. Indeed, the authors are surprisingly willing to aver explanatory force to 
“ancient hatreds,”12 despite the intense criticism this notion has received from most contemporary 
scholars. 
The second major analytical theme Tatz and Higgins use to account for modern genocides is 
modernity itself. Again, this is familiar terrain for genocide studies, but the core of their argument 
rests on a rendition of liberal modernization theory that seems excessively crude. In the various 
available “routes” states can take to develop, Tatz and Higgins argue, “the liberal-democratic route 
leads to the most thoroughgoing modernization of civil society and the state, and can be achieved 
under relatively humane conditions.”13 By contrast, genocide—at least in Germany—was rooted in 
“the failure of the ‘bourgeois revolutions’ in the German sovereign states [that] blocked this kind of 
benign development and condemned them to the reactionary route into the modern world.”14 Parts 
of this argument are clearly plausible: democracy, a vibrant civil society and other associated liberal 
institutions can function as important restraints on genocide. But this does not mean that “proper” 
modernization can simply be identified with liberalism, and non-liberal orders treated as backward 
or reactionary deviations from history’s proper course. Indeed, such an account of modernization 
generates considerable tensions within Tatz’ and Higgins’ own arguments. If a reactionary path 
to modernity is a precondition of modern genocides, why are liberal states apparently capable 
of committing them (and, certainly, capable of other forms of mass killing)? How can Tatz and 
Higgins claim, within a page of arguing that Germany’s “reactionary modernization” explains 
the preconditions of the Holocaust, that “the German precedent warns us that [processes leading 
to genocide] can overtake any Western country”?15 Or, if this “failed modernization” process is 
unique to the Holocaust, how can the Holocaust be the paradigm case from which we should 
9 Ibid., 51.
10 Ibid., 51.
11 For example: Sarah Davies, “’Us Against Them’: Social Identity in Soviet Russia, 1934-41,” in Stalinism: New Directions, 
ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick (London: Routledge, 2000); Ronald Grigory Suny, “Why We Hate You: The Passions of National 
Identity and Ethnic Violence,” Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series (2004); Michael 
Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005); 
Siniša Malešević, Identity as ideology: understanding ethnicity and nationalism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); 
Scott Straus, Making and Unmaking Nations: War, Leadership and Genocide in Modern Africa (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2015).
12 For example: Tatz and Higgins, The Magnitude of Genocide, 5, 84, 91, 99, 111.
13 Ibid., 71. 
14 Ibid., 72. 
15 Ibid., 74.
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develop generalizable theories of genocide?16 To maintain the picture of a dysfunctional proto-
modern German state, Tatz and Higgins are also led to some implausible empirical claims, such 
as the assertion that in World War I and II, Germany started two wars it was “bound to lose” and 
was dragged to defeat by an inevitable “Montesquieuian logic.” This hardly matches most military 
histories of either conflict. Not all Tatz’ and Higgins’ observations on modernization are so awry, 
but the overall theoretical synthesis seems dubious.
This all imposes limits on how convincing Magnitude of Genocide is as an explanatory 
framework for the causes of genocide. Its’ most intriguing ideas need development, its empirical 
breadth matched by greater depth, and a broader range of major recent scholarship bearing on 
causal questions better integrated. These flaws, however, are not fatal to the book’s value. Several 
sections will be appreciated by students and scholars for their elegant introductions to the many 
elements of the historical record of genocide. Tatz and Higgins valuably clarify the contrasting 
ways states respond to genocide. And their volume sets high standards in its accessibility, the 
scope of its comparative analysis, and its balanced consideration of the history of genocide that 
future work would do well to emulate.
16 Ibid., 70. 
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At a time when the plight of the Rohingyas—a Muslim confessional group living in the Rakhine 
province of western Myanmar—are receiving increasing international attention, Azeem Ibrahim’s 
new book is a timely intervention. The book’s core message is plain and clear: Myanmar currently 
stands on the edge of genocide and without decisive action by the international community, 
the long-standing persecution, discrimination and violence the Rohingyas have suffered 
since Myanmar’s independence in 1948 will escalate into full-scale genocide. The situation the 
Rohingyas have faced, and which they continue to confront, needs to be appreciated as a text-book 
case of pre-genocide, Ibrahim forcefully asserts. For almost seventy years, the Rohingyas have 
faced systematic oppression and persecution, which has been both orchestrated and facilitated 
by Myanmar’s military regime: they have been denied legal citizenship and are therefore stateless 
in their own country; their economic livelihood has been dismantled through economic boycotts; 
their participation in electoral processes has been restricted; mosques in their local communities 
have been destroyed; restrictions have been placed on their ability to marry and to have children; 
their access to health and education has been curtailed; and there are regular attacks, massacres 
and acts of violence being committed against them. 
Demonstrating how and why the situation faced by the Rohingyas merits the charge of genocide 
is, moreover, accompanied by a further objective, namely, to challenge conventional narratives that 
currently pervade contemporary political assessments of Myanmar. In doing so, Ibrahim presents 
a critical reassessment of commonly-accepted claims about Myanmar. Firstly, far from being a 
closed country that is internationally isolated, the military regime has consciously and consistently 
maintained external links with the rest of the international community. Secondly, the global praise 
Aung San Suu Kyi—the leader of the country’s main opposition party, the National League for 
Democracy (NLD)—often receives for her long-standing commitment to a democratic future for 
Myanmar often obscures the fact that her domestic political support, as well as that of her party, 
comes almost entirely from the ethnically Burman community, who are mainly Buddhists. Like the 
military regime, therefore, the NLD has, and continues to have, a difficult relationship with non-
Buddhist ethnic minorities in Myanmar. Finally, instances of inter-communal violence in Myanmar 
are not simply a predictable side-effect of the country’s difficult transition from authoritarian 
military rule to democracy. Rather, Buddhism has played an instrumental role in facilitating inter-
communal violence in Myanmar, particularly because it has been consciously employed by the 
military regime, as well as religious actors like Buddhist monks, to construct a nationalist discourse 
that is essentially exclusivist in character. 
A greater appreciation of these political dynamics, Ibrahim argues, is central towards 
understanding how and why the Rohingyas have been the target of continued persecution and 
violence, as well as why there has been a conspicuous absence of domestic and international 
action aimed at reversing this state of affairs. While it is conventional to view Myanmar as an 
isolated state governed by military rulers who are deeply suspicious of external powers, Ibrahim 
pertinently demonstrates how this fear has co-existed with an economic imperative to maintain 
international trade links, as well as calculated decisions concerning Myanmar’s approach to 
international relations. On the one hand, the military regime is cognisant that foreign investment 
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from regional powers such as China, India, South Korea and Australia—particularly in the spheres 
of telecommunications, oil, gas and real estate—presents it with significant economic and political 
dividends. Given the military’s control over the Myanmar’s economy, it is unsurprising that the 
regime personally profits from greater trade and investment links. However, these economic gains 
also brings significant political benefits for the military regime. Keen to safeguard their commercial 
interests in a country that presents them economic opportunities to exploit, regional powers 
presently investing in Myanmar are reluctant to either criticize the military regime for its treatment 
of the Rohingyas or to intervene in the matter directly. 
On the other hand, the military regime has consciously made strategic foreign policy decisions, 
which additionally serves to shield its domestic policies, especially those in connection with the 
Rohingyas, from international pressure and scrutiny. Here, Ibrahim argues a calculated decision to 
make North Korea one of its key allies—a relationship that has been marked by the trading of food 
in exchange for advanced weaponry—provides the military regime with an important bargaining 
card vis-à-vis the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). Concern with Myanmar’s 
relationship with North Korea effectively means Western states cannot afford to unnecessarily 
antagonize the military regime, as they fear it could force Myanmar to deepen its existing links 
with North Korea. The US and the EU, therefore, have had to content themselves with the limited 
democratic reforms the military regime has introduced within the country. And indeed, discernible 
political changes within the country—the current openness of its economy, an international-friendly 
opposition leader and freer national elections—have largely fed into the prevailing narrative that 
Myanmar is progressively moving, slowly but surely, towards democracy. According to Ibrahim, 
however, this has meant that the situation facing the Rohingyas has been dismissed as an inevitable 
bump along Myanmar’s road to democracy, rather than being seen as an urgent matter that merits 
greater international attention.
Domestic political dynamics also fundamentally conspire against the Rohingyas, Ibrahim 
contends. Although Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD opposition party are electorally popular, they 
are not, contrary to popular belief, a mass party with either widespread or entrenched political 
support amongst Myanmar’s diverse ethnic groups. Rather, its electoral base comes primarily 
from the Burman ethnic community, who are mostly Buddhists. In order to maintain a political 
connection with the Burmese electorate, therefore, the NLD is fundamentally reliant upon Buddhist 
monks and consequently, it has formed alliances with organized Buddhist monks. Worryingly, 
this has included political dealings with the 969 Movement—a grouping of extremist, anti-Islamist 
Buddhist monks who have been instrumental in perpetrating and encouraging violence against 
Myanmar’s Muslim communities. Despite its democratic credentials and its status as the country’s 
opposition, therefore, the NLD has found it politically convenient to remain silent on the question 
of the Rohingyas and anti-Muslim violence. And indeed, Aung San Suu Kyi herself, Ibrahim notes, 
has frequently avoided direct comment when the question of the systematic persecution of the 
Rohingyas is raised. Popular connotations of Buddhism as a benign and peaceful religion—which, 
in turn, predominantly centre on images of yoga, meditation and mindfulness—fail to appreciate, 
Ibrahim therefore argues, how Buddhism in Myanmar has had a much more menacing role. In 
particular, the politically explosive way in which religion and politics has become intertwined 
in Myanmar has played a significant role in enabling the legal, political, economic and social 
persecution of the Rohingyas. The fusing of Buddhism and Burmese nationalism has, in Ibrahim’s 
assessment, fundamentally contributed to an exclusivist nationalist discourse that presents Muslims 
and Islam as a fundamental threat, both to Buddhism’s and that state’s continued existence.
This, then, is not a book that simply makes a passionate plea on behalf of an ethnic group whose 
predicament has been domestically and internationally neglected. Rather, it is simultaneously 
a commentary on contemporary politics in Myanmar but crucially, one grounded in a deep 
appreciation of how Myanmar’s colonial and post-independence history has contributed to some of 
the pressing political problems it faces today. The book, therefore, successfully speaks to multiple 
audiences. Historians will find Ibrahim’s account of Myanmar’s history especially interesting, 
particularly because he takes issue with contemporary historians who, like extremist Buddhist 
monks and the military regime, maintain that the Rohingyas were never original inhabitants 
of Burma. It bears mentioning, too, that for those unacquainted with the history and politics of 
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Myanmar, this book is an invaluable resource. In addition, political scientists and lawyers will find 
Ibrahim’s analysis of the legal discrimination effected upon the Rohingyas through exclusionary 
citizenship laws bears relevance to broader politico-legal questions, such as how the legal machinery 
of the state can be utilized to achieve broader political objectives. And from his assessment of 
Myanmar’s foreign policy and its external relations, international relations scholars will be able to 
draw important insights on what still remains an under-explored issue, namely, how a peripheral 
Southeast Asian state still manages to influence the contours of regional and international politics 
from the margins. Finally, Ibrahim’s engagement with the scholarly literature on genocide will be 
of interest to both international lawyers and genocide scholars. Although his comparative analysis 
of the impending genocide of the Rohingyas with past genocides in Armenia, Germany and 
Rwanda is somewhat brief and cursory, it nevertheless invites more research, particularly from the 
perspective of genocide studies, to be conducted in connection with the Rohingyas.
The book concludes with a set of policy prescriptions, which are aimed at reversing the current 
state of domestic and international inaction over the Rohingyas. Cognisant that any solution would 
require action on multiple fronts, Ibrahim finds it crucial to focus efforts on the following: firstly, 
increase the levels of external pressure upon the military regime; refer past instances of mass violence 
to the International Criminal Court (ICC); and finally, intensify pressure on the domestic front. While 
this combination of domestic and international action appears politically constructive, Ibrahim’s 
vision of the way forward raises a great number of questions, all of which are left unexplored in 
the book. For instance, Ibrahim identifies four key external actors – the United Nations (UN), the 
US, China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – as having a role to play in 
increasing political pressure on the military regime for its treatment of the Rohingyas. However, 
exactly what this pressure should entail remains vague and unclear: international condemnation, 
sanctions, suspension of trade links, or outright international intervention? What is equally missing 
in Ibrahim’s analysis is an assessment of the political feasibility, as well as the possible constraints, 
of different international policy options. Indeed, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that these 
four external actors have not acted more forcefully in the past because of a host of complex political 
factors – as opposed to simple inaction and indecision, as Ibrahim suggests.
Turning to his proposal concerning the ICC, Ibrahim rightly points out that Myanmar is not 
a signatory to the Rome Statute and as such, a self-referral to the ICC would not be possible in 
this instance. Nevertheless, Ibrahim is of the view that the ICC should, in fact, commence its own 
investigation into the Rohingyas. This, too, remains a vague suggestion. As international lawyers 
will point out, prosecutions before the ICC require the identification of perpetrators and as such, 
it is unclear who Ibrahim sees as the potential perpetrators that could be brought to account—key 
members of the ruling military regime, Buddhist extremist monks who are members of the 969 
Movement, or a combination of both? Moreover, it remains unclear from Ibrahim’s suggestion how 
the ICC itself can be cajoled into focusing its gaze on Myanmar and the Rohingyas. In particular, 
who has the power, influence and means to persuade the ICC to investigate the question of the 
Rohingyas? 
Despite these questions, Ibrahim’s book forces us to contend with a pressing issue of 
international concern. In doing so, it places the situation faced by the Rohingyas under a glaring 
spotlight, thereby urging us to appreciate and understand it as a political problem, which although 
intrinsically connected to Myanmar’s history and ongoing political developments, that merits 
greater attention in its own right. On balance, therefore, this is an instructive book—not only for 
scholars and students with different disciplinary interests but also, for all of us who believes that the 
question of preventing and punishing genocide amounts to a shared, international responsibility.
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Tomasz Ceran’s work provides a microhistory of the establishment, thirty-three month 
existence, and functioning of one small Nazi camp called Szmalcówka, located in Toruń, northern 
Poland during World War II. In similarity with other camps of the vast Nazi camp network, the 
purpose and role of Szmalcówka changed over the course of its existence contingent on exigencies 
for the Germans at a given time. Established in 1940, the camp was initially described in German 
documents as a Sammellager (transit camp), later as an Umwandererlager (resettlement camp) and 
eventually, before it closed in mid-1943, as an Arbeitserziehungslager (educational work camp). Over 
the course of the German occupation, the initial organized transfer of people through the camp 
gave way to a fixed residency for forced laborers. This was followed by the permanent captivity of 
civilians and, undeniably, a premeditated expectation of the death of Poles, in particular, children 
who remained in the camp from secondary exposure to disease and starvation. Though never 
specified or functioning as a German Vernichtungslager (extermination camp) per se, Szmalcówka 
did serve as a camp in which mass murder through intentional malnutrition, overcrowding, 
inadequate response to sickness, injury, and life threatening disease prevailed. In addition, 
physical abuse and sporadic murder, not systematic execution, were commonplace. As Ceran 
relates, Attorney Małgorzata Wójcik summarized at the end of the last investigation into the camp 
conducted in 2010: 
the behaviour of the authorities of the camp—deliberately and consciously making life as 
difficult as possible for the people in the camp, in numerous ways, leading to the biological 
destruction of this life—bears all the attributes of a crime—the crime of genocide.1 
Szmalcówka was established in December 1940, on the site of the former First National Lard 
Processing and Packing factory at 124/126 Grudziądzka Street, Toruń. The factory buildings had 
been constructed a decade earlier by Szarf Selma, a Polish Jew who fled the Germans in 1939.2 
The factory site was attractive to the Germans because it was situated in close proximity to the 
General Government, especially Warsaw, and it was also located close to Łódź in the Reichsgau 
Wartheland—the newly established German location for the settlement of ethnic Germans. What 
is more, Szmalcówka was located in an industrial area with a railway siding. During the war, 
the railway infrastructure was used to facilitate the deportation of Poles from the surrounding 
region, now redefined in accordance with Nazi racial regulations and policy, to, from, and via the 
newly established camp Szmalcówka. In other words, the camp was established after the initial 
wave of mass killings of the Polish intelligentsia following the German invasion of Poland and, 
1 Tomasz Ceran, The History of a Forgotten German Camp: Nazi Ideology and Genocide in Szmalcówka (London: I.B. Tauris, 
2015), 50. 
2 Ibid., 50. 
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operated to facilitate aggregation, racial screening, segregation, and the dispersal of Poles along 
racial and economic lines. As Ulrich Greifelt, the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of 
German Nationhood, explained in May 1940:
While ‘the removal of persons of alien race from the annexed eastern territories is one of 
the most important aims to be achieved in the German East,’ it is equally imperative ‘to 
regain for the German nation the German blood in these districts, even in cases where the 
person concerned is Polonised in language and religion.’ It is ‘an absolute national-political 
necessity to screen the annexed Eastern territories and, later, the Government General also 
for such persons of Teutonic blood, to make this lost German blood available to our people 
again.’3
Polish civilians from surrounding areas, mainly farmers who were expelled from their 
properties and had their land expropriated, were brought to Szmalcówka. Those deemed to 
exhibit German blood, Volksdeutsche—Germans in terms of people, folk or race, or ethnic Germans 
according to often arbitrary4 Nazi evaluation, would be forced to “re-settle,” predominantly in the 
Reichsgau Wartheland, if not sent to the Reich proper to work. Ethnic Poles on the other hand, viewed 
as subhuman Slavs lacking Germanic blood were to be deported to the General Government or 
held to work. A premature death would come to them, and was intended for them, sooner or later. 
This process of Entpolisierung (Depolonisation) or clearing Poland of racially alien Poles and Jews 
by all means included slave labor and mass murder. Ceran quotes Hans Frank, Nazi Governor 
General of the Occupied Polish Territories in 1942,
The evacuation of Poles, and their destruction or treatment exclusively as manpower is the 
task of our Polish policy….What should be said here is this: all those Poles we’re using for 
work, we keep; while the rest, we eradicate. The great difficulty, however, lies in the fact that 
the extermination of millions of human beings is a project which we are not yet able to deal 
with.5
As an example of arrival and distribution at Szmalcówka, the first two transports of Polish 
families evicted from their properties arrived between 20 and 30 November 1940. This included 
forty-one families from Tczewo, fifty-nine families from Nowe Miastro Lubawskie, twenty-five 
families from Bydgoszcz, 106 families from Toruń, forty-two families from Rypin, twenty-three 
families from Świecie, thirty-eight families of Chełmno, twenty-eight families from Grudziądz, 
seven families from Tuchola, four families from Lipno and three families from Starogard Gdański.6 
Of these 1,358 individuals sent from Szmalcówka to the General Government, 185 were hired by 
the employment office in Toruń, 119, deemed of German blood, were sent to Łódź in the Reichsgau 
Wartheland, as suitable for Germanisation, thirty-two were released (including twelve Soviet 
citizens and two women with children), while twelve Poles remained in the camp.7 Over the course 
of the following two years an average of 1,500 people arrived at the camp per month. Conditions 
were always substandard. At commencement, bales of hay were scattered on the cement around the 
inside of the four halls of the factory to serve as bedding pallets and three army field kitchens were 
installed within the former boiler room. Buckets were used as toilets. These quickly overflowed. It 
took eight months of operation before a washroom was installed. No heating was installed to offset 
frozen Polish winters. Leaking roofs went unrepaired. After the initial period of concerted forays 
into separating out “valuable German blood” in the region had subsided, and as the course of the 
war changed, more people remained incarcerated in Szmalcówka. Eventually transports arrived 
3 As quoted in the Nuremberg Military Tribunals. “The RuSHA Case,” Trials of War Criminals, 15 Vols. (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1950), 4:762f.
4 To be born in Prussia, for example, was often enough to constitute German ethnicity.
5 Ceran, The History of a Forgotten German Camp, 59.
6 Ibid., 60. 
7 Ibid., 61.
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but did not leave. By May 1943, one and a half months before the camp was closed, 2,319 remained 
there, most of them children, too young to work. The above mentioned factors, experienced over 
the course of the life of the camp, resulted in regular overcrowding, infestation with fleas and 
lice, typhus epidemics and death secondary to malnutrition, food poisoning, starvation, illness, 
physical injury or murder. 
Ceran’s book, not overly lengthy at 256 pages, is divided into five chapters with two 
appendices. The first chapter, entitled “An Ideological Crusade,” encompasses Ceran’s theory of 
German motivation for their policy and actions in the East, including Szmalcówka. Although I did 
not necessarily disagree with Ceran’s views in this chapter, I found the chapter wanting. At twenty-
two pages it was too short to adequately unpack the ideas he relates including his own exposition 
of the Nazi worldview with Antisemitism; Imperialism and Social Darwinism; Anti-Slavism and 
Anti-Polishness; and Nationalism and Chauvanism emanating around a central cog of Racism. 
Concepts of modernity, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, the loss of WWI and the persona of Hitler, 
were touched upon very briefly. Scientific racism and eugenic theory informed Hitler’s (and the 
Nazi) worldview well before the 1930s,8 and the organized evaluation, segregation, transport, and 
murder of the disabled—“life unworthy of life” established a logistical roadmap for later wartime 
actions. These details, along with the role of beneficiaries, bystanders, the willing participants, 
accomplices, conspirators, aiders and abettors as enactors of the Nazi worldview as concepts are 
missing from Ceran’s work. But perhaps they should be, as that was not the level at which Ceran 
was focusing in this chapter, nor what a book about Szmalcówka camp was about. That is my point, 
instead of an overly brief chapter on ideology; I would have much preferred here a chapter on the 
history of Toruń and how and why this location was important to the Germans. How did this town 
change over the course of the war and the role of Szmalcówka camp in that change, perhaps in a 
similar vein to the work of Deborah Dwork and Robert J. Van Pelt, Auschwitz, 1270 to the present.9  
Chapters two to five of Ceran’s book describe the underpinning concepts (Depolonisation) 
and process of Nazi Polish policy in the region, as summarized above, and provide a detailed 
description of a number of people incarcerated in the camp as well as conditions within the camp at 
various periods of its existence. Ceran’s work contains a multitude of Tables, Figures, maps and line 
drawings, some completed by the author. Given that no physical remains of the site exist today and 
that no photographic images of the camp have been located in the author’s quite comprehensive 
examination of local archival sources, these drawings proved useful to this reader. Appendix one 
contains ten well-selected documents—two German and seven Polish, in English translation—that 
I found most valuable in rounding out my understanding of Ceran’s prose in various sections of 
his work. 
A central concern for Ceran, and one I agree with is an essential obligation of the historian, is 
accuracy, empathy, and remembrance in historiography. Toward this end, in painstaking fashion, 
Ceran has gathered, compared, and contrasted all previously known names, ages, and causes of 
death of Polish victims who died in the Szmalcówka camp, including one child not listed in any 
formal documentation, but known to the mother who lost her child there. More than a narrative 
history, Ceran’s book therefore, additionally, becomes a Memorbuch or memorial book, based upon 
an updated examination and correction of the historical record and the latest extant documentation. 
Ceran’s tabulation of these details (Table 5.1) constitutes twenty-seven pages or 12 percent of his 
entire work.
Ceran’s book is largely derived from his investigation and analysis of Polish language 
documents especially, that can be found in the various regional and state archives located in 
Bydgoszcz, Gdańsk, Toruń, and Warsaw. His most important sources are the collections of the 
Polish regional commission for the investigation of Nazi crimes in Bydgoszcz, at its branch in Toruń, 
held between 1968 and 1976. As well as the materials collected anew by the branch commission for 
investigation of crimes against the Polish nation in Gdansk, leading the proceedings in Bydgoszcz 
held between 2005 and 2010. These sources are supplemented with survivor memoirs and witness 
8 Edwin Black, War Against the Weak: Eugenics and America’s Campaign to Create a Master Race (New York: Four Walls Eight 
Windows, 2003), 259.
9 Deborah Dwork and Robert Jan Van Pelt, Auschwitz, 1270 to the Present (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996).
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testimony as well as regional histories. I was somewhat puzzled by the omission of the use of 
Bundesarchiv resources, for example SS Officer Records or the NSDAP central card index, that may 
have facilitated Ceran’s profiles of camp Commandants and guard perpetrators based at the camp 
over the course of its existence.
Tomasz Ceran’s book makes a valuable contribution to the history of the treatment of the 
Polish people under Nazi race and resettlement policy during World War II. It is solidly based 
on Polish archival documents yet sensitively conveys the sense of chaos—“hunger, displacement, 
expulsion from home, beatings, executions and forced labour for the Germans”—experienced by 
the Poles of the region and in the camp.10 The work would suit senior students and academics of 
World War II history and genocide studies.
10 Ceran, The History of a Forgotten German Camp, 7.
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Göran Olsson’s Concerning Violence - Nine Scenes From the Anti-Imperialistic Self-Defense (2014) 
is an unusual documentary, which—formally and thematically—probes the complex relationship 
between image, voice and histories. It is Olsson’s second film. The first, The Black Power Mixtape 
1967-1975 (2011), used footage shot by Swedish journalists in the 1960s and 1970s to explore the 
Black Power Movement in the United States. Very much like its predecessor, Concerning Violence 
also relies on images not originally shot by Olsson. Dug out from Swedish archives, the footage of 
the liberation struggles in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, (former) Rhodesia, accompanied 
by other scenes of colonial and early post-colonial life, oppression and exploitation across Africa, 
sets out to illustrate and, in the more brilliant moments of the film, converse with extracts from 
Franz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth (1961).1
Fanon’s well-known treatise (banned in France and the U.S. soon after publication) painfully 
and painstakingly itemizes and deconstructs the different forms of violence and oppression that lie 
at the very heart of the colonial project. It also contemplates the tragedy of violence being the only 
available response to colonization. The merits and shortcoming of Fanon’s text have been amply 
discussed and are of no particular relevance here. It is worth mentioning, however, that the first 
edition of The Wretched of the Earth carried an introduction by Jean-Paul Sartre.
Unusually, some would say perilously, for a film, Concerning Violence also seeks a philosophical, 
academic endorsement at its very beginning. The documentary starts with a 6-minute lecture-like 
introduction (shot very simply and consisting of only four shots) by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. 
Sat in her Princeton University office, surrounded by shelves and piles of books, journals and 
manuscripts, Spivak introduces Fanon and the film. She also mentions Sartre’s preface to the 
original text and admonishes the philosopher for reading the book as “an endorsement of violence 
itself” rather than a contemplation of the impossible position of the colonized who is reduced to 
violence as the only viable response to the colonial project.2 
One of the most basic and important principles of filmmaking is show not tell. An introduction 
that summarizes the film (Spivak at one point actually says: “Here now is our film”) is a bold and 
potentially disastrous move. But it does pay off for Olsson. The archive used in the film can feel 
labyrinthine. It covers diverse geographical, political, cultural and economic locales; often with 
limited guidance and restricted context. This introductory section helps to orientate the viewer; 
provides a useful starting point. The section is didactic but does not feel heavy-handed. Spivak 
does not simply provide the historical and theoretical background. She also challenges Fanon and 
speaks about the often overlooked gendering of both colonial oppression and liberation struggle, 
about how revolutionary activity can emancipate women and then return to their subjugation. 
She singles out the shot of a Mozambican woman whose arm has been amputated as a result of 
Portuguese bombings (Spivak calls her “the black venus”) as the most moving image of the film.
After this introductory section, Concerning Violence is visually comprised exclusively of the 
archive material captured by Swedish journalists. The first image shows a black man shining a shoe 
1 The film takes its title from one of the essays in The Wretched of the Earth.
2 This criticism of Sartre’s interpretation has also been put forward by other scholars, including Homi Bhabha.
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worn by a white foot—the theme of racial, cultural and economic oppression is set out clearly from 
the beginning and comes back many times in the film. It is followed by another mini-section in which 
we see white soldiers in a helicopter, shooting at cattle in an open field. The animals are helpless; 
there is nowhere to hide. The technological advantage of the weaponry of war and the distance from 
which it can be used are completely overwhelming. We then move on to a close ups of the head 
of one of the cows being shot at point blank. Blood streams from the nostrils and the mouth.3
The juxtaposition and metaphor are, perhaps, a little obvious in these opening images. But their 
presence and execution are telling of the peculiar formal nature of Concerning Violence. Working 
exclusively with the archive, Olsson does not have all the tools usually available to a director. He 
cannot decide where to point the camera, what to film, what angle to employ. The images at his 
disposal have not only been shot by someone else (and in fact have multiple authors) but are also 
from a particular era. Here, the process of re-contextualization of the archive inevitably depends 
on editing (shot selection, chronology, structure, duration, pace, rhythm, juxtaposition, contrast) 
and on the audio track that accompanies the images. These directorial interventions, as much as 
the archive itself (so aesthetically seductive and so firmly placed in the past), shape the narrative 
and give meaning to the footage – meaning that is a mixture of the footage’s original designation 
and its re-contextualized existence.
The film is divided into nine sections or chapters. Some retain their original audio (including 
interviews and pieces of narration). Others are accompanied by an eerie soundtrack composed 
especially for Concerning Violence, occasionally reminiscent of the soundscape of another seminal 
compilation documentary: Emile de Antonio’s In the Year of the Pig (1968). But by far the most 
striking sound in the film are the extracts from The Wretched of the Earth read by the American 
rapper, singer and songwriter Ms. Lauryn Hill. Hill’s voice is authoritative, melodic, beautiful. It 
combines conviction, pent-up anger and, towards the end of the film, sounds like a call to action 
rather than mere commentary. The extracts from Fanon, although short, are carefully chosen and, 
most of the time, land very effectively on the archival footage. As well as being spoken by Hill, the 
passages appear in writing on screen.
The potential connection between Fanon’s words and the archival footage in Concerning 
Violence is one of the most fascinating aspects of the film. On the one hand, the words shape the 
footage. They provide it with context (in the sense of the images being able to be placed within and 
used as illustrations of the wider trends of colonial oppression and anti-colonial struggle across 
the continent, as seen by Fanon). They also help to carry the structure of the film in that the choice 
of passages (and the accompanying images) dissects and zooms in on particular aspects of the 
colonial project and the reaction to it. On the other hand, this kind of contextualization inevitably 
remains quite general. Even though places, people, particular liberation movements are often 
named, there is a very strong sense that these unique images are illustrative rather that dialogical, 
discursive vis-à-vis the text.
This could be seen as a mark of passivity of the images in relation to a seminal text that is 
imposed on them (Fanon, after all, was not writing specifically about the places or events shown in 
the film). However, Olsson manages to let the footage breathe in its own right, as well as creating 
the feeling that it is part of a bigger whole, a bigger process. Within the generalized discourse 
of colonial violence and anti-colonial struggle, Olsson is able to create moments of intimacy and 
particularity (some of them very uncomfortable). These moments are ample in the film. To mention 
just a few: an interview with a racist white settler (in section three, entitled “Rhodesia”) who 
admonishes his servant for not opening a beer bottle, bemoans the situation in the country and 
concludes that “The gooks have got it”; the plight of the family of Robert Jackson (an employee 
of Lamco – a Swedish/American mining company in Liberia) who are evicted from their house 
for Jackson’s participation in a strike and left homeless and destitute on the side of the road, in 
the middle of the night (in section five, entitled “Lamco—Liberia, 1966”); the lingering shot of the 
woman with her arm amputated, breastfeeding a baby who lost a let in the same attack by the 
Portuguese (in section eight, entitled “The Fiat G.91, with the FRELIMO in Mozambique 1972”).
3 This image is reminiscent of the slaughtered cow in Sergei Eisenstein’s Strike (1925)
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Even though many of the protagonists of these images remain unnamed and, arguably, 
illustrative, the potentially abstract and general points about the complexity of co-habitation of the 
colonized and the colonizers, about the economic face of colonial and post-colonial violence, about 
the sacrifices of the anti-imperial struggle become somehow more urgent, more real as a result of 
the editorial choices made by Olsson.
This sense of urgency is another important marker of Concerning Violence. There is a risk in 
making a film so firmly based in the past—consisting entirely of archival footage and structured 
with the help of a text published in the 1960s. This risk is datedness. One of Olsson’s biggest 
achievements is the fact that Concerning Violence feels so pertinent. It is not a helpless, purely 
illustrative film. Towards the end, the tone and content of the narration turn towards action. 
Hill, in Fanon’s words, warns Africa not to try to emulate Europe but to choose a different path. 
The U.S. is invoked as an example of a former colony that followed the example of the colonizer 
and became an oppressor of others itself. In a similar vein, the latter parts of the film suggest the 
longevity of economic oppression that was born under colonialism (one of the original engines of 
capitalism) and continues to thrive (often challenged but rarely defeated) long after independence 
was achieved. While firmly set in the past the film succeeds in being an urgent comment on the 
present.
Concerning Violence demands effort from the viewer. The unusual formal make up of the 
film and the jigsaw-like co-existence of the images, narration/text and concepts requires a very 
active viewing if it is not to fall into the realm of obscurity or abstraction. It is a viewing mode 
of a particular kind, a viewing that implicates. The presence of implication, the impossibility of 
neutrality, for me, lies at the heart of the film. It feels reductive to describe a good documentary 
as a useful didactic text—it seems to take away from its value as a work of art rather than pure 
document. But such description does not seem pejorative in the case of Concerning Violence—at 
once a highly subjective, poetic text and a useful point of engagement with Fanon and the legacy 
and colonialism more generally.
Title of the Film: Om våld (Concerning Violence – Nine Scenes From the Anti-Imperialistic Self-Defense); 
Director: Göran Olsson; Producers: Tobias Janson, Annika Rogell; Screenplay: Göran Olsson, 
Frantz Fanon (based on his book); Cinematography: Lis Asklund, Bo Bjelfvenstam, and others; Film 
Editors: Michael Aaglund, Dino Jonsäter, Göran Olsson, Sophie Vukovic; Sound Designer: Micke 
Nyström; Country: Sweden, Finland, Denmark, USA; Year of Release: 2014; Production Company: 
Final Cut for Real, Helsinki Filmi Oy, Louverture Films. Duration: 78 minutes.
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